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Linking policing and human rights: a recent invention  
or an enduring legacy?
Simon Bronitt, Melanie O’Brien and Melissa Bull*
The genesis of this special issue of the Australian Journal of Human Rights was an 
international conference on policing and human rights held in Canberra in 2013.1 The 
theme of the three-day conference, hosted by the Australian Research Council Centre 
of Excellence in Policing and Security (CEPS), was hardly original. Fifty years earlier, 
at the same hotel venue (the Rex Hotel, Canberra), the Commonwealth of Australia 
hosted the United Nations Seminar on the Role of Police in the Protection of Human 
Rights (1963). That seminar, like the 2013 conference and this special issue, provided 
a forum to reflect upon the vital role that policing plays in upholding human rights. 
This issue provides a showcase of the contemporary challenges, locally and globally, 
in policing and human rights. It also demonstrates how the discourses have changed 
in 50 years: the voices of the oppressed are heard more clearly, and the range of 
disciplines engaged in this debate has expanded from law to include psychology, 
ethics, criminology and sociology. 
Professor David Hambly, one of the guests of honour at the 2013 event, was the 
only person whom we could ascertain had in fact attended the 1963 seminar. At the 
time, he was a fledgling legal academic. In the speech delivered at the conference 
dinner, Professor Hambly recalled the atmosphere of the UN seminar, reflecting on 
the prevailing political climate of the 1960s that stretched out from the United States 
and Europe to a sleepy, conservative and rather sparsely populated Canberra. It was 
apparent to some of the attendees that, in the words of Bob Dylan, ‘The Times They 
Are A-Changin’ ’. At the 1963 seminar, the ‘elephant in the room’ as Professor Hambly 
* Simon Bronitt, Deputy Dean (Research), Deputy Head of School and Professor, TC Beirne School of Law, 
University of Queensland. Email: s.bronitt@law.uq.edu.au.
 Melanie O’Brien, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, TC Beirne School of Law, University of Queensland. 
Email: m.obrien@law.uq.edu.au.
 Melissa Bull, Associate Professor, School of Criminal Justice and Criminology, Griffith University. Email: 
m.bull@griffith.edu.au.
1 Human Rights and Policing Conference, an international conference commemorating the 50th 
anniversary of the UN Seminar on the Role of Police in the Protection of Human Rights, Canberra 1963, 
hosted by the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Canberra, 
16–18 April 2013. The Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security 
(SR0700002) (2007–14) was established to boost policing and security research capacity in Australia amid 
the growing complexity and internationalisation of transnational crime in the post-9/11 environment. 
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termed it — the abuse of Aboriginal people at the hands of the criminal justice 
system — was exposed in dramatic fashion, not by the official delegates, academics, 
lawyers or judges, but through the powerful words of a civil society and social 
justice activist, Shirley Andrews. Miss Andrews’s attendance was as an observer, 
representing the UK-based Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights. 
Her brief but effective intervention in the seminar highlighted police discrimination 
against Aborigines and provoked a visceral reaction from the senior police officials 
present. Fittingly, the first contribution to this special issue is an edited version of 
Professor Hambly’s speech, which we include not only for its eloquence and the 
important historical preservation of his eyewitness memories, but also to provide a 
fitting tribute to the power of a single female voice to ‘speak truth to power’. At that 
time, it was a ‘truth’ that was flatly and angrily denied by the Australian senior law 
enforcement officials and public servants attending the seminar. The controversy that 
Miss Andrews’s intervention provoked, which even reached the pages of The Times 
of London, was a foretaste of the royal commissions and inquiries that in subsequent 
decades would expose the widespread discrimination and violence directed to 
Aboriginal people at the hands of the police, as well as the entrenched nature of 
corruption and abuses of power by police. 
As the eminent policing historians John Myrtle and Mark Finnane observed in their 
commissioned background paper on the 1963 UN seminar (Myrtle and Finnane 
2013), the seminar’s themes traversed two roles for police: (i) the duty of the police 
to maintain a system of law and order; and (ii) the duty of the police to protect the 
community without them infringing on the rights of anyone, including the criminal 
and the suspect. In reviewing the 1963 program, the challenges for policing and 
human rights were somewhat predictably represented as a perennial tension between 
crime control and due process; implicitly, the quest for police and policy-makers alike 
was striking the ‘right’ balance between these two interests.2 The topics addressed in 
the seminar ranged across police powers, the right to silence, the exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence, and electronic surveillance, as well as the importance of political 
independence and other police issues.
Much has changed for policing since 1963. The extent of those changes is reflected 
in the range and diversity of the 2013 conference topics, which examined, inter alia, 
advancements in police technology and forensic science (the use of social media and 
DNA profiling); the internationalisation of policing (peacekeeping missions, mutual 
assistance and cooperation in fighting transnational crime, and international criminal 
2 Indeed, the UN seminar just predated the publication of Herbert Packer’s influential essay (1964), in 
which he famously represented criminal justice in terms of a tension drawn between two models, Crime 
Control and Due Process.
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courts and tribunals); the increased role of women in policing; human rights concerns 
around security and anti-terrorism (such as control orders and preventive detention); 
and police interactions with young people, minorities and disadvantaged groups, 
and those experiencing mental illness. 
This special issue profiles only a snapshot of the work underway in Australia 
and overseas on policing and human rights. The first three articles provide an 
assessment of interactions between various vulnerable minorities and the police, and 
the criminal justice system more generally. Offering an international perspective, 
Easton critically examines the normative ideal of community policing, a new model 
of policing that has been enthusiastically embraced around the globe in policing 
agencies committed to upholding liberal democratic principles and human rights — 
including in her own country, Belgium. Easton’s empirical study, based on extensive 
interview and observational data gathered over three years, reveals how policing 
responses are (mis)informed by frontline officers’ perceptions, images, stereotyping 
and clichés prevalent in society about ‘problem’ groups. These working ‘profiles’ 
lead to more repressive police responses, though interestingly her study suggests 
that over-policing within multicultural neighbourhoods does not run along ethnic 
or racial lines, suggesting that ‘problem’ groups for police have a more diversified 
character than research previously suggested. The flipside to over-policing is 
under-policing, where police neglect of ‘non-problematic’ neighbourhoods misses 
significant opportunities to promote community cohesion and social order. The 
interaction between over-policing and under-policing generates what Easton terms 
‘blind spot’ policing, in which frontline police remain ‘blind’ to the real policing 
needs of multicultural neighbourhoods. 
Farmer, in the second article, assesses ‘move-on’ and related powers granted to police 
in the state of Victoria. These powers effectively bypass formal mechanisms of the 
criminal justice system (arrest, charge and prosecution), creating a form of police-
administered justice. Farmer outlines the rationale behind move-on powers, the 
terms of the legislation itself, the crime prevention impacts, and the application of the 
powers in the context of procedural justice and rule of law ideals.
In the third article, Richards and Dwyer examine the policing (in the broadest sense of 
the term) of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) young people 
in the youth justice system in Australia, including their interactions with police 
officers, courts and detention systems. The authors consider this in the context of the 
international human rights framework relating particularly to non-discrimination 
and criminal justice, while at the same time acknowledging the limitations within 
that framework with regards to specific protections for LGBTIQ youth and a need 
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for greater tolerance and non-discrimination from actors within the criminal justice 
system towards LGBTIQ youth.
The fourth and fifth articles of this issue deal with specific policing actions and 
conduct. Goodman-Delahunty, Beckley and Martin look at the nature of conduct 
reported in complaints against New South Wales Police, and categorise the conduct 
into human rights violations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The authors consider 
the actions taken in regards to the complaints, and how they impact Australia’s 
obligations under human rights treaties. The fifth article focuses on how specific 
human rights principles, related to fairness and procedural justice, must be applied 
to every step of the criminal justice process. Sivasubramaniam, Goodman-Delahunty, 
Fraser and Martin evaluate the protection of human rights in police interviews, 
with a specific focus on the recording of interviews and interview duration limits. 
Preliminary findings show that human rights principles are substantially followed, 
including liberty and security of the person, protection from self-incrimination, and 
protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The authors determine that 
further study is required to ascertain future directions for the policy and practice of 
investigative interviewing.
As the disciplinary diversity of these contributions reveals, it is striking how far 
debates in policing and human rights have progressed in the past 50 years. Police 
leadership is no longer uniformly sceptical, or indeed openly hostile, to the role 
of human rights in policing. In police leadership circles (if not always frontline 
practice!) there is widespread recognition that upholding human rights (whether 
embedded in domestic human rights legislation or international treaties) is a vital 
part of the policing mission. In the United Kingdom, spurred on by the adoption of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), human rights are now viewed as core operational 
policing principles: ‘human rights must sit at the heart of the conception, planning, 
implementation and control of every aspect of the operations of the police service’.3 
Of course, the implementation of these human rights — either as policy or as ethical or 
operational principles — remains a challenge in specific policing contexts, as Harfield 
reveals in his thoughtful examination of the human rights dilemmas implicated when 
police engage in covert operations. Of course, as recent events in the United Kingdom 
have revealed, a strong policy commitment to human rights policing, backed by a 
3 Cited in College of Policing 2013. By contrast, Australian police agencies do not regard human rights 
as an operational principle. The Australian Federal Police does, however, commit to human rights 
protection as part of its international peacekeeping mandate.
Volume 20(2) Linking policing and human rights 5
legislatively mandated authorisation scheme, may not ultimately be an adequate 
safeguard against the wayward actions of individual officers and their supervisors.4 
In the final article, Miller exposes the moral and ethical problems raised by police 
corruption, articulating the key elements of effective integrity systems for policing. 
Drawing on empirical research with Victoria Police, Miller identifies that most officers 
are not corrupt and are keenly aware of the harms caused by corruption. Nevertheless, 
officers remain unwilling (for a range of reasons) to report corrupt conduct. These 
concerns include perceptions that such actions will generate harsh, unfair and 
disproportionate punishments for reported officers. Miller contends that the resultant 
‘blue wall of silence’ combines with ineffective internal affairs procedures to sustain 
cultures of corruption within modern policing. Miller’s contribution to police ethics 
more broadly is his insight that policing inherently involves conduct that otherwise 
(outside the policing context) would be morally harmful (for example, using force or 
intrusive covert or even unlawful methods to prevent or apprehend serious crime). 
It is only through linking the fundamental institutional purpose of policing to the 
protection of human rights (and other moral rights) of citizens that this type of moral 
harm can be justifiable.
Miller’s closing article underscores the point that the vocabulary of human rights 
provides much of the ethical framework for police training and development. In these 
first decades of the 21st century, there is evidence that at least senior police leadership 
across the globe takes human rights much more seriously. Although human rights 
violations in policing around the world persist and continue to challenge us, there 
have been significant improvements since 1963. The last word on the 1963 seminar 
may be left to Dr John Humphrey, founding Director of the Division of Human Rights 
in the United Nations, and one of the architects of the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights. Reflecting upon the seminar series and the significant controversy generated 
in Canberra in 1963, Dr Humphrey concluded: 
The police are sometimes guilty of violating the most fundamental rights, but they also 
protect human rights. The excellent discussions were well covered by the press and we 
made a real impact on the public … The participants came from all over Asia; but it was 
4 This is most powerfully revealed by the controversy surrounding Mark Kennedy, an undercover 
police officer who for seven years infiltrated a range of environmental protest groups. Over that time, 
posing as a senior leader of these groups, Kennedy instigated occupations of power plants and other 
unlawful direct actions. At the same time, he was also forming long-term intimate relations with women 
in the group. At all times, the operations had been approved by senior police leaders. The Kennedy 
controversy, and resultant miscarriages of justice and inquiries, are reviewed in Hyland and Walker 
2014.
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the Australian delegation, which was made up largely of judges and police commissioners 
(who could be expected to have radically different points of view) that kept the debate 
going. [Myrtle and Finnane 2013, 23.]
The 2013 conference and the articles included in this special issue are a commemoration 
of the important idea, emerging from the 1963 seminar, to keep the debate going about 
policing and human rights. Although the police, legal and academic communities 
may not always be ‘on the same page’ on many of the topics discussed here, it 
remains vital that this discussion continues. 
Finally, in our capacity as organisers of the 2013 conference and editors of this 
special issue, we offer our sincere thanks to the numerous local and international 
participants who attended the conference, and especially those who presented 
papers and then responded to our invitation to submit their papers for publication. 
Bringing the papers to publication took much longer than planned, and we offer 
our collective thanks to the AJHR executive editors, Associate Professor Chris 
Michaelsen, Dr Claudia Tazreiter and Associate Professor Justine Nolan, as well as 
the student editors Ash Wickremasinghe and Timothy Chan, for their patience and 
understanding concerning the ‘special’ issue editors. 
The 2013 conference in Canberra, unbeknown to the organisers at the time, would be 
the last annual CEPS conference. CEPS had been established in 2007 as an Australian 
Research Council Centre of Excellence. It was a research-industry partnership 
between Griffith University (the administering host organisation), the Australian 
National University, the University of Queensland and Charles Sturt University 
and various policing agencies, including the Queensland Police Service, Victoria 
Police and the Australian Federal Police. CEPS ceased formal operations as an ARC 
Centre of Excellence on 31 December 2014, while this publication was under way. 
This special issue on policing and human rights therefore serves as a fitting tribute 
to the hard work and dedication of the community of researchers, PhD students 
and administrative staff, as well as policing partners, who provided support to our 
activities between 2007 and 2014 (profiled at www.ceps.edu.au). It would be remiss 
not to acknowledge the Australian Research Council, which provided substantial 
funding to CEPS between 2007 and 2014, including funding for the 2013 conference 
and, by association, this special issue on policing and human rights. ●
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Police and human rights: 1963 and 2013 
David Hambly*
This is an edited version of a conference dinner speech delivered by Professor David Hambly 
during the Human Rights and Policing Conference held in Canberra in 2013. The 2013 
conference commemorated the United Nations Seminar on the Role of Police in the Protection 
of Human Rights held in Canberra 50 years earlier. In his speech, Professor Hambly, who 
had attended the 1963 seminar, reflects upon the significance of the seminar, as well as the 
continuing challenges faced by modern police forces in the intervening years to uphold law 
and order, as well as respect fundamental human rights. 
Fifty years ago, in this room at the Canberra Rex Hotel where we dine tonight, 
I was a spectator at the first United Nations conference to be held in Australia. I 
was probably the youngest person in the room. Now, I might be the only available 
survivor. In some circumstances, this could be liberating. History belongs to the 
survivors. I could tell you anything. But I am constrained by the admirable essay on 
the 1963 seminar that has been prepared by John Myrtle and Mark Finnane (2013). 
It is the product of their extensive research into official archives, contemporary 
newspaper reports, and correspondence and other papers of prominent participants. 
I shall only attempt to supplement their work by offering some recollections of the 
events 50 years ago, and some reflections on their significance for us today.
But first, let us reflect for a moment on the events in Boston as we are meeting.1 We 
must always remember that there are many parts of the world where such calamities 
are a constant hazard, but it is still shocking when an attack happens in a place like 
Boston. Preparing for this conference led me to think about the 1960s, and in 1964–65, 
I lived in Boston as a graduate student at Harvard University. It was a formative 
experience for a young visitor from remote Australia. To give you a glimpse of that 
time: an unforgettable Boston highlight for me was to attend a civil rights rally in 
a huge high school auditorium, addressed by Dr Martin Luther King, Jr. There is a 
sombre contrast between my uplifting memories of Boston then, and the disaster on 
Sunday. I think it is proper to acknowledge the disaster and its ramifications here, 
* Emeritus Professor, ANU College of Law. Email: david.hambly@anu.edu.au.
1. On Sunday, 15 April 2013, bombs exploded during the Boston Marathon, killing three people and 
injuring hundreds. Participants in the seminar learnt of the bombing as they assembled for the opening 
session.
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in a gathering of people with a professional, as well as a humanitarian, concern for 
public security.
Now, let me try to place the 1963 seminar in its historical setting for a 2013 audience.
As Myrtle and Finnane say, ‘the event was unprecedented and its agenda potentially 
explosive’ (2013, 4). It was a signal achievement by the UN Division of Human 
Rights to convene a seminar on the role of police in the protection of human rights, 
in Canberra, and with representatives from nations in the region of the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (as the region was then called). The Director of 
the UN Division of Human Rights, Dr John Humphrey, was at the seminar. He was 
a Canadian who had been the lead staff draftsman of the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR). He set an apparently modest but realistic goal: simply 
to stimulate awareness of human rights issues among those responsible for policing 
policy and practice. 
The event itself was of historic significance. I remember that Justice McClemens, 
one of Australia’s participants, said in informal discussion that he felt his fortnight 
was well spent simply as an expression of international goodwill. In his speech of 
welcome, Sir Garfield Barwick, then Commonwealth Minister for External Affairs 
and Attorney-General, acknowledged the ceremonial value of the gathering, partly 
as a celebration of the 15th anniversary of the UDHR. 
While recognising the significance of the event, it must be said that there were 
constraints on the depth and candour of the discussions. This was clear to some critics 
then — some vocal, some subdued. It seems obvious today. The contrast with the 
relaxed candour of the international and interdisciplinary discussions here, 50 years 
later, is notable, but hardly surprising.
Like most professional conferences in those days, it was a forum for insiders. The 
organisers were predominantly government lawyers. Only two police officers — 
Commissioners Selwyn Porter from Victoria Police and Ray Whitrod from the 
Commonwealth Police Force — were involved in the planning. The participants, 
nominated by their respective governments, were safe choices for a culturally 
diverse international forum, and, overwhelmingly, lawyers or senior police officers. 
Distinguished lawyers of a robust, critical disposition (such as Justice John Barry and 
Professor Julius Stone) attended only as observers for non-government organisations.
It had the ambience of a gentlemen’s club. There were no women participants 
or alternates on any national delegation. Several Australian women attended as 
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observers, representing NGOs, but observers were given very limited speaking 
opportunities and their contributions are not reflected in the official report. 
There was another, contextual, factor. The year 1963 was extraordinary in a decade 
of upheaval in the Western world in social attitudes and behaviour. Young adults 
assertively entered political debate, questioning traditional attitudes. There were 
challenges to power structures based on social class and wealth. Deference to the 
professions was offset by new demands for accountability. 
In the United States, for example, 1963 saw a massive surge in the civil rights 
movement, culminating in the March on Washington and Dr King’s ‘I have a dream’ 
speech. Then, in the aftermath of President Kennedy’s assassination in November 
1963, the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted. In the turmoil of the civil 
rights movement and the anti-war movement, there were new issues for the law 
and law enforcement on the balance between free speech and maintaining public 
order. The US courts were also intensely active in expounding the Bill of Rights in 
the Constitution to ensure that the protections promised to accused persons at their 
trial were applied in practice and not circumvented. A series of Supreme Court 
cases sought to extend the protections to the investigation and interrogation stages 
of the process, so that the protections at trial were not pre-empted at the police 
station. These included the unanimous landmark US Supreme Court decision of 
Gideon v Wainwright, 1963, in which the court held that an indigent defendant had 
a right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment — the ‘due process clause’ 
of the Constitution. (Australia did not establish an equivalent level of protection 
until Dietrich v R, 1992, where the High Court held that the failure to provide legal 
representation to indigent accused facing serious charges would violate the common 
law right to a fair trial.) 
And, in 1963, Betty Friedan published The Feminine Mystique, which helped to 
launch a new wave of feminism, and Bob Dylan, aged 22, sang ‘The Times They Are 
A-Changin’ ’.
In England there were comparable social convulsions; for example, some of you 
will know of the Profumo affair in 1963. Philip Larkin, a gloomy, middle-aged poet, 
saluted 1963 in England in a poem called ‘Annus Mirabilis’:
Sexual intercourse began
In nineteen sixty-three
(Which was rather late for me) —
Between the end of the Chatterley ban
And the Beatles’ first LP.
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Australia observed these tumultuous changes, and in its own small way tried to join 
in.
The only unplanned incident at the 1963 seminar exemplifies all the constraints that I 
mentioned, and the underlying sense that the times were beginning to change. 
Shirley Andrews was a Melbourne biochemist with a commitment to social activism. 
She was honorary secretary of the Council for Aboriginal Rights in Victoria. She 
gained accreditation as an observer representing an international organisation, the 
Anti-Slavery Society for the Protection of Human Rights. Through persistence and 
courage, she gained the floor to deliver a brief speech that drew more media attention, 
nationally and internationally, than any other aspect of the conference. She spoke 
of discriminatory laws in all states which made Aborigines especially vulnerable 
to breaches of human rights, and discriminatory police practices in both city and 
country areas. She attracted support in the press and in private correspondence, and 
achieved her aim of drawing the attention of UN agencies to human rights issues 
affecting Indigenous Australians.
But within the seminar, officials chided her for bad manners in exposing Australian 
embarrassments to an international audience, and senior police requested a suspension 
of business so that they could reply. New South Wales Police Commissioner Norman 
Allan, in particular, denied that any discrimination or impropriety of this kind 
ever occurred in New South Wales, whether in Redfern or remote rural areas. This 
implausible defensiveness might now be seen as an example of the kind of incident 
that provoked the shift in the 1960s and 70s from deference to assertions by the 
professions that their standards and practices were beyond challenge by laypeople, 
to an acceptance of reasoned debate and principles of accountability.
So, in tune with the changing times of the 1960s, Miss Andrews, though a layperson 
among professionals, and with only the status of an observer whose speech 
was ignored in the official report, made the most courageous and consequential 
contribution to the seminar. 
I should like now to mention two other Australians who were associated with the 
seminar. They were pioneers in Australian criminology and in the study of the 
administration of criminal justice. The benefits of their work still endure.
Sir John Barry was a long-serving judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, the first chair 
of the Parole Board of Victoria and a major figure in the Department of Criminology 
at the University of Melbourne. He attended the first week of the seminar as an 
observer. He slipped away from the seminar to join a few members of the Law 
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Faculty at the Australian National University for lunch at University House. Fifty 
years later, I remember that lunch vividly. I was struck by the passion and vehemence 
of his opinions on law and politics. It seemed to me, mustering all the insight of a 
23-year-old fledgling academic, that having narrowly missed appointment to the 
High Court of Australia, where he would have made an inimitable contribution, he 
had determined to carve out his own territory in fields of law that he deemed to be 
socially important, even if they were spurned by the mainstream of the practising 
legal profession. He said he was glad to preside in the undisturbed isolation of the 
divorce jurisdiction and the Parole Board. He detested personal injury litigation; he 
used the word ‘prostitution’ in referring to legal practice in that field. Fifty years later, 
the proposal for a National Disability Insurance Scheme might give a ray of hope that 
the cruelties of the personal injuries compensation lottery in Australia might at last 
be alleviated to some degree. Justice Barry gave his energies outside court to many 
aspects of public affairs. He contributed to the early stages of the family law reform 
movement and to pioneering the parole system in Australia. As it turned out, I spent 
part of my career on family law reform and I chaired a Parole Board for many years, 
so for me and for others in each of those fields, Justice Barry was a trailblazer. 
At the lunch, his intensity, and his perception that he was a lonely dissenter who 
was ahead of his time, gave him the air of a visionary condemned to constant 
disappointment. As we left the lunch and walked through the University House 
library, he went to the bookshelves and returned to tell us, with sorrow, that he had 
donated his book on the great 19th-century penal reformer Alexander Maconochie 
(Barry 1958) to the library some years ago, but it was not there. The gift must have 
been rejected or lost. Another rebuff, another disappointment. A quick-thinking 
colleague said ‘It will be out on loan to a reader’. This had not occurred to Justice 
Barry, and he almost smiled at the thought that this theory might be true. 
The library at the Australian Institute of Criminology is named in his honour. I 
recommend Mark Finnane’s biography of Justice Barry (Finnane 2007) as rewarding 
post-conference reading.
I encountered Norval Morris in 1958 when I was a student and he, at 35, was an 
exceptionally gifted teacher in undergraduate classes in criminal law and torts at the 
University of Melbourne. Although his students could not help but believe that we 
were getting the full blast of his enthusiasm and energy, his teaching in law must 
have been almost incidental to his prodigious work in criminology and in advising 
governments here and overseas. He was a protégé and a lifelong friend and colleague 
of Justice Barry. He was closely involved in planning for the 1963 seminar, but he 
withdrew from participating when he was appointed to an important new UN post 
in Tokyo. 
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From 1964, he held a chair in law and criminology at the University of Chicago for 
40 busy years. As well as academic and advisory work, he stimulated public debate 
in the United States with books such as the provocatively titled The Honest Politician’s 
Guide to Crime Control in 1970. I shall just add a note on the less publicised aspect 
of his career. Exceptional teachers bestow enduring inspiration on their students. 
Norval Morris was such a teacher. 
Barry and Morris were mainstays of the long campaign that achieved the establishment 
of the Australian Institute of Criminology. It is a memorial to both of them.
Norval Morris had urged that the theme of the 1963 seminar should be ‘the dual 
obligation of police in relation to the human rights of the citizen — the duty to protect 
the citizen from antisocial behaviour by others and also from the use of excessive 
police powers by the state’. This seems to me to be a theme of significance, whether 
in 1963 or 2013. As eminent policing scholar Professor David Bayley reminded us 
yesterday in an address titled ‘Progress and prospects for human rights policing’, 
these obligations need not be antithetical. To advance human rights is to advance 
public safety. Nevertheless, the relative emphasis given to these obligations at any 
time will influence our perception of the role of police in the protection of human 
rights. 
As Tim Vines, representing Civil Liberties Australia, showed in his presentation ‘50 
years of police/civil liberties interaction’, at the level of legislation and government 
policy in Australia, social and technological change is producing a shift in the 
balance of policing obligations. Proliferating legislation affecting the prevention and 
investigation of crime and the interrogation of suspects, as well as legislation reacting 
to terrorism, has moved the balance towards public security, with incursions on civil 
liberties. Conferences like this give an opportunity to ask whether the balancing of 
policing obligations is appropriate.
However, in order to place that question of high policy in perspective, may I 
invoke the spirit of Shirley Andrews, and respectfully draw your attention to some 
‘elephants in the room’. The first elephant: no matter how impressive formal rules 
and procedures affecting police and human rights may be, they count for little if the 
criminal justice system is polluted by delay. ‘Justice delayed is justice denied’ is a 
timeless adage. The Magna Carta promised ‘To no one will we sell, to no one deny or 
delay right or justice’. Even Shakespeare’s Hamlet moaned about ‘the law’s delay’. 
The adage might seem trite today, but it is profoundly true. For complex reasons, 
even in affluent and sophisticated countries, delays in many courts are becoming 
overwhelming. Lives of victims, witnesses and accused are stalled. Prosecution 
failure rates go up alarmingly. Trust in the integrity of the system evaporates. The 
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New York Times is this week running a series of articles on the utter breakdown of 
the criminal courts in the Bronx, and the demoralisation of everyone in contact with 
them. The noble protections of the Bill of Rights, promised to all Americans, mean 
little in the Bronx in the face of chronic, hopeless delay. 
We cannot be complacent. We have a mounting syndrome of delay in Australia. We 
all know this, but delay in the criminal justice system is insidious and intractable, 
and our sensitivities become blunted. To give a small example: the Australian Capital 
Territory has the highest percentage in Australia of prisoners on remand, awaiting 
trial: 34.7% of all prisoners. This is unacceptable.
The second elephant: efforts to enhance policing and to protect human rights can 
be frustrated by indiscriminate legislative sentencing policies, such as mandatory 
sentencing regimes.
A third elephant enters the room when a government acts in breach of international 
human rights standards. For example, although Australia is a party to the UN 
Refugees Convention, governments on both sides of politics have imposed mandatory 
detention on so-called ‘boat people’ seeking asylum. I do not want to gloss over the 
complexity of the issues, or to take a partisan position. But there is now a proposal, 
which one party will apparently take to the next election, that would go even further, 
and create new functions for police. Asylum seekers released into the community will 
be subject to a regime called ‘behaviour protocols, with clear negative sanctions for 
breaches of such protocols’; they are not to be housed near ‘vulnerable communities’; 
‘neighbouring residents must be alerted in advance of boat arrivals being located in 
their community’, according to Scott Morrison MP. All this will involve notification 
and consultation with police. Presumably, police will have duties of enforcement 
(Morrison 2013; see also Zagor 2013). Professor Bayley spoke yesterday of migrants, 
human rights and xenophobia. Such a scheme would indeed pose new questions 
about the role of police in the protection of human rights. 
It remains for me to thank Professor Simon Bronitt and his colleagues for their 
enterprise in organising this 50th anniversary event. An Australian poet, Alan 
Wearne, wrote sadly about a recent academic conference. He said (Wearne 2012) that 
he emerged with:
Frequent flyer points and tears, tears, tears,
Backstabbed, bitten and burnt.
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I think we have done rather better than that. Whether in spite of or because of the 
gravity of the subject matter, our discussions have been congenial and purposeful. We 
look forward to the next conference on a milestone anniversary of the 1963 seminar. 
Because of everything that has been said here about the pace of technological change, 
I expect that we shall all be able to participate next time, wherever we happen to be. ●
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‘Blind spot’ policing in Belgian multicultural 
neighbourhoods and the implications for human rights
Marleen Easton*
This article reconsiders the findings of three years of qualitative empirical research 
in six Belgian multicultural neighbourhoods on the dynamics of policing in terms of 
its implications for human rights. Based on interviews with both police and ethnic 
minorities, as well as observations of police interventions on the beat, our findings 
show that police knowledge of certain groups in multicultural neighbourhoods 
influences their images of those groups. More specifically, these images strongly 
influence police actions in relation to those groups by generating over-policing and 
under-policing. This leads to some form of ‘blind spot policing’ with implications for 
the right to security of citizens living in these neighbourhoods. Furthermore, these 
findings generate questions in relation to whether police can be true guardians of 
human rights and to the intrinsic ambiguities emerging from the Belgian model of 
community oriented policing.
Keywords: democratic policing, right to security, community policing, multicultural 
neighbourhoods, ‘blind spot’ policing, police tradition
Introduction
This article reconsiders the findings of three years of qualitative empirical research in 
six Belgian multicultural neighbourhoods on the dynamics of policing in terms of its 
implications for human rights. This Belgian research can be considered a contribution 
to police sociology through which the project sought to understand police work by 
studying the social processes taking place between the police and citizens (Van der 
Torre 1999). The project aim was to shed light on the complex dynamics inherent 
in police work in multicultural neighbourhoods in Belgium through undertaking 
research on the interactions between police personnel and citizens. Paying attention 
to both sides of ‘the story’ allows us to reflect upon the relationship between police 
work and human rights, and the implications for the right to security of every citizen. 
To develop our argument, this article is divided into seven parts. In the first part, 
we elaborate on the idea of the police as guardians of human rights in a democratic 
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society. The second part explains the explicit policy choice adopting community 
oriented policing in Belgium and examines its link with human rights. The unique 
character of the Belgian research is described and contextualised in the third part of 
the article. The research design is described in the fourth part and the main findings 
in the fifth part. Interactions between images, feelings and actual behaviour of the 
police are addressed in the sixth part and the voice of residents of multicultural 
neighbourhoods is central to the seventh part. This leads to the conclusion that 
enables us to reconsider these findings in relation to human rights and community 
policing. 
Police as guardians of human rights in a democratic society
The strength of a democracy, it is often said, can be measured through its respect 
for human rights. Human rights treaty ratification, although valuable, is not enough 
(Neumayer 2005) and there remains an urgent need to examine the operation of both 
policies and practices in the field. This is particularly true in relation to police work, 
since the mission and functions of the police in a democratic society have implications 
for the balance between freedom and security. In democratic societies, the mission 
and functions of the police are defined by reference to the two key concepts of ‘law’ 
and ‘order’. ‘Law’ in this context includes municipal laws, but also the fundamental 
human rights and freedoms enjoyed by all citizens. ‘Order’ refers to the central 
values in society that promote peace and security, and derive their legitimacy from 
agreement of the majority. The balance maintained between safeguarding the rights 
and freedoms of every citizen and upholding the public order is a matter of abiding 
concern for any democracy (Lustgarten 1986; Monet 1993; Keith 1993). Police are 
directly confronted with this balancing act in exercising their functions.
The traditional paradigm through which policing is operationalised is known as the 
‘law and order’ approach (Monet 1993). On this view, ‘order’ is invariably placed 
above ‘law’. Order is the state authority embodied within and constituted by the 
police, while law is what legitimises this authority (Van Ryckeghem, Huens and 
Hendrickx 1998). Most modern European police organisations were founded in the 
19th century for the express purpose of creating and maintaining order within the 
state (Keith 1993; della Porta and Reiter 1997). Apart from this conceptualisation of 
the police as an embodiment of state authority, the traditional paradigm rests upon 
an instrumental vision of policing. In a democratic society, the public police is a 
professional force that contributes to safeguarding the legal and constitutional rights 
of everyone. To this end, the police are given a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence. On this conception of policing, police officers are merely simple enforcers 
of the law and its directives; this ideal of strict enforcement of law denies police 
officers any power to exercise critical independent judgment on whether or not the 
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law should be enforced. Consequently, law is perceived by police officers as being 
a compulsory and restrictive framework for policing work (Monet 1993; Monjardet 
1996; Van Ryckeghem, Huens and Hendrickx 1998). The law is coercive because the 
law should be applied. As reflected in the Latin maxim dura lex sed lex, the law is an 
end in itself. 
In totalitarian regimes, this instrumental view is that the police are a tool for 
upholding the power and authority of the state. In democratic regimes, the police 
are enlisted in the service of order, authority and the law (Monjardet 1996). From an 
instrumental viewpoint, the police are a mere sword in the hands of the domestic 
government (Cachet 1978), reinforcing the ideal that policing is apolitical — a 
position that has been highly controversial and contested in the academic literature 
(Reiner 1992; della Porta and Reiter 1997). 
The traditional model embodies two elements for policing: undertaking state action 
and upholding state authority. This model, with its two core assumptions, has shaped 
the development of most European police organisations in the 19th century (Monet 
1993). This traditional paradigm is present in many contemporary models of policing 
and is observable in police models in Western liberal democracies, as well as in those 
policing models exported to their former colonies or post-conflict areas (Easton et al 
2010). It has always been striking to contrast the British model of domestic policing 
by consent (characterised by an unarmed force of ‘bobbies’) with the export model 
of colonial policing (characterised by armed paramilitary forces) applied across the 
British Empire, including in India (Jauregui 2010). Nevertheless, the traditional view 
of policing has been increasingly questioned since the second half of the 20th century, 
with growing awareness that a different style of policing is required to meet the 
changed needs and expectations of modern Western liberal democracies.
One possible answer that has emerged is community policing, a philosophy that 
addresses the question of how to make the police more democratic and responsive 
to the community they serve: ‘an inclusive philosophy that promotes community 
based problem-solving strategies and encourages partnerships between police and 
communities in a collaborative effort to solve crime and disorder’ (Fleming 2009, 
37). One of the basic ideas of community policing is that the police should first 
understand the nature of societal problems before they decide what kind of answer 
the police can or should provide. It implies a critical reflection on the role of the 
police in solving complex societal problems. Community policing requires that 
the underlying cultural assumptions of the traditional model of policing should be 
questioned (Van Ryckeghem, Huens and Hendrickx 1998). On the level of the role 
and position of the police in society, this questioning leads to a considered choice in 
democracies to stress ‘law’ before ‘order’. In practice, this means that the rights and 
22 Australian Journal of Human Rights 2014
liberties of the minorities are being protected without neglecting attention for the 
values of the majority (namely, the maintenance of public order). To be able to do so, 
the police need to work on their relationships with the civil world and be a part of 
society, like schools and churches. From the point of view of community policing, the 
police are assumed to be guardians of human rights in democratic societies. 
Human rights and the explicit choice for community oriented  
policing in Belgium
The sources of the concept of human rights in Belgium are diverse and an important 
context for the research presented in this article. Global, regional and European 
treaties and the national constitution are the main points of reference. Undoubtedly, 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, signed on 10 December 
1948, has been a global key initiative and a crucial starting point for the development 
of other human rights conventions (De Raedt 2013). In the context of discussing 
police work in Belgium, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), signed 
on 4 November 1950, is very important. The ECHR has direct links to Belgian national 
law; its jurisdiction is often associated with the exercise of the police functions, as 
exemplified by the fact that parliamentary work in relation to our police legislation 
explicitly refers to the ECHR (Goossens 2006). The Belgian Law on the Police Function 
(05/08/1992) stipulates that the police should fulfil their administrative and judicial 
functions while protecting individual rights and freedoms and the democratic 
development of our society (Art 1). Article 1 is considered to be ‘an anchor’ in the 
field for linking human rights and police work in Belgium (De Raedt 2013).
Another important context is the profound (structural and cultural) reorganisation of 
the Belgian police system in 1998. The Belgian Law on the Integrated Police (07/12/1998) 
implied a structural reorganisation in which the municipal police forces, gendarmerie 
and judicial police forces, which formerly constituted separate independent agencies, 
were integrated. Since then, the newly created Integrated Police Force consists of 
a federal police component and a local police component, which are functionally 
(though not hierarchically) linked to each other. This structural fusion, which was 
on the political agenda for many decades, can be considered as one of the most 
significant administrative reorganisations of the Belgian landscape of public policing. 
The forces driving change were dysfunctions in each of the police forces, including 
lack of information exchange and the incompetence of police officers. Scandals, 
including the Dutroux affair where the 2004 trial of a child molester and serial killer 
exposed serious failures in Belgian policing, further garnered political momentum 
for police reform.
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An important element within this profound change is the cultural component. 
Belgian policymakers had the intention to change the culture of the public police 
by introducing a new philosophy of community oriented policing. Together with 
police practitioners and academics, key policy documents were developed to steer 
the implementation of community oriented policing in Belgium (Vande Sompel et 
al 2003a; 2003b). In addition to drawing on Anglo-American expertise, insights from 
community policing in South Africa and Sweden were used to develop the five 
central steering principles (Van Ryckeghem and Hendrickx 2001; Van Ryckeghem, 
Hendrickx and Easton 2001). These principles were ‘external orientation’, ‘problem-
solving’, ‘partnership’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘accountability’ — principles which 
are now considered to be the keystone of the Belgian interpretation of community 
oriented policing. All five principles, which are mutually reinforcing, are central to 
the nature of police work and the role of policemen and policewomen as guardians 
of human rights in a democratic society. 
‘External orientation’, for example, explicitly refers to the fact that the public police 
should be a part of our society, delivering their services to all citizens on an equal 
basis, regardless of race, gender or other status. Rights and freedoms of members of 
minorities should be safeguarded and cannot be brushed aside in the interests of the 
majority. With this principle, community oriented policing directs police attention 
towards vulnerable or disadvantaged communities in our society. ‘Empowerment’ 
refers to the need to support the emancipation of communities, and the stimulation of 
resilience and social self-reliance. The aim is that people can take greater care of their 
own security and safety and, in the (ultimate) end, the police are not needed anymore. 
The remaining principles of ‘problem solving’, ‘partnerships’ and ‘accountability’ 
reinforce the functioning of ‘empowerment’ and ‘external orientation’. Problem-
solving demands an open mind towards understanding the complex societal 
problems that lie behind disorder and crime, which are the symptoms that frontline 
police are confronted with on a daily basis. Since the public police is no longer the 
main security actor, ‘partnerships’ are needed to address these underlying problems 
and symptoms. ‘Accountability’ in relation to goals and means used by the police 
is considered to be the tail-end of this democratic model of policing. Finally, it is 
the interaction between these five principles that is considered to be essential in the 
philosophy of community oriented policing in Belgium, cultivating, at the individual 
level, new attitudes and mentalities that police officers are guardians of human 
rights. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the five central principles of community 
oriented policing are an ideal type, and that the implementation in the field often tells 
a very different story (Easton et al 2003).
Belgian lawmakers made the explicit choice for police that they must act according 
to the principles of community oriented policing (departing from the traditional 
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instrumental model described above). The fact that this philosophy has been 
embedded both in the substantive law on policing and in ministerial circulars makes 
Belgium quite a unique and interesting case study. The adoption of community 
oriented policing at the legal policy level implies clear expectations towards 
operational frontline police officers in terms of being guardians of human rights in 
the field. This contribution is aimed at discovering how this philosophy applies in 
practice in Belgian multicultural neighbourhoods. 
Community policing in Belgian multicultural neighbourhoods
Taking into account that community policing grew out of Anglo-American policing 
conflicts with minority communities in the 1980s (Fleming 2009), the question is 
raised what this philosophy could mean in the context of Belgian multicultural 
neighbourhoods. Although Belgium is a small country on a global scale, it has an 
interesting migration history and Belgian cities are confronted with challenges that 
resemble those of any other West European capital (Liedenbaum et al 2013). Since 
the Second World War, Belgium has known three waves of migration. The first wave 
included work-related immigrants from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Morocco and Turkey. 
Families were being reunited during the second migration wave (in the mid-1970s) 
and nowadays the third wave involves a more diffuse group of migrants entering 
Belgium. This group contains refugees, asylum seekers, highly skilled and educated 
people, fugitives and people coming over to marry Belgians, but also people without 
any papers at all (Martens and Caestecker 2001; Meuleman and Billiet 2003; Wets 
2001; Timmerman, Clycq and Lodewycks 2004). 
International research and Belgian research (to a more limited extent) examining 
the relationship between the police and ethnic minorities reveal both tensions 
and complicated interactions (Bowling, Phillips and Shah 2003; Casman et 
al 1992; Haen Marshall 1997). These studies often point out that the cause of 
this difficult relationship originates in conflicting cultural backgrounds and 
a mutual construction of negative images, which often lead to self-fulfilling 
prophecies of conflict between the police and these groups. From the perspective 
of ethnic minorities, this is frequently connected to (perceived) racism in the 
police (Casman et al 1992; Brunson and Miller 2006; Goodey 2006) and to social 
vulnerability and exclusion (Sun, Payne and Wu 2008). Studies suggested that this 
may lead to the development of a ‘vindictive subculture’, which is also directed 
towards the police (as ‘delegates’ of the Belgian government) (Hebberecht 1995; 
Bekkour 2001). On the other hand, negative images of ethnic minorities held by 
the police are often linked to a belief in the validity of official crime data and to 
the frequency of negative confrontations, which bolster stereotyping processes 
and sustain an inadequate knowledge of ethnic communities (Casman et al 1992; 
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Feys 2002; Hebberecht 1995; Van San and Leerkes 2001; Walgrave 2002). The bulk 
of the research is, however, usually fragmented in the sense that it focuses on 
particular elements of this relationship (for example, institutional racism: see 
Lee 1981) or treats it merely as a secondary subject — for example, not making 
it the focus of research in any way (see Van San and Leerkes 2001; Vercaigne et 
al 2000). These limitations provide compelling reasons to examine both sides of 
this ‘story’ in Belgium, in order to reveal what is actually happening in the field. 
On the one hand, researchers are interested in revealing how police officers deal 
with the reality of working in multicultural neighbourhoods on a daily basis. 
How is community oriented policing being implemented, and how have officers 
and community members responded to the assumption that police are guardians 
of human rights in these neighbourhoods, specifically in relation to upholding 
the right to security? On the other hand, researchers are interested in revealing 
the perspectives of people living in those multicultural neighbourhoods, their 
expectations towards the police, and their interpretation of community oriented 
policing and the safeguarding of their human rights. The main research question 
is what dynamics are at play in the streets of these multicultural neighbourhoods, 
and what the implications are for the assumption that the police should be 
the guardians of human rights. In the next part of this article, we sketch the 
methodology employed to obtain data about these everyday policing realities and 
practices, and the main research findings.
Empirical qualitative research in five Belgian cities
This article is based on revisiting the findings of a three-year empirical, qualitative 
study completed in 2009 on policing multicultural neighbourhoods in Belgium 
(Easton et al 2009). For the purpose of this article, we focus more specifically on two 
aspects of this research. First, we examine the images that ‘street cops’ develop in 
relation to groups of residents within multicultural neighbourhoods being studied. 
We pay attention to the link between their images and thoughts (stereotypes), feelings 
and appreciation (prejudices), and actual behaviour (discrimination). Second, we 
examine the images being developed by some members of those groups (residents 
of the neighbourhoods) in relation to the police. This generates insights on the ‘fit’ 
between both images and the dynamics that play in the field. It inspires us to reflect 
upon the nature of police work in multicultural neighbourhoods and the role that 
street cops play as guardians of essential human rights. 
This research took place across six multicultural neighbourhoods, over a six-month 
period in each neighbourhood, in Brussels (two neighbourhoods), Charleroi, Seraing, 
Antwerp and Genk. The study focused on neighbourhoods with a heterogeneous 
demographic composition. The degree of urbanisation (small to large cities ranging 
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from 50,000 to 500,000 inhabitants in Belgium) and the diversity of the residential 
histories of the ethnic minorities (in terms of the migration waves mentioned above) 
were the main criteria for selecting the neighbourhoods in these cities. Although the 
available statistics never fully reflect the real flow of migrants, a large diversity of 
ethnic minorities was covered in the selected neighbourhoods. The main groups were 
people from (North) Africa, Turkey, Roma, Armenia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Italy, 
Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Nepal and Poland. A characteristic of each of the multicultural 
neighbourhoods being studied is the accumulation of economic and social problems. 
Poor housing, lack of public space, unemployment, health problems, nuisance and 
social disorder are part of everyday life for many people living in these kinds of 
neighbourhoods (Liedenbaum et al 2013). 
Two researchers worked full-time on this project for about three years. After studying 
the context of each of the selected neighbourhoods, an intensive period of observation 
took place in which the researchers contacted people living and working in the 
neighbourhood (the social sector and the public police). A total of 37 members (or 
representatives) of the immigrant community were interviewed (in Dutch, French 
or English) and 24 police officers were interviewed before going into the field for 
observation (182 days in total). It is important to note that the researchers entered 
the field of research by starting to build up contacts with (representatives of) ethnic 
minorities to prevent being considered as ‘the enemy’. This allowed them to obtain 
a picture of the images developed by the community before interviewing and 
observing police in the field. 
The focus of the observations (or the ‘unit of analysis’) was the interactions between 
the police and ethnic minorities. Police on the beat and during interventions were 
observed because they have the most frequent contacts and interactions with citizens 
in the field. Observations were made during the day and overnight, and the available 
time was used to ask questions about attitudes, behaviour, intentions, perceptions 
and consequences of certain interactions. Citizens and police officers of a variety of 
ages, genders, experiences and ethnic backgrounds were selected for these purposes. 
We now turn to the main research findings. 
Over-policing and under-policing in dealing with  
multiple communities
The fieldwork revealed that the police regularly come into contact with only parts 
of the community that they should serve. So-called ‘regular customers’ are ‘over-
policed’ (also referred to as ‘police property’: Reiner 1994), compared with ‘under-
policed’ groups with which the police hardly, if ever, come into contact. Both groups 
are part of the same heterogeneously composed neighbourhood. The police, however, 
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experience these groups as multiple neighbourhood communities related to an 
extremely fragmented social patchwork of origins, behavioural patterns, preferences, 
statuses, ‘cultures’ and ages. The striking conclusion is that the line of separation 
between both groups does not run clearly between immigrant groups on the one 
hand, and non-immigrant groups on the other hand. The boundaries of groups that 
are being over-policed and under-policed sometimes coincide with ethnicity, but 
are likely just as much to correlate with other variables such as age, lack of parental 
control, gender and marginality. 
The ‘regular customers’ are a minority of groups and individuals in the neighbourhood 
who repeatedly call on the police services and interventions. Police officers encounter 
these citizens on a regular basis as ‘victims’, but also as ‘offenders’ of different types of 
crime. These groups, which contain native Belgian people and ethnic minorities, live 
in marginal conditions of housing, work and health. They have weak social networks 
and often lack the ability to take care of themselves. For these people, the police are 
often the only helpline available 24/7. Due to the nature and the frequency of the 
contacts, the police experience a feeling of ‘proximity’ towards these residents. Police 
develop strong perceptions about this small but problematic group with which they 
are constantly being confronted. They build up images of group members, ascribing 
them with specific attributes and nicknames such as ‘drunks’, ‘petty crooks’, ‘jerks’, 
‘tramps’ and ‘amoebas’. The nicknames are mainly used internally to communicate 
between colleagues about the complex social phenomena related to this group. Police 
consider this language to be a functional shorthand in the field that assists them to 
predict possible behaviour and to be ready to act accordingly. After all, these police 
are the ones who have gathered much knowledge and experience about (the context 
of) this group of people. Accordingly, this street ‘knowhow’ makes them able to 
adjust their intervention strategies — which can be preventive but also repressive, 
depending on the nature of the problems. 
This kind of knowledge is not available in relation to the group of people being 
‘under-policed’ in multicultural neighbourhoods. The research pointed out that 
police officers have far more vague perceptions and images of these groups, which 
can be subdivided into the problematic and the unproblematic. The problematic 
category contains people who represent to police in the role of a victim, though this 
group rarely seeks police assistance. Roughly three groups can be distinguished. 
The first group of people are travellers, mobile groups of people such as asylum 
seekers, people without papers, gypsies and students. As mentioned earlier, these 
people stay for a shorter period of time in the neighbourhood where there is a high 
turnover of population. Quite often, these transient people are simply afraid to talk 
to the police, or they think that the police are unable to help them, as their problem 
is not a priority — for example, in cases of rape or stolen bikes. The second group are 
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people who have a long history of living in the neighbourhood, but who prefer to 
manage their own problems in the community without the help of the police. In the 
neighbourhoods examined, the Turkish and Pakistani communities are considered 
to be an example of this group. The third group of people are new residents in the 
neighbourhood — for example, new immigrants from Eastern Europe. Police on the 
street do not feel comfortable dealing with these groups and indicate that they feel a 
‘distance’ towards most of them. 
On the basis of our interviews and observations, we have found out that the lack of 
information about these people generates vague perceptions and images and triggers 
stereotyping and the acquisition of clichés (such as ‘Eastern Europeans use heavy 
violence’ or ‘gypsies are kidnappers’) that are prevalent in society with regard to 
these groups. Far more important are the effects of these images on their empathy and 
feelings, and eventually on their actions and behaviour in the field. The lack of any 
contextual information about these groups in their neighbourhood prevents police 
officers from developing different strategies to deal with the nature of the problems 
encountered. As a result, observations show that more repressive strategies are being 
used to deal with these problematic groups. 
The take-home message from this research is that the experiences of street cops 
in multicultural neighbourhoods are fragmentary, since police only have contact 
with some of the groups and individuals living in the neighbourhood, regardless 
of ethnicity. Moreover, the images that these police develop on the basis of these 
fragmentary experiences are selective, as the research revealed that not all experiences 
have an equal effect on the image that the police develop of these groups. Moreover, 
a pitfall lies in the observation that the intertwined perceptions of known groups and 
unknown groups (which leads to over-policing) convinces police officers that their 
images are equally grounded in reality and experiences. However the observations 
show that this is a misconception of reality and that ‘fragmented experiences’ and 
‘selective images’ are generated in the field (as developed above). This truly holds a 
risk in terms of democratic policing. 
Our main argument is that this dynamic of over-policing and under-policing 
generates what we term ‘blind spot’ policing. This occurs when policing in these 
neighbourhoods develops without awareness about the blind spot in perceptions 
and images that are generated in the dynamics of working in the field. As a result, 
policing is ‘blind’ to the needs of some of the groups living in those neighbourhoods, 
which threatens the right to security of those groups. The research reveals that a 
complex range of factors is at work in a dynamic that is further explored below.
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Factors influencing the relationship between images, feelings  
and actual behaviour 
The qualitative nature of this empirical research revealed some of the factors that 
influence the connection between images, feelings and actual behaviour of street 
cops in multicultural neighbourhoods. In relation to human rights, this connection 
is crucial as it sheds light on the link between stereotyping (on the level of images), 
prejudices (on the level of feelings and appreciation) and discrimination (on the level 
of behaviour). A pressing question arises whether the labels and categories described 
above produce more prejudiced street cops who engage in discriminatory policing in 
Belgian multicultural neighbourhoods.
Our research identified some inductive factors that contribute to the complex 
relationship between images, feelings and the behaviour of street cops. Roughly 
four main factors can be discerned. The first factor relates to the tendency of police 
on the beat to set priorities themselves, more or less independent of implemented 
official policy. These officers prioritise much more on the basis of perceived and 
experienced realities in the workplace (in terms of criminality, troublemaking and 
neighbourhood problems). Police on the beat construct their own mental crime 
profiles, which they relate to specific communities and to which they tailor their 
own approach. These profiles rest largely on anecdotal ‘hands-on’ experience and are 
not informed by systematic analysis. Some well-defined minorities, such as gypsies 
(members of Romani or other groups with itinerant traveler lifestyles), suffer directly 
through this. Street cops experience mental and physical distancing in relation to 
this group and even systematically attach to the group a particular crime profile 
(such as ‘gypsies are thieves’). It is a group whose negative image always comes 
through during interactions, regardless of the police officer(s) involved or the specific 
situation. Second, situational aspects often influence the tone of an interaction and the 
approach taken by the police. It is in the concrete situational context that underlying 
perceptions or preferences are expressed. This tends to be the case if the situation 
and, more particularly, the behaviour of the citizens coincides with the presumed 
attributes that police have given to the person or group through their categorising 
system. In this way, street cops have their preconceptions confirmed, for example, 
when they catch a gypsy in the act of stealing. This finding is extremely consistent 
and is strongly related to the way in which street cops define their own role and 
how they interpret the behaviour of the citizen encountered. The third factor, which 
has already been explained above, is the amount of contextual knowledge that 
street cops have about particular (members of) groups they are policing. During 
interactions with the so-called ‘property groups’, the police may select from several 
strategies depending on the situation. They may depart from the dominant social 
narrative about the group and, due to their varied experience, opt for other specific 
strategies or even a custom-made approach. This may be tough and controlling, 
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but also conciliatory or mediating. However, these choices appear to be missing in 
interactions with groups for which only partial (hands-on) knowledge is available. 
At such moments, street cops seem to lose their grip on the situation and fall back on 
a kind of ‘consensus approach’, which leans closely towards underlying but clichéd 
perceptions and exaggerated criminality profiles.
Finally, the ‘cultural and social capital’ of street cops is a fourth crucial factor 
influencing the link between images, feelings and behaviour. This covers all the 
underlying attitudes, political preferences, knowledge and social skills, as well as 
experience, knowledge of various social representations and trends, social networks 
and environments frequented in their private life. For example, this factor clarifies 
the often precarious relations between street cops and young North Africans in 
the neighbourhoods being studied. In general, negative images about these young 
persons and problematic relationships with police are being observed. Perceptions of 
North African youths rest on explicit mental crime and troublemaking profiles. We 
were, however, unable to observe any so-called ‘consensus approach’, as opposed to 
the observations with regard to gypsy families. On the contrary, during interactions 
with Moroccan youths, for example, we observed caution. Despite the negative 
image, we observed a variety of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ strategies in practice, which varied 
greatly from officer to officer. However, some police followed a ‘black-and-white’ 
reasoning, opting for a tougher response regardless of the situation. This type of 
approach could be observed mainly among police officers who placed themselves 
on the right of the political spectrum, and who were quicker than other colleagues to 
criticise multicultural society. They appear less ready to take a mediating line. Other 
police demonstrated a more subtle and moderate approach. They were also the ones 
who took the trouble to put their colleagues’ negative statements about policing 
multicultural neighbourhoods into context when talking to the researchers in the 
field. They even corrected their colleagues’ statements or actions, but never engaged 
in this criticism in the presence of any citizen.
These factors indicate that existing images do not always or automatically translate 
in certain appreciations and accompanying behaviour. Street cops using the labels 
and categories mentioned above are not automatically prejudiced in their work 
and do not always manifest discriminatory behaviour on the streets. It is possible 
that they share jokes (containing racist stereotypes) about certain groups when 
they are with their colleagues but, confronted with members of those groups on 
the street, demonstrate appropriately respectful behaviour. We observed a wide 
variety of relations (between images, appreciation and behaviour) and most of the 
time interaction effects are at play with the factors above. Nevertheless, abuses do 
occur, and these need to be taken seriously and they demand accountability. Over-
policing and under-policing that exist in multicultural neighbourhoods create blind 
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spots in the service delivery towards citizens. This threatens the right to security 
and negatively influences the relationship between police and residents in these 
neighbourhoods. In the next part of the article, we shift focus from the perspective 
of police officers to that of residents. 
Listening to residents in multicultural neighbourhoods
Reviewing the data gather on the perceptions and experiences, as well as the needs, 
of the interviewed residents (n = 37) with regard to police conduct, the following 
can be concluded. First, residents of these neighbourhoods expressed the desire 
to be treated equally and do not wish their particular ethnic origin to be viewed 
as important during interactions with the police. Second, residents have specific 
requirements regarding the tone and attitude during interactions with street cops. 
They expect police to adopt a respectful, professional and objective approach in which 
(cultural) subtleties are taken into account. Third, residents want to be recognised 
as ‘victims’ of the neighbourhood context, and want the police to pay attention 
to their vulnerabilities. Fourth, they expressed a preference for vigorous, efficient 
‘hard’ police who deal with the problems in the neighbourhood (such as nuisance), 
but who also listen to them and who know the community and take into account 
their expectations and concerns. Regarding these findings, there are no significant 
differences between over-policed and under-policed groups, between problematic 
and non-problematic groups, or between ethnic minorities and native Belgian people 
in the neighbourhood. It appears that all residents interviewed wanted the police to 
be present, reachable, available and familiar with their problems. Combined with the 
findings related to over-policing and under-policing, this data reveals a blind spot in 
policing where the needs of citizens are not being met. 
Variation in the images, needs and expectations of residents of multicultural 
neighbourhoods can be linked to a range of factors, including the age and attitude of 
the street cops; personal experiences and recent incidents with street cops; impressions 
or ‘stories’ told by other residents; the image of the police in the residents’ homeland; 
their immigration status; feelings of being treated unfairly; perception of the societal 
climate in relation to immigration age, role and function of the residents in the 
neighbourhood; and concerns about (the status of) the neighbourhood. For example, 
resident migrants from war-torn countries or without any papers are more afraid of 
the police and have lowered expectations accordingly, as the following reflection of a 
citizen from Russia reveals:
The reason that I do not like to see or be close to the police is related to my experiences in 
my home country. I am still afraid of the police. Although I do not commit any crime … I 
just do not like to have contact with them. 
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Another example comprises residents from the Turkish community, who often have 
a preference to solve their own problems and who often hesitate to call upon the 
police for help.
It is interesting to examine the congruence of these images and expectations of 
residents to the key principles of community oriented policing. Their expectations 
and complaints are mainly linked to ‘external orientation’ and ‘problem solving’. 
Analysis of their responses reveals a discourse that creates the image of a repressive, 
reactive but also ‘distant’ and passive police. Too often, residents meet the police 
in a negative context and they complain about slow or even unresponsive police. 
Furthermore, residents perceive police vehicles as ‘shields’ that block and interfere 
with police–citizen interactions. Residents believe that police officers lack the 
necessary information on what is happening in the neighbourhood, which impedes 
performance and authority in the field. Even the police officer on the beat is considered 
to be quite repressive and ‘hasty’. More regular contact and communication in a 
neutral context, with structured dialogue through community organisations, would 
be welcomed. It seems that these groups want a multiple community oriented police 
— which, due to the dynamics of over-policing and under-policing outlined above, is 
a serious challenge for police services to institute in their neighbourhood. 
Conclusion
Revisiting the empirical research on community oriented policing in Belgium, this 
article has revealed that the dynamics of policing in multicultural neighbourhoods 
generate blind spots in which certain problems are not being addressed by the police, 
with the result that the right to security of some residents might be threatened. 
Researchers observed a Janus-faced story of police practices, in which some problems 
were over-emphasised while others were under-estimated. A process of under-
policing and over-policing is taking place in these neighbourhoods. This prevents 
full service delivery by police to all residents, who (in theory) equally share the 
same right to security. Some of these problems remain under the radar of police, 
although they form part of the multifaceted problems confronting multicultural 
neighbourhoods. Over-policing and under-policing are two sides of the same coin, 
since, as this research demonstrates, they can co-exist within the same multicultural 
neighbourhood. The research demonstrates that the most vulnerable communities in 
those neighbourhoods include individuals drawn not only from ethnic groups, but 
also from native Belgian groups that experience disadvantage and social deprivation. 
The contradiction between the images and expectations of the residents, and the 
images and perceptions of the street cops, reinforces the existence of what we have 
called ‘blind spot’ policing. The ultimate challenge for policing and policymakers is 
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to balance over-policing and under-policing in multicultural neighbourhoods that are 
particularly vulnerable to these dynamics.
The identification of blind spot policing puts pressure on the concept of community 
policing, and is fundamentally at odds with the idea of the police as guardians of 
human rights. Blind spot policing generates shortcomings in police interactions with 
all citizens within a defined geographical space, such as a neighbourhood, and for the 
police role in protecting the citizens’ right to security. The finding that the division 
between over-policing and under-policing does not run along ethnic lines might 
moderate the problem slightly. The findings of this research do not add any strength 
to the argument linking ethnic profiling and over-policing, as suggested by earlier 
research (Open Society Justice Initiative 2012). An exception to the rule, however, 
was identified in relation to gypsies in Belgium. As in other European countries, 
this group suffers from the risk of stereotyping directly translating into repressive 
behaviour by the police, with officers paying little (if any) attention to the specific 
context of particular group members and their behaviours. 
In respect of under-policing, one might assume that police paying no attention to 
unproblematic groups is not an issue at all. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Many 
members from these unproblematic groups contribute to the positive dynamics 
(collective efficacy) in the neighbourhood — for example, taking initiatives to 
bring people together, establishing start-up businesses, developing informal power, 
building social cohesion through networking, and so on. These actions may be 
unknown to street cops, though knowing about these dynamics could offset the 
cynicism, frustration and professional isolation that most street cops develop due to 
their almost total preoccupation with the groups being over-policed. The research 
findings generate further questions in relation to the definition of ‘the community’, 
upon which the concept of community oriented policing rests. The research 
shows that the singular idea of the community is difficult to grasp — especially in 
multicultural neighbourhoods where there is a huge degree of anonymity, and a 
constant movement of people coming ‘in’ and ‘out’ of the neighbourhood. The fact 
that most of the local police officers in this study did not know exactly who was 
living in their neighbourhood indicates the scale of challenge faced in implementing 
community oriented policing and the barriers police will continue to face in 
performing their assigned role as guardians of human rights. ●
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‘Is a 24-hour ban such a bad thing?’ Police-imposed  
banning notices: compatible with human rights  
or a diminution of due process?
Clare Farmer*
A key element in Australian policing in recent years is the growth of police-imposed 
discretionary summary justice. The rise and impact of on-the-spot fines, infringement 
notices, exclusion orders and move-on powers enable police-initiated resolutions 
and punishments to be imposed, often without legal or judicial intervention. These 
operational policing mechanisms reflect underlying pressures to reduce costs, ease the 
burden on the court system, and speed up the decision-making process, but when 
viewed from a human rights perspective the potential consequences are significant. 
Focusing on the legislative development of banning notices in Victoria, this article 
highlights the impact of such a police-imposed punishment upon individual due 
process procedural protections. Banning notices deny the recipient the right to 
conduct a defence, undermine the presumption of innocence, and conflate notions 
of pre-emption and punishment. 
The rhetoric upon which the banning notice legislation is predicated obviates 
meaningful scrutiny of the diminution of individual rights that are implicit in its 
enactment. A perceived ‘need’ to control disorder and ‘re-balance’ justice to prioritise 
community protection is used to legitimise any consequential impact upon the 
principles of criminal law, due process and human rights. 
Key words: police-imposed punishment, discretionary summary justice, due 
process, criminal justice procedures, banning notice provisions, individual rights
Introduction 
The notion of the state regulation of behaviours, activities and space, in the pursuit 
of risk management, mitigation and security, has found increasing expression within 
criminal justice processes in recent years, both internationally and across Australia. A 
key element is the role and growth of discretionary summary justice (Morgan 2008; 
2011; Young 2008). Increasingly, punishments are being imposed that bypass the 
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formal mechanisms of the criminal justice system through the application of police-
administered justice. The rise and impact of measures such as on-the-spot fines, 
infringement notices, exclusion orders and move-on powers enable police-initiated 
resolutions and punishments to be imposed, potentially without legal or judicial 
intervention. Such developments may reflect a number of underlying pressures — for 
example, to reduce costs, ease the burden on the court system, speed up the decision-
making process, and respond to media depictions and public perceptions regarding 
problem areas and behaviours, as well as enabling minor and first-time offenders to 
avoid the effects of criminalisation. However, when viewed from the perspective of 
human rights, judicial procedural protections and due process, there are significant 
consequences inherent in a move towards police-imposed punishments. Most 
discretionary powers are applied to lower level behaviours, where scrutiny and 
explicit application of human rights and civil liberties are less evident (Valverde 
2009). 
Through an examination of Victoria’s banning notice provisions (Liquor Control 
Reform Amendment Act 2007 (Vic); Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime 
Assistance and Other Matters) Act 2010 (Vic)), this article identifies specific due process 
implications arising from the legislation, with particular respect to notions of pre-
emption, burden of proof and the immediate imposition of penalties. Issues relating 
to legislative, public and judicial accountability, as well as broader human rights 
considerations, are then discussed in the light of the implementation and application 
of the banning notice provisions.
Criminal justice and human rights
Individual rights should be maintained through the independence and separation 
of the judiciary and judicial functions, at both federal and state/territory levels. 
Separation of powers is fundamental to the effective operation of the criminal justice 
system, ensuring the protections and safeguards embedded within it (Wheeler 
1997; 2004; Bateman 2009). This is bolstered by the formalisation of criminal process 
procedures and due process rights in state, national and international declarations 
and conventions. Due process comprises both procedural and substantive principles. 
Procedural principles find expression in the criminal justice framework in a number 
of specific protections encompassing the presumption of innocence, the opportunity 
to effect a defence, the right to legal representation, and the right of the accused not 
to be compelled to confess their guilt (Bateman 2009; Keyzer 2008). Clear procedures 
underpin the functioning of criminal justice processes, ideally ensuring consistency, 
transparency and accountability. 
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Expectations and experiences of human rights and civil liberties animate legal 
stakeholders, judicial theorists, politicians and the media. The assumption that the 
criminal process be subject to safeguards should elicit little controversy. Whether the 
safeguards are constitutional in basis or exercised through statutory limits placed 
upon the police, legislative and judicial bodies, they are ‘norms to which any decent 
state should aspire’ (von Hirsch and Simester 2006, 173). Such a due process depiction 
reflects a need to successfully surmount a set of obstacles in the pursuit of justice 
(Packer 1968, 163). Evolving human rights-focused models of the criminal justice 
system (Roach 1999; Zedner 2005; Ashworth and Redmayne 2010; Dripps 2011) 
perceive these obstacles as protective barriers designed to safeguard the rights and 
liberties of individuals against the potential power of the state, exercised through 
agencies such as the police.
Public compliance with the law is predicated, in part, upon perceptions of procedural 
fairness, validity and effectiveness that comprise and underpin police legitimacy (for 
example, Tyler 2006; Murphy 2009; Tankebe 2013). The growing use of risk-focused, 
administrative and pre-emptive responses to crime and disorder is increasingly 
competing with expectations of human rights in police interactions with the public 
(von Hirsch and Simester 2006; Zedner 2007a; 2010; O’Malley 2010; Ashworth and 
Redmayne 2010). Conceived as a manifestation of governmental regulatory control, 
‘police power’ reflects a drive to manage crime and public behaviour (Dubber 
2005; 2011). This is particularly prevalent at the lower level of offending through 
mechanisms, such as infringement notices, that control and regulate an increasing 
range of activities and behaviours (Ashworth and Zedner 2008; Crawford 2009). 
With a focus upon public interest and protection, control and risk management 
are prioritised in the best interests of the community (Dubber 2005; 2011). While 
definitions of criminality are vague, the scope of the criminalisation of behaviours, 
activities and space continues to expand (Dubber and Valverde 2008; Pantazis 2008; 
Crawford 2009; 2011), along with the range of discretionary police powers. This 
article focuses on one manifestation of this broader trend: namely, the introduction of 
banning provisions in Victoria.
Victoria’s banning provisions
Liquor licence reforms, taxation changes and deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s, 
rooted in the 1986 Nieuwenhuysen report (Nieuwenhuysen 1986) on liquor licensing, 
led to significant growth in the alcohol industry across Victoria, and a proliferation 
of licensed premises and entertainment precincts. Alcohol-related problems evolved 
and escalated in parallel (Zajdow 2011). In common with jurisdictions across 
Australia, Victoria’s burgeoning night-time economy, and the impact of changing 
patterns and trends in alcohol consumption and behaviour, led to a series of licensing 
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and operational measures (Doherty and Roche 2003; McIlwain and Homel 2009; 
Department of Justice 2009). Victoria’s Alcohol Action Plan: 2008–13 (Department 
of Justice 2008) presented a suite of initiatives targeting a reduction in the impact 
of alcohol-fuelled violence and anti-social behaviour, a key tenet of which was the 
banning notice provisions enacted in the Liquor Control Reform Amendment Act 2007 
(Vic) (LCRA Act).
The LCRA Act was the first Victorian legislation to introduce the notion of the 
prohibition of individuals from a defined designated area for a fixed period of 
time — initially 24 hours, it was increased to 72 hours under the Justice Legislation 
Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance and Other Matters) Act 2010 (Vic) (JLA Act). 
Reflecting the re-emergence of banishment1 as a method to control people and 
behaviours (Beckett and Herbert 2010a), and a movement towards the criminalisation 
of public space (Crawford and Lister 2007; Pantazis 2008; Hancock 2008; Beckett and 
Herbert 2010b), banning notices apply to declared designated areas. An area may 
be declared if ‘alcohol-related violence or disorder has occurred in a public place 
that is in the immediate vicinity of the licensed premises within the area’ (LCRA 
Act, s 147(1a)), and if it is believed that the imposition of banning notices may be 
effective in controlling or preventing alcohol-related violence or disorder in the area. 
Victoria’s first two designated areas were declared by the Victorian Commission for 
Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR) in December 2007, within days of the 
legislation passing through parliament. These areas were the Melbourne Central 
Business District (CBD) and Prahran/South Yarra, incorporating the Chapel Street 
entertainment precinct of inner Melbourne (VCGLR 2013). The application and reach 
of designated areas increased steadily. By February 2013, 18 designated zones had 
been declared across Victoria, in both metropolitan and regional areas, typically 
encompassing key entertainment districts within major towns, cities and suburbs 
(VCGLR 2013). 
The LCRA Act afforded police on-the-spot powers to ban troublemakers and those 
perceived to be behaving in an anti-social manner from the designated area. While 
1 Exile and banishment were used widely across ancient empires, in the emergent United States, in the 
Soviet Union, during British colonial rule and generally under more authoritarian forms of governance 
(Borrelli 2002; Beckett and Herbert 2010a). In jurisdictions across the United States, Western Europe 
and Australia, banishment and exclusion have been reintroduced under the guise of social control, 
law enforcement and the management of public space (Young 2007; Beckett and Herbert 2010a; 2010b; 
Crawford 2011).
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not a criminal sanction, the imposition of a banning notice is recorded indefinitely 
on the Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) database.2 Specified offences 
for which banning notices may apply are documented in the LCRA Act (s 7 Sch 2). 
A banning notice may also be imposed in anticipation of more general disorderly 
behaviours, as perceived by police officers, for which a specified offence may not 
exist (LCRA Act, s 148B). Breach provisions are outlined in the legislation and may 
be initiated if a banned person is caught returning to the prohibited area within the 
period of the ban. Initially financial, breach penalties carry the usual potential to 
lead to criminal consequences in the event of persistent noncompliance (LCRA Act, 
s 148F).
In the first five years of operation, 5364 bans were imposed across Victoria, with the 
majority (4305, or 80%) applying to Melbourne’s CBD (Victoria Police 2008; 2009; 2010; 
2011; 2012a). The proportion of recipients receiving multiple bans rose from 0.78% in 
the first year to 5.04% in the period ending June 2012 (Victoria Police 2008; 2012a).3 
From these figures, it is clear that banning notices, whether as a method of control, 
punishment or community protection, are being used extensively. Consideration of 
their potential impact upon due process procedural expectations and human rights, 
therefore, is more than merely theoretical or conceptual. 
‘Is a 24-hour ban such a bad thing?’
Banning notices may appear to be a straightforward and logical response to a clearly 
articulated issue. They remove those causing problems from the area in which 
they are causing them. Leaving aside the difficulty of enforcement — and more 
fundamental issues associated with exclusionary practices, particularly in relation 
to vulnerable groups — ‘Is a 24 hour ban such a bad thing?’ (Legislative Assembly 
2007b, 4072 (Ms Thomson)). Bans may seem innocuous and a sensible addition to 
the options available to police officers on the street. However, a number of specific 
due process issues are embedded within Victoria’s banning provisions, reflecting 
their permissible pre-emptive application, their changes to the usual burden-of-proof 
requirements, and their immediate imposition.
2 Introduced in 1993, LEAP is a dynamic database recording Victoria’s crime-related data and 
information. It is used for operational policing and statistical analysis of individual offences, penalties, 
missing persons and so on. An individual’s record may remain on LEAP indefinitely (Victoria Police 
2012b). 
3 Victoria Police data does not detail the demographics or any specific information for multiple recipients. 
This prevents analysis of any trends or patterns underpinning this increase.
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Pre-emptive application
Banning notices may be imposed pre-emptively. A notice may be given if a police 
officer reasonably believes that it may prevent the recipient continuing to commit 
a specified offence or committing a further offence. Crucially, though, no actual 
offence need have been committed. In effect, officers may issue a banning notice in 
anticipation of problematic behaviour. While there are specified offences for which a 
ban may be imposed (LCRA Act, s 7 Sch 2), more general behaviours that may lead 
to banning notices are much more loosely defined, are determined on-the-spot by 
police officers, are discretionary in their application, and do not necessarily pass the 
threshold of criminality for which a specified offence may exist. While not discussed 
here, the merits of not criminalising individuals for engaging in problematic or 
undesirable behaviours are acknowledged. However, measures that are put in place 
in lieu of a criminal sanction but restrict the rights of recipients, and from which 
criminal consequences may follow, should still aspire to the expectations inherent in 
due process procedural protections in particular and human rights in general.
Such pre-emptive imposition personifies the temporal and conceptual depiction of 
pre-crime articulated by Feeley and Simon (1992) and cemented by Zedner (2007a), 
Pantazis (2008), Crawford (2009; 2011) and others. It also embodies Crawford’s (2009) 
critique of the principle of governing the future, whereby early interventions, risk 
assessments and security-focused approaches fundamentally challenge traditional 
principles of criminal justice — in particular, the presumption of innocence and the 
need for a specific offence to have occurred that warrants police action. Pre-emptive 
imposition of a punishment leads to some fundamental questions, specifically in 
relation to whether intent should be assumed, whether punishment should result 
from that assumed intent, and how pre-emption is balanced with individual rights 
and community protection.
Diluted burden of proof
The dilution of the burden of proof builds upon issues embedded in the pre-emptive 
imposition of banning notices. There is no requirement for a police officer to offer 
proof that an offence has been committed or to objectively demonstrate that the 
accused intended to commit an offence. Imposition of a banning notice requires only 
that police suspect ‘on reasonable grounds’ (LCRA Act, s 148D) that an offence has 
been committed or is likely to be committed. Behaviours for which banning notices 
may be imposed are loosely drawn, largely subjectively determined, and described in 
normative terms such as ‘disorderly’, ‘anti-social’ and ‘quarrelsome’. That no proof, 
evidence or witnesses are required for a banning notice to be imposed adds to the 
potential fluidity of the behaviours that may lead to such a penalty. Compounding 
the effect of changes to the burden of proof when a ban is imposed is the application 
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of the reverse onus principle to breach proceedings (LCRA Act, s 148F(3)). Not only 
are recipients denied the presumption of innocence in receiving their ban, if they are 
accused of a breach they must prove their defence beyond reasonable doubt.
Immediate imposition; no judicial oversight
The banning notice sanction is imposed and takes effect on-the-spot. The immediate 
nature of the penalty — along with the absence of any need to prove intended or actual 
behaviours — is heightened further by there being no recourse to legal representation 
or capacity to independently challenge the imposition of a ban. The decision is made 
and the penalty is imposed on the street, in real time. Anyone to whom a banning 
notice is to be given must provide their name and address to the requesting police 
officer (LCRA Act, s 148D). Penalties exist for refusal to do so ‘without a reasonable 
excuse’ (s 148D(3a)), but what is meant by this is not defined in the legislation. 
Recipients are effectively compelled to accept the notice and, therefore, their guilt. 
The legislation is bolstered by the permissible use of ‘reasonable force’ to ensure 
that the banned person leaves the designated area (s 148H). No provision exists for 
legal representation and, reflecting the burden-of-proof requirements, no evidence or 
witness details need be recorded.
Unlike other legislation that permits the imposition of on-the-spot penalties, such as 
speeding fines, there is no realistic opportunity to appeal or seek a review of a banning 
notice decision. Section 16 of the Infringements Act 2006 (Vic) outlines the options 
available for recipients of penalty notices who wish to challenge their imposition, and 
the penalty — typically a fine — is not required to be paid until the review process is 
complete. Due process is enabled prior to the punishment taking effect. 
In the case of banning notices, the immediate nature of the sanction means that such 
a challenge is rendered impossible. The only avenue for the recipient of a banning 
notice to appeal its impact or perceived validity is in writing to a police officer above 
the rank of sergeant (LCRA Act, s 148E(1)). The likelihood of being able to submit 
such a written application and receive a response within the period for which the 
ban is enacted is debatable. No records are available detailing how many of these 
applications, if any, have been made. And no appeal is possible beyond the realm of 
the police. During parliamentary debate on the Liquor Control Reform Amendment 
Bill 2007 (Vic) (LCRA Bill), an amendment to permit judicial appeal was approved 
by the Legislative Council (Legislative Council 2007, 3891). This would allow a 
banning notice decision to be reviewed in court and the record to be expunged from 
an individual’s LEAP database entry if its imposition was found to be inappropriate. 
Clear concern is evident in the parliamentary debate, manifested as principled 
support for the right to a court-based appeal against a banning notice:
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We believe that if you can challenge a parking fine in court, you should be able to challenge 
a banning order in court. [Legislative Assembly 2007a, 4405 (Mr O’Brien).]
I must say as a matter of general principle we think the amendments themselves are 
common sense and sensible, because the notion of a banning notice being issued in the 
manner which is contemplated by the bill is something which ought as a general principle 
carry a right of appeal. [Legislative Assembly 2007a, 4405 (Mr Ryan).]
… how absolutely appalling it is for the Attorney-General to be seeking to deny to citizens 
a right of appeal to the courts to clear their name and to have the law upheld. [Legislative 
Assembly 2007a, 4406 (Mr Clark).]
However, as part of openly articulated concessions to ensure timely passage of the 
LCRA Bill through parliament on the last sitting day of 2007, the amendment to 
permit a right of judicial appeal against a banning notice was overturned in the 
Legislative Assembly (Legislative Assembly 2007a).
Judicial oversight is only possible when a banning notice recipient is accused of 
breaching their ban. As the breach of a banning provision is regarded as a criminal 
offence, due process is therefore enabled (LCRA Act, s 148F(3)). There is perhaps 
some irony that the reasons for the imposition of a ban (which may involve an 
accusation of problematic or serious behaviours) may not be judicially challenged, 
but the fact of a breach (which requires entry into a designated space — an action 
not typically regarded as criminal) carries full judicial and procedural protections. 
However, there are no records of any court-based breach proceedings in relation to 
a banning notice.
The LCRA Act has created and embedded a number of fundamental challenges to 
core due process protections and, as a consequence, to the individual human rights of 
recipients. The effect of these specific issues is compounded by the ways in which the 
implementation and operation of the banning provisions are rendered accountable.
Accountability vacuum
Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Charter Act) took effect 
in January 2007. Three core principles underpin the application of the Charter Act:
• when developing new laws, parliament must consider human rights and how 
proposed legislative changes may affect them;
• all public organisations must consider and comply with the Charter’s stated 
human rights in all matters that affect the public; and
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• judicial processes must ensure that the interpretation of laws is compatible 
with the Charter requirements (Charter Act, s 1).
The primary objective of the LCRA Act may be laudable: a targeted response to a 
perceived risk or challenge. However, broader consequences and what should be an 
overriding need for accountability in the administration of justice, and the assurance 
of human rights, should not be subsumed by a drive to be seen to do something.4 To 
this end, banning notices appear to operate within something of an accountability 
vacuum, which lacks effective mechanisms across the three key domains reflected in 
the Charter Act principles (legislative, public and judicial) — each of which should 
work to ensure Charter Act compliance, transparency, scrutiny and the necessary 
accountability.
Legislative
The Charter Act requires parliament to present a Statement of Compatibility for all 
proposed legislation to ensure human rights compliance, and to document and justify 
any potential areas of noncompliance (Charter Act, s 28). That a banning notice is 
not a criminal sanction is referenced across the parliamentary debate to minimise 
the need to comply with the detailed provisions of the Charter Act (for example, 
Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4067; Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4072). This is despite 
the potential consequences for repeated noncompliance, and the fact that personal 
details are recorded as a permanent record on the LEAP database. Specifically, ss 24 
and 25 of the Charter Act, regarding rights to a fair hearing and rights in criminal 
proceedings, are not addressed in the Statement of Compatibility for the LCRA Bill, 
with specific respect to the imposition of a banning notice (Legislative Assembly 
2007c). They are discussed in relation to breach proceedings, but no mention is made 
of their relevance or application to the initial imposition of a ban.
Concern is evident in the parliamentary debate of the LCRA Bill regarding civil 
liberties and the potential incompatibility of banning provisions with a number of 
core human rights — in particular, freedom of movement, the right to a fair trial, 
and the right to judicial consideration of the impact and appropriateness of a penalty 
(Legislative Assembly 2007a; Legislative Assembly 2007b; Legislative Council 2007). 
However, justifications of the interests of the greater good and the need for public 
protection are used repeatedly to counter concerns regarding the impact of provisions 
4 The LCRA Act was one of a number of targeted responses to address issues relating to alcohol-related 
violence and disorder — what John Brumby, then state Premier, regarded as ‘the biggest social issue 
facing Victoria’ (Whinnett 2007).
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upon individual recipients. Victoria’s then Attorney-General, Rob Hulls, insisted that 
banning notices are not a punishment and that their purpose is to protect (Legislative 
Assembly 2007a, 4405). When justifying the extension of the banning period to 
72 hours, Mr Hulls highlighted the precedent already set with respect to 24-hour bans 
not impacting the human right to freedom of movement:
In effect, these provisions ensure that banning notices are only given where there are strong 
community protection grounds for doing so … As such, while it is possible that a 72-hour 
banning notice issued on a weekend may now prevent a person from availing themselves 
of the most efficient or timely route to, for example, their place of work on the following 
Monday, in my opinion, the purpose that is fulfilled by such a notice outweighs any 
temporary inconvenience that may or may not be caused to that person.
The potential for any such inconvenience was also possible … under the previous 24-hour 
maximum period. For example, a notice issued on a Friday night may have prevented a 
person from conveniently travelling to his or her place of work on the Saturday. [Scrutiny 
of Acts and Regulations Committee 2010, 14.]
Any impact upon individual rights was deemed irrelevant by Mr Hulls, as the notion 
of banishment had already been approved on the overriding principle of protection 
of the public. This merits consideration regarding how much further such a rationale 
could be taken.
Public
In an attempt to ensure the appropriate and proportionate use of the banning 
provisions, the need for Victoria Police to publish detailed statistics was articulated 
during parliamentary debate of the LCRA Bill (Legislative Assembly 2007b; 
Legislative Council 2007). The legislated requirements include the publication of 
the reason for the imposition of each notice, where they were imposed, and key 
demographics of each recipient (LCRA Act, s 148R). The provision of this data is cited 
in parliamentary debate as the vehicle for public scrutiny of the appropriateness of 
banning provisions, of the behaviours for which bans are imposed, and, in particular, 
of any disproportionate impact upon defined demographic groups (Legislative 
Assembly 2007b; Legislative Council 2007). While not stated explicitly, implied is 
the need to ensure a perception of police legitimacy in the discretionary power to 
ban. Yet an amendment to trigger a review of the legislation if certain groups were 
found to be adversely affected was rejected (Legislative Council 2007, 3894). The 
formal recording and publishing of specified data was regarded as a sufficient check 
to ensure the appropriate implementation of the legislation: ‘Any of the figures in 
the report indicating that particular groups are the subject of banning or exclusion 
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orders should be the subject of public debate rather than subject to ministerial review’ 
(Legislative Council 2007, 3894 (Ms Lovell)). The published data, along with its public 
scrutiny, was to be the safety net for individual rights.
However, the data required to do this has not been published, contrary to the 
legislated requirements. General data has been made available in terms of overall 
numbers of notices, where they were imposed and the age ranges of recipients. 
However, the data lacks granularity and key specifics are missing or vague. Other 
than in the first year of publication, both the Indigenous status of recipients and the 
specific reasons for which bans are imposed are not reported appropriately (Victoria 
Police 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012a).
Failure to publish fully the mandated banning notice data renders assessment of 
their precise impact problematic. In particular, lack of scrutiny limits identification 
of specific consequences for defined or vulnerable groups. Other than by general 
age category, it is simply not possible to elucidate any common characteristics or 
features of banning notice recipients in terms of their behaviours, their gender, their 
ethnicity or any discernible vulnerability. For example, the proportion of recipients 
whose Indigenous status is recorded as ‘unknown’ increased from 0% in the first 
(part) year, ending June 2008, peaking at 46% in the year ending June 2011 and 35% 
in the year ending June 2012 (Victoria Police 2008; 2011; 2012a). The Indigenous 
status of a significant minority of ban recipients is unrecorded, and understanding 
of the impact of banning on Indigenous citizens is limited — contrary to legislative 
requirements and parliamentary expectations. Public examination and scrutiny of the 
actual operation of police-imposed banning provisions are therefore compromised. 
The way in which banning notices are imposed places significant emphasis upon 
police discretion. Without robust public scrutiny, the potential for discriminatory 
application is considerable. Given the fluid and subjective nature of the behaviours 
that may lead to the imposition of a banning notice, their permissible pre-emptive 
nature, the lack of evidence required, and the absence of judicial oversight, the 
execution of police discretion is fundamental to the impact upon the human and 
procedural rights of recipients, and consequential perceptions of police legitimacy. 
Police decisions are influenced by multiple and complex factors. In the context of the 
discretionary power to ban, the potential for personal bias, stereotyping, prejudice 
and subjectivity is enhanced and enabled by the opacity of the scrutiny of notices 
imposed. Discriminatory policing that disproportionately targets ethnic and other 
vulnerable groups is the subject of extensive research (for example, Tyler and Waksak 
2004; Bowling and Phillips 2007; Gray 2011). Acknowledging the significance of 
police legitimacy in ensuring public confidence, and following allegations of endemic 
racial profiling, in 2013 Victoria Police published a strategy to address discriminatory 
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policing, improve community engagement and ensure individual rights. That report 
emphasises the need to remove prejudice, personal assumptions and unconscious 
bias from the decision-making process (Victoria Police 2013, 9). However, the 
discretionary nature of banning notices and the failure to publish the required data 
limits any meaningful analysis or assessment of the application of banning notice 
powers, in particular the use of racial or any type of discriminatory profiling.
Judicial
Whether or not formally categorised as criminal sanctions, manifestations of state 
control (in the case of banning notices via the police) that carry the risk of significant 
impact on individual rights should be subject to careful and ongoing scrutiny. To 
this end, legislation is typically tested and verified through judicial channels and 
processes, such as court-based appeals. Judicial accountability is thereby rendered 
clear and visible. That no appeal beyond the police is permitted in relation to the 
imposition of a banning notice, unless breach proceedings are initiated, means that 
there is no legal scrutiny of the legislation. The issues associated with enabling an 
immediate appeal that would delay the imposition of the ban are acknowledged. 
However, the reasons why no subsequent judicial appeal is permitted are much less 
clear.
Despite the principled concerns expressed about the absence of a right of appeal, 
analysis of parliamentary debate suggests a prevailing view that only those who 
deserve to be affected by a banning notice will actually be affected. A picture is 
painted of alcohol-fuelled troublemakers who are making life a misery for the 
majority of law-abiding citizens and who therefore fully deserve whatever penalty is 
enacted upon them. One member commented:
This is a good provision, and it seems foolhardy to suggest that a person should be able to 
appeal it, which is why we oppose that amendment … Is a 24-hour ban such a bad thing? 
One would suggest that if someone is so concerned about it, maybe they should have been 
banned for 24 hours. [Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4072 (Ms Thomson).]
The debate appears to embody the paradoxical dichotomy that we all have rights, 
but some deserve more rights than others. Implied is an assumption that the rights 
of those from whom the community needs to be protected must be conceded to the 
overriding rights of the broader community. Embedded within the parliamentary 
discourse is the notion of ‘them’ and ‘us’. Those causing problems, ‘them’, are 
perceived and presented as being less deserving of their rights than the majority, 
‘us’. This presumption remains unchallenged, and the undesirable minority is 
marginalised through the political debate and resulting legislation (van Dijk 1993; 
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Burnside 2007). As a result, Victoria’s banning notice legislation has been legitimised 
effectively through ministerial statement, rhetoric and use, rather than procedural 
and judicial scrutiny. Its worth is implied and assumed, and its application is 
subject to limited scrutiny and accountability. Victoria’s Charter Act makes it clear 
that human rights apply to everyone; they are not relative, discriminatory or more 
applicable to any one group. The way in which the banning provisions can be 
imposed undermines this fundamental expectation.
Legitimised through use rather than scrutiny
Whatever the desired end, the consequences of the chosen means must be fully 
understood (Waldron 2003; Zedner 2007b). Responses that are put in place to address 
a specific issue, but lack or compromise established due process and structural 
accountability, may not only impact human rights and procedural protections in 
themselves, but may also risk being extended and applied more broadly. Despite the 
due process and human rights issues that are evident, the way in which the need 
for banning provisions has been justified raises a number of concerns. These relate 
in particular to an ongoing lack of scrutiny of the individual impact and general 
effectiveness of the legislation, yet within the context of a continued assumed need, 
the conflation of intent and punishment, and the potential for the normalisation of a 
police-imposed discretionary sanction — in spite of the issues that it embodies. 
Need, effectiveness and public protection 
The rhetoric upon which banning legislation has been predicated has reduced debate 
and diminished any challenge to the diminution of due process protections and 
individual rights that are explicit and implicit in its enactment. Parliamentary debate 
of the proposed legislation assumes the existence of a serious problem, from which 
the broader community must be protected. Anecdotes and hypothetical scenarios are 
presented, employing persuasive techniques of hyperbole and the language of fear. 
For example, requests for an amendment permitting judicial appeal are countered 
with responses such as:
[Opponents of the legislation are] trying to wreak havoc by allowing drunks and people 
who are drug affected to rampage through communities, venues, shopping centres, 
neighbourhoods and streets … [Legislative Assembly 2007a, 4405 (Mr Batchelor).]
… you could have Alphonso doing all sorts of antisocial things in Chapel Street. Under 
that earlier provision a police officer would come up and try to give him a banning notice. 
Alphonso would say, ‘Hold on, I’ve got my lawyer here. I want you to withdraw the 
banning notice. We will see you in the Magistrates Court tomorrow, and we will sort out 
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the propriety of the banning order which is meant to apply now. We will sort that out in 
two or three weeks time’ … It would have been a lawyer’s picnic. [Legislative Assembly 
2007a, 4406 (Mr Robinson).]
Despite the rhetoric, specific analysis of the issues that banning notices are designed to 
address is not evident within the debate. Similarly, each application to designate a new 
declared area, such as the Melbourne Docklands (Future Melbourne Committee 2011), 
is embedded with assumptions about both the problem that needs to be addressed 
and the effectiveness of banning as the proposed solution. Official crime figures are 
used to imply that banning notices are effective in reducing rates of certain offences. 
For example, offences relating to behaviour in public reduced from 8322 in 2009–10 
to 6414 in 2011–12, or by approximately 30% (Victoria Police 2012b, 48). However, 
variations in offence rates reflect more than the imposition of banning notices. A 
number of initiatives and legislative changes occurred alongside the introduction 
of banning provisions. New penalty infringement notices for riotous, offensive and 
indecent behaviours and language were enacted in July 2008 (Infringements and Other 
Acts Amendment Act 2008 (Vic), Pt 2). In December 2009, amendments to the Summary 
Offences Act 1966 (Vic) introduced move-on powers and expanded the use and 
application of infringement notices for public drunkenness and anti-social behaviour 
(Summary Offences and Control of Weapons Acts Amendment Act 2009 (Vic), Pts 2 and 3). 
Like banning notices, infringement penalties are not criminal offences. Official crime 
figures may suggest that rates of key offence types are reducing, but data relating to 
infringement and banning notices are typically not included. Those who may have 
previously been charged (and afforded full procedural rights) may now be dealt 
with differently (Victoria Police 2012b). Behaviours, therefore, have not necessarily 
changed, but operational police responses have. There remains no empirical evidence 
to support the actual effectiveness of banning notices, yet their permissible use and 
scope continue to be expanded. 
The legislative development of banning notices in Victoria can be explained as a 
response to perceived challenges relating to alcohol-related violence and disorder 
in the night-time economy, but specific due process consequences have received 
only limited consideration. Similarly, broader issues relating to human rights and 
civil liberties, while acknowledged in parliamentary debate, have been largely 
subsumed to the clearly articulated interests of the greater good and public protection 
(Legislative Assembly 2007a; 2007b; Legislative Council 2007). The application of 
banning provisions — being low level, immediate and ‘on-the-street’ — has served to 
limit their legal and critical scrutiny. Lack of information and data regarding their use 
similarly restricts meaningful analysis. The perceived pressing need upon which the 
banning provisions continue to be based finds only limited resonance with respect to 
broader notions of human rights and civil liberties. 
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Pre-emption, intent and punishment
The way in which the banning provisions have been drawn up conflates notions 
of pre-emption, intent and punishment. Lacking judicial examination or any 
independent review mechanism, banning notices may be imposed following an 
assessment by a police officer of a potential behaviour. The sanction, while initially 
administrative in application, carries a tangible impact upon the human right of 
freedom of movement. A banning notice breach may lead to criminal prosecution. 
Implied throughout the legislation is the bundling up of more traditional responsive 
policing with anticipatory and pre-emptive controls. As an end-to-end process, 
banning notices arguably hybridise two criminal justice paradigms, creating what 
could be termed the ‘pre-crime: crime-control’ model (Packer 1968; Feeley and Simon 
1992; Zedner 2007a).
The lack of data reporting the offences and behaviours for which banning notices 
have been imposed means that there is no clear knowledge of how banning powers 
are actually being applied, or who is being impacted. Their legitimacy cannot be 
verified. Extensions, to both the length of bans and the increasing number of areas in 
which they apply, have been justified essentially with the rationale that it has been 
okay so far, so extending them will be okay too (Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations 
Committee 2010). Such scope creep within such an accountability vacuum is a high 
risk endeavour. In this case, the process is reliant almost entirely upon the appropriate 
and proportionate application of the legislation by police, but without any effective 
capacity to empirically examine this.
Normalisation of the exceptional?
Lack of legislative and ongoing scrutiny risks normalising exceptional responses. 
Crawford (2009) argues that powers may be introduced, initially as exceptional 
measures, that are time limited or spatially restricted (such as banning notices), but 
which later become routinised — need and success are assumed, momentum builds, 
scope and impact expand, and the exceptional transitions into the normal. The 
experience of police-imposed powers in other jurisdictions offers a useful comparison 
and a framework from which to consider Victoria’s banning legislation. 
One example is the UK dispersal order. Introduced in the Anti-social Behaviour Act 
2003 (UK) (ss 30–36) as a specific measure to be used only in pre-designated areas 
for a specific purpose, a 48-hour dispersal order may now be imposed anywhere 
with blanket restrictions, preclusions and prohibitions (Crawford and Lister 2007; 
Crawford 2011). Under new provisions in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing 
Act 2014 (UK), a police officer need only be satisfied that dispersal will prevent 
members of the public being ‘harassed, alarmed or distressed’ (s 35). Children as 
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young as 10 may be subject to dispersal and those over 16 may receive a community 
protection notice if their ‘conduct is unreasonable’ (s 43). Failure to comply could 
result in imprisonment (ss 39, 48). This legislative progression is underpinned, again, 
by assumption regarding the nature of the problem, but with limited monitoring and 
scrutiny of the solution.
The normalisation thesis excites critics and proponents alike. Perspectives contrary 
to the notions of net-widening and progressive normalisation of policy may 
acknowledge the more pessimistic viewpoint with respect to civil liberties and 
procedural protections. However, their focus reflects advances and improvements as 
a result of mechanisms such as human rights charters and conventions (Waddington, 
Stenson and Don 2004; Waddington 2005). Pessimists are accused of focusing 
upon potential rather than actual affects. Rather than being a one-way ‘slippery 
slope’ (Waddington 2005, 369), criminal justice policy and practice are ‘a hotly 
contested terrain’ (Waddington 2005, 371) where civil liberties may be improved 
and extended, as well as diminished. However, examples such as human rights 
charters are not necessarily sufficient proof of the advancement of civil liberties. 
They are an aspirational framework and their true value lies in the way in which 
they are implemented and enforced. Victoria’s banning provisions exemplify how 
requirements and protections articulated in the Charter Act are flexed and waived 
by ministerial statement in the interests of loosely framed public protection, 
demonstrating the subjective and limited nature of the human rights that the Charter 
Act purports to ensure. 
Conclusion
Central to the thesis presented here is that police-imposed discretionary justice 
risks subordinating individual human rights to loosely defined but overriding 
needs of public protection. Whatever the nature of the alleged activity, when 
penal consequences follow there must be clear processes, protections and scrutiny. 
Victoria’s Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission, in its 2012 review of 
the Charter Act, emphasised the fundamental role of judicial oversight:
Courts and tribunals play a crucial role in the Charter’s human rights protection 
framework. They are a mechanism where Victorians can hold government and public 
authorities to account for conduct that infringes their rights. [VEOHRC 2012, 30.]
As they stand, the banning provisions lack any judicial scrutiny of the operation of 
the legislation, and also lack effective public scrutiny due to the failure to publish 
required data. The efficacy and effectiveness of banning provisions are assumed 
and largely unchallenged, bolstered by parliamentary debate and the convenient 
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application of crime statistics. But the way in which the banning notice legislation 
has been framed, implemented and extended has three core implications, all of which 
merit ongoing examination: a police-imposed discretionary punishment operating 
largely without meaningful measurement or effective accountability; the embedded 
notion of ‘re-balancing’ the provision of justice for the ‘greater good’ of public 
protection, but which undermines the separation of powers and individual rights; 
and the ability of the Victorian parliament to circumvent the Charter Act but without 
rigorous scrutiny of the human rights impact of legislation. ●
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Unspeakably present: the (un)acknowledgment  
of diverse sexuality and gender human rights in  
Australian youth justice systems
Kelly Richards and Angela Dwyer* 
A number of international human rights frameworks protect the rights of young 
people in contact with the criminal justice system in states parties, including Australia. 
These frameworks inform youth justice policy in Australia’s jurisdictions. While the 
frameworks protect young people’s right to non-discrimination on the grounds of 
‘race’, religion and political opinion, the rights of young people to non-discrimination 
on the grounds of sexuality and gender diversity are not explicitly protected. This 
is problematic given that lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) 
young people appear over-represented in youth justice systems.
This article argues that the exclusion of this group from human rights frameworks 
has an important flow-on effect: the marginalisation of the right of LGBTIQ young 
people to non-discrimination in policy and discourse that is informed by international 
human rights frameworks. 
After outlining the relevant frameworks, this article examines the evidence about 
LGBTIQ young people’s interactions with youth justice agencies, particularly police. 
The evidence indicates that the human rights of LGBTIQ young people are frequently 
breached in these interactions. We conclude by arguing that it is timely to consider 
how best to protect the human rights of LBGTIQ young people and keep their rights 
on the agenda. 
Keywords: human rights; youth justice; lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, intersex and 
queer young people 
Introduction
While there has been much progress in youth justice systems to acknowledge the 
diversity of young people (AHRC 2008), some forms of diversity are yet to be 
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explicitly acknowledged in international human rights frameworks that relate to 
youth justice. While international frameworks note that young people should be 
protected from discrimination on the grounds of ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or 
other status’, for instance, they are still silent on sexuality and gender diversity. While 
the United Nations has claimed that its international human rights frameworks cover 
sexuality and gender diversity (UN 2012), these specific terms are still noticeably 
absent from the frameworks and are instead covered by reference to ‘other’ statuses. 
We argue in this article that the lack of explicit acknowledgment of sexuality and 
gender diversity in international human rights frameworks creates the potential for 
the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans,1 intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) young 
people to go unacknowledged in policy and practice frameworks in youth justice 
systems in Australia. 
As LGBTIQ status is still to be recorded in the national census, we have no statistics 
on the proportion of Australian young people who identify as LGBTIQ, or how 
many of these young people come into contact with Australian youth justice systems. 
However, international research demonstrates that LGBTIQ young people comprise 
around 14 per cent of youth justice populations (Irvine 2010). If a similar proportion of 
Australian youth justice populations identify as LGBTIQ, human rights frameworks 
fail to explicitly protect the right to non-discrimination of a substantial population of 
young people in contact with youth justice systems. 
This article is divided into two parts. The first part introduces the international 
human rights frameworks that relate to youth justice, and the principles that 
these frameworks promote. It then outlines in more detail the principle of non-
discrimination contained in each of the frameworks, and demonstrates the absence 
of an explicit commitment to non-discrimination against LGBTIQ young people 
in the frameworks. The second part considers the potential consequences of this 
absence. It argues that the absence of an explicit commitment to protecting the 
human rights of LGBTIQ young people filters down to the numerous national, 
state and local government and nongovernment organisations whose policy and 
practice is informed by international human rights frameworks. Following this, it 
summarises the international research on breaches of human rights experienced by 
1 ‘Trans’ is an umbrella term used to refer to people whose physical sex does not match with how they 
experience or feel their gender identity. People who identify with this category may transition with or 
without medical intervention and may use many different types of identifiers (for example, transgender, 
transsexual, transvestite).
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LGBTIQ young people who come into contact with the police, courts and youth 
detention. We conclude by arguing that in light of this evidence, it is timely to 
consider how best to protect the human rights of LBGTIQ young people and keep 
the rights of this marginalised group on the policing, youth justice and human 
rights agenda. 
Human rights and young people in contact with the  
criminal justice system
A number of international human rights frameworks provide guidance to states 
parties, including Australia, on the principles that should underpin youth justice. The 
four primary frameworks (Goldson and Muncie 2006) are the: 
• Convention on the Rights of the Child;
• Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice;
• Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty; and 
• Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency.
Further guidance on the ‘interpretation, promotion and protection of child rights’ 
(UNICEF 2007) is provided by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC 
2007).
Collectively, these human rights frameworks promote a number of principles of 
youth justice, including that:
• a minimum age of criminal responsibility should be set;
• pre-trial safeguards should be utilised; 
• punishments for young people should be proportionate; 
• detention should only be used as a last resort; 
• capital and corporal punishment should be prohibited; and
• young people have a right to be treated without discrimination of any kind. 
Signatories to the frameworks are required to embed these principles into their 
practice with young people in contact with the criminal justice system.
The principle of non-discrimination 
As noted above, the four major human rights frameworks that relate to youth justice 
each contain the principle of non-discrimination. Article 2 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child states that:
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States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each 
child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s 
or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status. 
Similarly, Art 2.1 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice is to be:
… applied to juvenile offenders impartially, without distinction of any kind, for example as 
to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status.
Article 4 of the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty 
similarly asserts that:
The Rules should be applied impartially, without discrimination of any kind as to race, 
colour, sex, age, language, religion, nationality, political or other opinion, cultural beliefs or 
practices, property, birth or family status, ethnic or social origin, and disability. 
Likewise, the Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency state that they 
relate ‘to the rights, interests and well-being of all children and young persons’ 
(Art 7). 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC 2007, 4) also highlights the 
importance of ensuring that all young people in trouble with the law are treated 
equally:
Particular attention must be paid to de facto discrimination and disparities, which may be 
the result of a lack of a consistent policy and involve vulnerable groups of children, such 
as street children, children belonging to racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, 
indigenous children, girl children, children with disabilities and children who are 
repeatedly in conflict with the law (recidivists).
Young people’s human rights broadly, and their right to non-discrimination specifically, 
are also protected under international human rights frameworks not directly related 
to youth justice, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Further, the rights of young 
people in detention — including a right to non-discrimination — are protected by 
the UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, which, like the 
frameworks relating to youth justice, state that in the implementation of the Rules, 
‘there shall be no discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
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political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ 
(Art 6(1)). In practice, however, these frameworks are rarely evoked in relation to 
youth justice policy and practice in Australia. Rather, the Standard Minimum Rules for 
the Administration of Juvenile Justice and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
are the frameworks that most commonly provide the basis of the protection of young 
people in youth justice systems (see, for example, AJJA 1999; ACT Government 2012).
Absence of sexuality and gender diversity 
While the principle of non-discrimination is clearly a key feature of international 
human rights frameworks relating to youth justice, it is striking that sexual and 
gender diversity is absent from each of these frameworks. Indeed, while ‘race’, 
ethnicity, nationality, language, religion, political views, sex, culture and disability 
— and even recidivist status and the status and views of a young person’s parents 
and family — are all explicitly listed as grounds on which a young person must not 
be discriminated against, sexuality and gender diversity are conspicuously absent. 
This is not to say that the right to non-discrimination does not exist for LGBTIQ 
people. On the contrary, ‘United Nations treaty bodies have consistently held that 
sexual orientation and gender identity are prohibited grounds of discrimination 
under international law’ (UN 2012, 41). In particular, in the case of Toonen v Australia 
(UNHRC 1994), the UN Human Rights Committee found that ‘the reference to 
“sex” in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 [of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights] is to be taken as including sexual orientation’ (see further Shearer 
1995). In its summary of international human rights protections for LGBTIQ people, 
the United Nations (UN 2012, 40) states that ’All people, irrespective of sex, sexual 
orientation or gender identity, are entitled to enjoy the protections provided for by 
international human rights law’. It follows that the international frameworks relating 
to youth justice outlined above protect the right of LGBTIQ young people to non-
discrimination by their reference to being applied ‘without discrimination of any 
kind’ and/or to young people of any ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ (UN 2012, 
Art 2.1, emphasis added).
The use of the terminology ‘other status’ in some other international human rights 
frameworks was strategically intended to allow the frameworks to be inclusive. 
For example, according to the United Nations (UN 2012, 4), the drafters of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ‘intentionally left the grounds 
of discrimination open by using the phrase “other status”’. According to the United 
Nations (UN 2012, 40):
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These lists do not explicitly include ‘sexual orientation’ or ‘gender identity’, but they all 
conclude with the words ‘other status’. The use of the phrase ‘other status’ shows that 
the lists were intended to be open-ended and illustrative: in other words, the grounds of 
discrimination are not closed.
Decisions of various United Nations agencies have also held that sexuality and 
gender diversity are covered by these references to ‘other status’ (UN 2012). In 
relation to young people in particular, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
(UNCRC 2003, 2) has stated in a General Comment that:
States parties have the obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the 
rights set forth in the Convention [on the Rights of the Child] without discrimination 
(art. 2), including with regard to ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status’. These 
grounds also cover adolescents’ sexual orientation …
A key point of this article, however, is that although sex is listed as grounds on which 
young people in contact with the criminal justice system must not be discriminated 
against, sexuality is uniformly omitted, and although sexuality and gender diversity 
may be implicitly encompassed by principles of non-discrimination, they are not 
explicitly addressed. Further, while this comparatively recent General Comment of 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child (UN 2003, 2) has ruled that ‘other status’ 
must include ‘sexual orientation’, this remains absent from the wording of the major 
human rights frameworks that relate to youth justice. Moreover, it is important to 
note that this General Comment relates only to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child and not to any of the three other international frameworks that relate more 
specifically to youth justice. In addition, while this General Comment recognises 
‘sexual orientation’, it does not mention gender diversity, thereby excluding intersex 
and trans young people. Even if we are to assume that intersex and trans young 
people are to be included under ‘other status’, it is worth noting that neither the 
Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty nor the Guidelines for 
the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency utilise this terminology, referring instead to 
‘the rights, interests and well-being of all children and young persons’ (Guidelines, 
Art 7) or being applied ‘without discrimination of any kind’ (Rules, Art 4). While 
it seems fair to assume that the right to non-discrimination exists for all LGBTIQ 
young people in international law, our rather modest contention in this article is that 
the absence of any explicit reference to these groups of young people is potentially 
problematic and should be closely examined. 
We recognise that the omission of LGBTIQ young people from international human 
rights frameworks may have resulted from a strategic decision on the part of the 
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United Nations to ensure that conservative states did not refuse to ratify them. 
It follows that explicitly recognising the right of LGBTIQ young people to non-
discrimination might not be in the best interests either of this group specifically or 
of young people in trouble with the law more generally, as conservative states may 
resist ratifying human rights instruments that explicitly recognise and protect this 
group, which would in turn limit the protections afforded to all young people in 
contact with the justice system. Nonetheless, this article argues that the exclusion 
of this group from human rights frameworks has an important flow-on effect: the 
marginalisation of the right of LGBTIQ young people to non-discrimination in policy 
and discourse that is informed by international human rights frameworks. We turn 
our attention to this in the following section of the article. 
Considering the potential impacts of the lack of protection for LGBTIQ 
young people
The omission of sexuality and gender diversity from international human rights 
frameworks that offer protection to young people in trouble with the law has 
potentially important consequences. One consequence is that while these frameworks 
inform the objectives and operating procedures of countless organisations around the 
globe, since sexuality and gender diversity are not explicitly noted in the frameworks 
they do not filter down to these organisations and are therefore subject to a process 
of repeated omission. 
For example, the Juvenile Justice Standards of the Australasian Juvenile Justice 
Administrators (AJJA) — the ‘agreed set of standards juvenile justice services 
agencies [in Australia and New Zealand] aspire to meet’ (AJJA 2009, 11–12) — draw 
on the Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice and 
the Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty. They include a 
commitment to recognising the ‘age, sex, gender, culture and personal circumstances’ 
and the ‘cultural, linguistic and religious diversity’ of young people (AJJA 2009, 
5–6), but do not explicitly address the needs of LGBTIQ young people. Similarly, the 
AJJA’s Standards for Juvenile Custodial Facilities, which again draw heavily on the 
international frameworks relevant to youth justice, include the following standards 
for youth detention centres:
• ‘the centre recognises and responds appropriately to the linguistic and 
cultural diversity of young people’;
• ‘the centre recognises and responds appropriately to the expressed religious 
and spiritual needs of young people’; and
• ‘the centre provides age-appropriate and gender-appropriate services’ (AJJA 
1999, 11–12). 
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Again, therefore, while cultural, gender and religious diversity are explicitly 
recognised, diversity in sexuality is not. Interestingly, however, gender diversity 
is recognised in this instance. A ‘sample indicator’ of the latter standard is that 
‘there is an appropriate policy or established method of responding to the needs of 
transgender and other young people who do not fit traditional gender categories’ 
(AJJA 2009, 12). This may indicate that trans young people present more of a visible 
‘problem’ to youth detention centres than do young people with non-heterosexual 
preferences.2
Importantly, while these AJJA national standards are informed by international 
human rights frameworks, they in turn inform policy and practice in Australian youth 
justice systems. For example, Queensland’s Youth Detention Centre Operations Manual 
is ‘underpinned by a suite of policies and collectively reflects the obligations outlined 
in the Youth Justice Act 1992 and the Australasian Juvenile Justice Administrators 
(AJJA) service standards for juvenile custodial facilities’ (Queensland Government 
2013). Tasmania’s Ashley Youth Detention Centre is similarly ‘influenced by the 
Australasian Juvenile Justice Administrators Standards for Juvenile Custodial 
Facilities (AJJA Standards), which incorporates relevant United Nations standards 
and provides a benchmark for service provision and the treatment of young 
offenders’ (Tasmanian Department of Health and Human Services 2005, 10). Our 
concern here is that the omission of LGBTIQ young people from international human 
rights frameworks has a flow-on effect, resulting in their omission from national 
policies and standards and, in turn, state and territory policies and standards that 
shape youth justice practice in Australia. 
These examples demonstrate that while the international human rights frameworks 
relating to young people — including the incorporation of the principle of non-
discrimination — help shape youth justice policy in Australia and elsewhere, the 
absence of an explicit commitment to non-discrimination against sexuality and 
gender diverse young people has filtered down and resulted in its repeated omission 
from policy and discourse about youth justice. This is not to suggest, however, that 
discrimination against this group of young people occurs as a direct result of this 
omission. As many scholars lament, human rights frameworks are ‘aspirational 
documents’ (Garbarino and Briggs 2014) and do not always have their intended 
influence on policy and practice (Bessant 2009; Muncie 2008; Zigon 2014). As 
Goldson and Kilkelly argue, while international human rights standards are useful 
2 Trans young people may be detected more easily than gay or lesbian young people, as diverse sexuality 
is not always visible. Visual cues about gender non-conformity, however, can be visible, as the physical 
appearance of a trans young person may not align with more traditional expectations of masculine/
feminine dress and personal presentation.
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in curtailing some of the excesses of youth detention, their practical impact has been 
limited to date (Goldson and Kilkelly 2013). We recognise that the acknowledgment of 
a group of young people in these frameworks will not necessarily result in a practical 
reduction in discrimination faced by them. As stated above, we also recognise that 
explicitly recognising the right of LGBTIQ young people to non-discrimination 
might not be in the best interests either of this group specifically, or young people 
in contact with the criminal justice system generally, as some nations may refuse 
to ratify human rights instruments that explicitly recognise and protect this group. 
Nonetheless, given both their over-representation and their vulnerability in the youth 
justice system (discussed below), the ways in which the rights of this group might 
best be protected is a matter that must be urgently addressed. 
As noted above, there is emerging evidence that LGBTIQ young people have more 
adverse contact with criminal justice systems than do their heterosexual counterparts. 
The remainder of this article examines this research and documents the discrimination 
and mistreatment of LGBTIQ young people in youth justice systems. As much of the 
existing research examines the contact of LGBTIQ young people with the police, we 
focus predominantly on policing. However, as discriminatory policing of LGBTIQ 
young people can entrench this group of young people into the more severe stages of 
the criminal justice system, we then consider the documented experiences of LGBTIQ 
young people in court and youth detention. 
Policing LGBTIQ young people
The police are charged with maintaining order in public spaces, and it is well 
documented that LGBTIQ young people are subject to more victimisation than are 
heterosexual young people (Hillier et al 2010). This leads them to spend more time 
in public spaces. For example, homophobia from families can lead to LGBTIQ young 
people being homeless, using drugs and being reliant on activities such as ‘survival 
sex’ for food and shelter (Jordan 2000; Bontempo and D’Augelli 2001; Cochran et 
al 2002; Whitbeck et al 2004; Cull, Platzer and Balloch 2006). Such activities are 
subject to policing in public spaces. This makes LGBTIQ young people more likely 
than heterosexual young people to have interactions with criminal justice agencies 
(Himmelstein and Bruckner 2011). Even when involvement in risk-taking behaviours 
is controlled for, LGBTIQ young people are more likely to be stopped and detained 
by police than are heterosexual young people (Himmelstein and Bruckner 2011). This 
raises important questions about the extent to which the human rights of LGBTIQ 
young people — including their right to non-discrimination — are observed by police.
An emerging body of research suggests that police engagements with LGBTIQ 
young people are less than satisfactory. Dwyer’s research found that looking queer 
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can shape how policing happens for LGBTIQ young people (Dwyer 2011; 2012) and 
that police are still policing same-sex affection between young people as a form of 
public indecency (Dwyer 2012). Police officers used homophobic pejoratives, policed 
same-sex affection in public, and failed to respond when LGBTIQ young people were 
victimised. Some police even worked around legal frameworks to fine young people 
for transgressing boundaries of heteronormativity. As one young person interviewed 
for Dwyer’s study claimed (Dwyer 2012, 22):
I got a $125.00 fine for telling a copper they looked hot in their uniform, this male cop … 
’cause I was in a car when I said it, and we were driving past him, the way he charged me 
was he said I had my body parts out the window … so he wrote the fine out under that and 
… told me that he was giving me the fine because that offended him … ’cause he knew he 
couldn’t give me a fine just for telling him he was hot. [Mac, gay male, 19.]
Issues like these are echoed in the work of Amnesty International (2006), with police 
non-response reported in addition to the harassment of LGBTIQ young people in 
public spaces as a result of the enforcement of ‘quality of life’ legislation (which 
covers ‘offences’ such as ‘public nuisance’ and ‘indecency’). These practices evidently 
breach a range of human rights of LGBTIQ young people.
These issues are particularly important given that, in most jurisdictions, police can 
remand young people in custody (Richards and Renshaw 2013). While there are no 
Australian data on the number of LGBTIQ young people on custodial remand, one 
study in the United States found that LGBTIQ young people are ‘twice as likely [as 
non-LGBTIQ young people] to be held in secure detention for truancy, warrants, 
probation violations, running away and prostitution’ (Irvine 2010, 693). Further, it 
has been documented that particular groups of young people, including homeless 
young people, those in out-of-home care and/or those lacking familial support, are 
vulnerable to being placed on custodial remand by police in Australia (Richards and 
Renshaw 2013). Given that LGBTIQ young people are at high risk of being excluded 
from families and becoming homeless, it stands to reason that this group of young 
people is exceptionally vulnerable to being remanded in custody by police. 
Although little has been documented about contact of LGBTIQ young people with 
police, the emerging evidence suggests that the human rights of these young people 
are being breached. Moreover, policing decisions have serious consequences for 
young people, and can draw them further into the justice system — a system that 
has serious documented impacts on young people and communities, and one that is 
notoriously difficult to exit. The remainder of this article examines these impacts on 
LBGTIQ young people in the more severe stages of the criminal justice system: courts 
and detention. 
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LGBTIQ young people and the courts
Little has been documented specifically about how LBGTIQ young people fare in 
Australian criminal courts. International research, however, demonstrates that court 
interactions with LGBTIQ young people often fail to assist them (Majd, Marksamer 
and Reyes 2009). Feinstein et al (2001) note that LGBTIQ young people can be 
misrecognised by court staff based on their appearance and behaviours, as they may 
act ‘straight’ to avoid detection in youth justice systems. The needs of these young 
people are subsequently overlooked (Feinstein et al 2001). The international research 
also documents a lack of knowledge about LGBTIQ issues among court staff. Majd, 
Marksamer and Reyes (2009) and Marksamer (2008), for example, found that courts 
in the United States have sentenced LGBTIQ young people to programs that attempt 
to change their sexual orientation, and have included details in sentenced orders that 
require trans young people to dress according to their biological sex in the misguided 
belief that this will ‘cure’ their gender issues (Marksamer 2008). These actions breach 
the human rights of these young people and are discriminatory and harmful. While 
we are yet to document if these are issues in an Australian context, this research 
underscores the key argument of this article: that the human rights of LGBTIQ young 
people in contact with the justice system require closer examination. 
Detention and LGBTIQ young people 
International research demonstrates that the rights of LGBTIQ young people 
are transgressed in a range of circumstances in detention facilities (Estrada and 
Marksamer 2006). Curtin (2002) found that detention centre staff in the United States 
refused to allow girls to shave their heads and to demonstrate affection to other 
young people in detention. LGBTIQ young people were also isolated from young 
people of the same sex for the purposes of ‘protective’ custody (to keep them safe 
from other inmates) or ‘preventative’ custody (to prevent them from making sexual 
advances towards young people of the same sex) in detention facilities (Curtin 2002). 
In the Australian context, little has been documented about how LGBTIQ young 
people are treated in detention. One interviewee in Dwyer’s study (2011, 17), 
however, recounts her experiences with security staff in an Australian youth 
detention centre as follows:
I’m a pretty butch girl … I didn’t really get treated that well cause they were like, ‘Ah you 
should stand up for yourself you’re butch ha ha’, and it was just like ‘Yeah I’m a 14 year 
old kid with a shaved head’. [Tayden, pansexual female, 19.]
This example demonstrates that, in some cases, LGBTIQ young people are assumed 
to have particular characteristics and are therefore treated by criminal justice 
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personnel in particular (discriminatory) ways due to misguided beliefs about this 
group of young people. Issues were also raised in the recent review of Bimberi Youth 
Detention Centre in Canberra, with young people in the review noting ‘concerns 
with staff not adequately responding to taunts from other young people about race 
or sexuality’ (ACTHRC 2011, 307). 
Conclusion
There is currently only a limited body of research on the experiences of LGBTIQ 
young people with police, courts and corrections systems, particularly in the 
Australian context. As outlined above, however, the emerging literature suggests 
that this group of young people is discriminated against by criminal justice personnel 
on the grounds of sexuality and gender diversity. This supports the argument of 
Majd, Marksamer and Reyes (2009) that youth justice systems are ‘characterized by a 
profound lack of acceptance of LGBT identity’ and this can consequently mean that 
youth justice professionals and processes fail to recognise the needs of sexuality and 
gender diverse young people. The primary aim of this article is therefore to stimulate 
consideration of the human rights of this group of young people. 
While we acknowledge that the United Nations has made substantial progress to 
address issues related to discrimination on the grounds of sexuality and gender 
diversity, we have argued in this article that an explicit recognition of the right of 
LGBTIQ young people to non-discrimination is absent from international human 
rights frameworks that influence domestic policy and practice. We also acknowledge 
that many international human rights frameworks have limited practical impact. 
As Muncie (2008) notes, while the Convention on the Rights of the Child may be 
the most ratified human rights convention in the world, it is ‘lamentably also the 
most violated’. Nonetheless, as we have aimed to demonstrate in this article, these 
frameworks are cited constantly in the youth justice literature (Hammarberg 2008; 
Muncie 2008; Gray 2011; Goldson and Muncie 2012) and are referred to constantly in 
debates about youth justice policy formation (see also NSW Department of Attorney 
General and Justice 2011). Further, they are standards against which the performance 
of Australia and other states parties in youth justice is measured. Each state party to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example, is periodically assessed on 
its progress towards meeting the objectives of this framework (Goldson and Muncie 
2012; UNCRC 2012). It has been suggested that compliance with international 
frameworks could be adopted more routinely in Australian youth justice systems: 
‘the compliance of a juvenile justice department, program or intervention with 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child … could be used to measure performance’ 
(Richards 2011). Indeed, this already occurs in some organisations. For example, the 
first key performance indicator listed in the Queensland Commission for Children 
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and Young People and Child Guardian’s Strategic Plan 2011–15 (2012, 13) is the 
extent to which ‘Queensland’s performance with respect to the implementation of 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) is positive’. To 
date, however, evaluations of the compliance of various nation states with these 
frameworks have focused largely on the extent to which young people in contact 
with the justice system face discrimination on ‘racial’ or ethnic grounds (Goldson and 
Muncie 2012; Muncie 2008). The absence of any explicit right to non-discrimination 
on the grounds of sexuality and gender diversity precludes states’ performance in 
this regard from being measured.
Our concern is that as LGBTIQ young people — who are over-represented in the 
criminal justice system and who are a vulnerable group within this system — are not 
explicitly included in these frameworks, the potential exists for their human rights to 
be breached and for their needs to be overlooked. The primary message of this article 
is, therefore, that it is timely to consider how best to protect the human rights of 
LBGTIQ young people and keep the rights of this marginalised group on the policing, 
youth justice and human rights agenda. ●
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Complaints against the New South Wales Police Force: 
analysis of risks and rights in reported police conduct
Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Alan Beckley and Melissa Martin*
Citizens subjected to wrongful arrest, incivility or other police misbehaviour need 
access to a sound and objective system for making complaints about police conduct 
that infringes their fundamental human rights. This qualitative empirical study 
examined potential human rights violations in written descriptions by 91 legal 
practitioners and client advocates of events culminating in a formal complaint against 
the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF). The descriptions were systematically 
coded to identify the types of police behaviours that led to complaints, the nature 
and extent of any human rights violations, and the degree of legal risk exposure to 
the NSWPF in the reported conduct. The majority of the complaints resulted from 
police inaction (30%) or unlawful behaviour (25%), and involved moderately high or 
high risk behaviours exposing the police to potential legal liability and diminishing 
police legitimacy. The reported police conduct was not trivial and impinged upon 
multiple rights of citizens, particularly the right to security of person and equality 
before the law. Increased awareness of human rights issues implicated in citizen 
complaints and the potential for costly litigation will assist police in responding more 
effectively to complaints and will enhance community confidence in police. 
Keywords: police, accountability, citizen complaints, human rights violations 
Introduction
All people living in Australia have the right to protection from infringement of 
their fundamental human rights, whether explicitly provided by legislation or by 
international instruments. However, Australia, as a liberal democracy, is unique in 
that it does not have a national integrated human rights legal framework (Marmo, de 
Lint and Palmer 2012, 641). Residents in some states and territories, such as Victoria 
and the Australian Capital Territory, are protected by local human rights legislation 
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(Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic); Human Rights Act 2004 
(ACT)). In states and territories where no explicit rights-based legal system exists, 
such as New South Wales, all residents are accorded protections enumerated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). In 1948, all members of the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly, including Australia, adopted the UDHR (Australian 
Human Rights Commission 2006). Australia has also ratified most major international 
human rights instruments,1 and issued a standing invitation to UN human rights 
experts to visit and report on the protection of human rights in Australia (AHRC nd). 
The protection and infringement of individual human rights are inextricably linked 
with everyday operational policing activities. Many police powers — such as stop, 
search, seizure, arrest, detention and interview — impact the rights to personal 
freedom and the privacy of persons with whom police interact in the course of 
operations to prevent and detect crime. Other rights, such as freedom of speech and 
lawful assembly, are affected by policing efforts to ensure public order and to prevent 
obstruction of free passage. Furthermore, decisions relating to the granting or refusal 
of licences, which form part of police administrative activities, and access to criminal 
justice, such as the right to a fair trial and employment, affect the rights of individuals 
(Beckley 2000, 1). During normal police operations, such as crime investigations 
and peacekeeping, the human rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens can be 
infringed if police use excessive force, make a wrongful identification or arrest, fail to 
act, or simply misinterpret a situation. 
Additional sources of protection for citizens’ human rights are inherent in professional 
standards and codes of conduct for police (Prenzler, Bronitt and Beckley 2012), such 
as the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979) which states at Art 1:
Law enforcement officials shall at all times fulfil the duty imposed upon them by law, by 
serving the community and by protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with 
the high degree of responsibility required by their profession.
In New South Wales, a police officer who successfully enters the NSW Police 
Academy and becomes a police constable is bound by the following Oath of Office:
I ... swear that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady the Queen as a police officer 
without favour or affection, malice or ill-will until I am legally discharged, that I will see 
and cause Her Majesty’s Peace to be kept and preserved and that I will prevent to the best 
1 Such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Volume 20(2) Police and human rights: 1963 and 2013 83Complaints against the New South W les Police Force 
of my power all offences against that Peace and that while I continue to be a police officer 
I will to the best of my skill and knowledge discharge all the duties thereof faithfully 
according to Law. So help me God. [Police Act 1990 (NSW), s 207D.]
Moreover, the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF) Customer Service Charter 
includes items relevant to the protection of the human rights of witnesses, victims 
and community members, undertaking to ‘be accessible to all persons regardless of 
their culture, language, age, sexuality, physical and mental ability, locality and socio-
economic background’, and to treat customers ‘fairly and with respect’ (NSWPF 
2013b). 
Notably, the major instruments that protect human rights are not part of Australian 
law. The UDHR, although not a treaty, comprises part of customary international 
law and can be perceived as a source of law in Australia (Gans et al 2011, 10), 
but is non-binding. The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (UN 1979) is 
recognised worldwide in policing (Neyroud and Beckley 2001, 62; Smith 2010) as 
a guide to best practice in managing policing operations (Cawthray 2013; Prenzler, 
Bronitt and Beckley 2012). Section 47 of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 
1986 (Cth) declared that seven international instruments were part of it, including 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). However, the 
courts have held that when executive agents of the government sign a treaty this 
does not create rights or obligations for private citizens unless these instruments are 
incorporated into domestic Australian law. Therefore, the instruments are not the 
bases of any actionable rights (Gans et al 2011, 19).2 
The ICCPR encompasses all the human rights and fundamental freedoms that exist 
in other instruments, such as the UDHR. The incorporated rights most relevant to 
the investigation and prosecution of crime are the right to life (Art 6); the right to 
liberty and security of the person (Art 9); the right not to be subject to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Art 7); the right to privacy 
(Art 17); the right to silence (Art 14); and the right to a fair trial (Art 4) (Gans et al 2011, 
37). These rights are interpreted in a similar way to those enumerated in the UDHR 
and have been mentioned in many criminal and civil cases in Australia, especially 
cases on deaths in police custody (Office of Police Integrity 2009) and excessive 
use of police force (UN Human Rights Committee 2009). Some of these rights have 
been incorporated into Australian statutes and human rights law, where it exists. 
2 See Walker v Baird, 1892. An example of a law enacted to give rights to Australian citizens is the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), which emanates from the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. 
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According to Gans et al (2011, 47), the right to privacy remains ‘relatively insecure’ 
in Australia. The value of human rights in Australia has been the basis of some 
scepticism in legal circles: ‘because rights do not have an absolute value they have no 
special value at all’ (Ashworth and Redmayne 2010, 36). This somewhat jaundiced 
view seems to emanate from uncertainty of the interpretation and weight that an 
Australian court will accord to a particular right recognised under the ICCPR.3 
Many academics and international non-governmental organisations have recognised 
the importance of considering human rights in policing. For instance, police owe 
citizens a duty of care, requiring them to be ‘critically aware of shared human 
rights, and the ways these ethical stances and legal structures can lead to better 
practical outcomes for vulnerable people and populations, and all “users” more 
generally’ (Bartkowiak-Theron and Asquith 2012, 14). International sources are more 
prescriptive about human rights principles — for example, the UN training manual 
for police officers states: ‘Law enforcement officials are obliged to know, and to apply, 
international standards for human rights’ (UNOHCHR 2004, 1). 
Whereas in ex-Warsaw Pact or other countries with totalitarian regimes the 
purpose of policing is to protect the state or its ideology, the purpose of policing in 
democratic countries is ostensibly to protect the human rights of individual citizens 
— a diametrically opposite approach.4 Countries such as Australia, deemed liberal 
democracies, aspire to achieve policing models described as democratic (Bayley 2006) 
that are accountable to the public, and have attained ‘legitimacy’ (Jackson 2013). 
Political systems achieve legitimacy when they (a) meet certain objective criteria 
related to the acceptance of domestic norms; and (b) observe human rights (Hough 
3 Where it is alleged to a court that evidence presented has been unlawfully or improperly obtained, 
the court may consider whether to exercise discretion to exclude evidence obtained ‘contrary to or 
inconsistent with a right of a person recognised by the ICCPR’ (s 138(3)(f) of the Australian uniform 
evidence legislation: see, for example, the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)). This factor has been considered 
in several cases (for example, R v Sotheren, 2001) to apply to the rights of the person in accord with 
Australian law, not a wider interpretation of other jurisdictions. In addition, because Australia 
acceded to the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, complainants may petition the UN Human Rights 
Committee for a determination on whether Australian law complies with the ICCPR. If a petitioner is 
successful, through a long and painstaking process, changes to the law are not enforceable, but may be 
considered by the Australian government. The potential for success should not be dismissed, however, 
as proven by the well-known decision in Mabo v Queensland, 1992, a remarkable case in which the High 
Court of Australia first recognised the merits of native land rights of a Torres Strait Island citizen.
4 One of the authors, who was a serving police officer, witnessed this factor while working with pre-
accession countries to the European Union (Beckley 2012, 275). 
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2012; Goodman-Delahunty et al 2013b). In the criminal justice system, legitimacy 
exists when people accept that authorities have earned the right to command, 
willingly obey systems of authority, and perceive police as legitimate (Hough 2012, 
146; Goodman-Delahunty et al 2013b). Police legitimacy is intrinsically linked to 
accountability to the public (Bennett et al 2009; Mazerolle et al 2011; 2013a; 2013b; 
2013c). Police accountability is maintained through a system of complaints against 
the police scrutinised by police oversight bodies such as the Ombudsman or specific 
bodies such as the Police Integrity Commission.5 
Legitimacy, policing and the ‘social contract’
As part of the ‘social contract’ (Neyroud and Beckley 2001, 20), citizens are content 
to comply with legislation and participate in maintaining good order in return for 
protection by the state, as well as safety and security. Operational policing, by the 
nature of its activity, often engenders conflict between citizens and stakeholders6 
that culminates in complaints against the police. Members of the public require 
a fair and objective means through which to communicate their displeasure 
when they are a witness to or a victim of police conduct that entails incivility, 
dishonesty, misconduct or more serious issues such as excessive use of force or 
corruption. A complaints system is a mechanism to deter police misbehaviours, 
hold police accountable for their actions, and empower citizens to assert that 
their rights are upheld. When citizens are subject to wrongful arrest, incivility 
or other police misbehaviour, they need access to a valid and trusted system of 
complaints that, when activated, results in an open, transparent, objective, timely 
and fair investigation with an acceptable outcome in most cases (Goldsmith 1999, 
34; Prenzler 2009, 61). The significance of a well-managed complaints system in 
protecting citizens against human rights abuses should not be minimised: ‘In all 
jurisdictions, whether or not a culture of police impunity prevails, complaints and 
the way they are handled serve as important indicators of police professionalism, 
responsiveness and accountability’ (Smith 2010, 71). 
Complaints against the NSWPF
In New South Wales, legislation covering the detailed procedures for complaints 
against the police is provided by the Police Act 1990 (NSW) (Goodman-Delahunty et 
al 2012; NSWPF 2012). Media sources reported that the total number of complaints 
5 All states and territories in Australia have some form of independent oversight to ensure accountability 
of the police. See den Heyer and Beckley 2013; Goldsmith 2001; Lewis 1994.
6 The ‘stakeholders’ in this context are all members of society, whether citizens or visitors, and, in 
particular, elected members and police oversight or scrutiny bodies. 
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filed against the NSWPF in 2011 was around 7000, including both formal and 
informal complaints from internal and external sources (Domjen 2012). The numbers 
of citizen complaints against police recorded in NSWPF annual reports in recent 
years are shown in table 1. 
Despite what appears to be a substantial number of written complaints, the volume 
of recorded complaints against police in Australia has been described as ‘only the tip 
of the iceberg’ (Prenzler 2009, 61). Prior research in the United Kingdom indicated 
that up to 90% of persons who have legitimate grounds to lodge a complaint based 
on negative experiences in their interactions with police did not formally lodge a 
complaint, despite their dissatisfaction with police conduct and service (Maguire and 
Corbett 1991). 
An investigation of complaints lodged against the NSWPF in the 12-month period 
May 2009–May 2010 revealed 3131 discrete external complaints from citizens, 
extracted directly from the NSWPF computerised complaints recording system, 
‘c@ts.i’, which is the tracking system database used by the NSWPF to manage all 
written complaints, accessible to the NSW Ombudsman and the NSW Police Integrity 
Commission (Goodman-Delahunty et al 2011). A common perception among some 
police officers is that the majority of complaints are non-meritorious, initiated either 
by disgruntled suspects who are motivated to retaliate against the police or by 
housewives with too much time on their hands (Goodman-Delahunty et al 2011, ix). 
However, an analysis of the content of the complaints revealed that the majority were 
initiated by law-abiding community members who reported serious and actionable 
misconduct that exposed the NSWPF to substantial legal risk (Goodman-Delahunty 
et al 2011; 2013a). When classified using the NSWPF taxonomy, which distinguishes 
23 separate issues related to specific police behaviours, these complaints reported on 
6460 separate issues, indicating that many events reported by complainants raised 
more than one issue of alleged police misconduct (Goodman-Delahunty et al 2011). 
To date, however, few researchers have examined the nature and scope of human 
rights violations in complaints about police conduct. The current study addresses 
this issue.
Table 1: Number of complaints against the NSWPF 2009–2013
NSWPF Year of complaint Source of data
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13
Complaints per thousand 
sworn police officers
301 289 311 332 NSWPF annual 
reports (1 July to  
30 June annually)
Total number of 
complaints
5196 5516 5135 4928
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Research aims
The purpose of the current study is to examine the extent to which human rights 
abuses were alleged in police conduct that formed the basis of formal written 
complaints lodged by legal professionals and community advocates who represented 
members of the NSW community following their clients’ negative interactions with 
the police. 
Method
Research design and materials 
A mixed-method online survey questionnaire containing 42 questions was designed 
in collaboration with Community Legal Centres NSW7 (Goodman-Delahunty et al 
2014). Ethics approval to conduct the study was secured through the Charles Sturt 
University Human Research Ethics Committee (2011/062).
Participants
Survey participants were 493 legal professionals and community advocates in New 
South Wales contacted via email through the Law Society of New South Wales and 
professional networks of the Community Legal Centres NSW.8 They were dispersed 
across a diverse range of metropolitan and rural locations in New South Wales. 
Survey participation took approximately 10–20 minutes, depending on the scope 
of participants’ experience with the NSWPF complaints procedures.9 In all, 378 
participants completed all questions in the survey. More than half of the participants 
(n = 195) had experience directly assisting their clients to make a complaint against 
7 Assistance and support in developing and fielding the survey questionnaire was provided by Roxana 
Zulfacar of Community Legal Centres NSW and Mira Taitz at Charles Sturt University.
8 Participating organisations included Aboriginal Legal Service; Australian Association of Social Workers; 
Australian Association of Social Workers NSW Branch; Australian Community Workers Association 
Inc; Australasian Disability Professionals; Australian Services Union; Community Legal Centres NSW 
(CLCNSW); Council of Social Service of New South Wales; Immigrant Women’s Speakout Association; 
Law and Justice Foundation; Law Society of New South Wales Monday Briefs; NSW Young Lawyers 
Legal Aid; NSW Young Lawyers Human Rights Committee; NSW Young Lawyers Criminal Law 
Committee; NSW Young Lawyers Public Law & Government Committee; Settlement Council of 
Australia; Women’s Domestic Violence Court Assistance Scheme DV Workers; Youth Action Policy 
Association; and Youth Justice Coalition.
9 Further details of the survey methodology are specified in Goodman-Delahunty et al 2014. 
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a police officer or to seek redress from the NSWPF. Approximately one in every 
four survey participants (23%; n = 91) had a client’s complaint against the NSWPF 
finalised within the 24-month period prior to completing the survey. A finalised 
complaint is one where an investigation into a matter has been assessed and allocated 
an outcome. These participants were asked the following open-ended question: ‘For 
the most recently finalised written complaint, what was the incident of concern?’
Responses from those participants who reported firsthand experience within the 
past 24 months of lodging a formal complaint on behalf of a client against the 
police comprised the sample for the current study. This report analyses their written 
responses to this question. The majority of the participants in this group (51%; 
n = 47) were legal practitioners; 30% (n = 27) were client advocates who worked 
in social or community services in New South Wales; and 19% (n = 17) were other 
advocates. Most participants were women (62%); 26% were men; and 12% did not 
disclose their gender. 
Data analysis and coding procedures
To assess the extent to which issues complained of infringed upon the clients’ human 
rights, participant responses describing the police conduct leading to the most 
recent finalised complaint were reviewed and manually coded on three dimensions 
indicative of the gravity of that conduct: (1) the nature of the police conduct in issue; 
(2) the level of legal risk exposure to the NSWPF in the reported conduct; and (3) the 
human rights, if any, breached by the conduct. 
The nature of the reported police conduct in issue: The police conduct described 
in participant narratives was classified as one of the following 10 behaviours: 
(1) illegal or unlawful conduct (behaviour contrary to criminal law); (2) undue 
aggression or force; (3) incivility, rude or abusive behaviour; (4) unprofessional 
conduct; (5) discriminatory or biased treatment; (6) inaction; (7) poor communication; 
(8) infliction of mental distress; (9) property damage; and (10) other. Where 
behaviours fitted within more than one classification, they were counted in the most 
appropriate category as determined by the researchers by assessing the most serious 
of the actions. 
Legal risk exposure: The level of legal risk exposure to the NSWPF in the reported 
police conduct was classified in one of five categories of legal risk, ranging from low 
to high (Goodman-Delahunty et al 2011; 2013a), as follows: (1) low risk consisted of 
rudeness, intolerance or minor inaction; (2) low–moderate risk consisted of police 
inaction involving vulnerable persons, repeated behaviour, costs to complainants 
with little public impact; (3) moderate risk conduct was action or inaction involving 
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public visibility, but no significant consequences or use of force; (4) moderate–high 
risk conduct resulted in physical or psychological injury, including assaults; and 
(5) high risk conduct resulted in severe injury or detriment to police public image — 
for example, serious assaults, severe intimidation, negligence, failure of duty, deceit, 
corruption or wrongful death. Based on civil torts law, conduct that was rated low 
or low–moderate in risk was that posing a negligible risk of civil litigation against 
the police. 
Human rights abuses: Using the definitions of human rights enumerated in the 
Articles contained in the UDHR, descriptions of the reported police conduct were 
reviewed and coded. The comparative framework of the UDHR was used because it 
is an internationally accepted and well-understood framework regarding the scope 
and reach of its Articles.10 All responses were coded by two independent raters,11 
who were blind to other survey responses provided by participants. To ensure the 
accuracy and reliability of the coding, the degree of consensus was tested statistically 
using a measure devised for coding the reliability of open-ended verbal responses.12 
Results
Finalised complaints against NSWPF
On average, each participant had experience with between one and two finalised 
written complaints against the NSWPF in the past two years. In total, they had 
experience with 211 separate formal written complaints in this period. 
10 Other instruments could have been used, such as the ICCPR, which does have a place in the legal system 
of Australia, albeit a marginal one, or the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, but the gender of complainants was not always clear. Taking the foregoing factors into 
consideration, the researchers based the coding on the longer-established and clear credentials of the 
UDHR.
11 Raters were the second and third authors, legal professionals with expertise in policing and human 
rights law. 
12 For the nature of the police conduct in issue, this yielded a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.7; for the legal risk 
exposure, 0.8; and for the human rights codes, 1.00. Inter-rater reliability was in the ‘good’ to ‘very good’ 
range.
90 Australian Journal of Human Rights 2014
The nature of police conduct leading to complaints 
Participants’ descriptions of details of the events that had generated the most recently 
finalised complaint revealed that the incidents of concern encompassed a variety 
of types of police conduct — for example, their clients reported that the police had 
not listened to what they said, did not follow routine protocol, were unnecessarily 
oppressive or harassed them. Systematic analyses of the nature of the police conduct 
in issue in the formal complaints that were lodged, as described by the client 
Table 2: Reported conduct culminating in complaints against NSWPF
Type of police conduct reported % Example of reported conduct
Inadequate police service — 
inaction
30 They had done no investigation and intended to do no 
investigation, and despite me giving them information as to 
witnesses before — as the matter developed, during, and 
immediately after, they took no details, didn’t care (Other 
Advocate 5)
 Illegal/unlawful conduct 26 Client claimed the police searched her in the main street, 
asking her to lift up her top, showing her bust in the main 
street. Witness can back up the claim, and observed this 
happening (Client Advocate 11)
Unprofessional conduct 11 Police officers passed on information to the RTA [Roads and 
Traffic Authority] that was distinctly contrary to evidence given 
in court, causing my client to have their licence suspended 
(Legal Practitioner 27)
Undue aggression 10 Excessive force against a young person and arresting instead 
of using alternatives (Other Advocate 10)
Discriminatory treatment: biased 
action or inaction
9 The NSWPF dismissed the concerns of a person with disability 
(Client Advocate 17)
Incivility; rude and abusive 
behaviour
7 My client complained that the officer was insulting and 
disrespectful as well as rude and inappropriate … told she 
was a liar and that no one would ever believe a junkie hooker 
(Client Advocate 18)
Inadequate communication 3 Lack of provision of Auslan [sign language] interpreters (Client 
Advocate 13)
Property loss or damage 1 Non-return of property following an arrest (Legal  
Practitioner 47)
Undue mental distress 1 A victim in DV [domestic violence] being re-traumatised by the 
Officer in Charge (Client Advocate 7)
Other 2 I can’t really go into details, because even though the NSWPF 
considers the complaint finalised, neither myself nor my client 
does (Legal Practitioner 29)
Note: N = 91. A behaviour that fitted more than one category was counted only once in the most 
appropriate category, determined by the researchers by assessing the most serious of the reported actions.
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advocates and legal professionals, revealed that three in every 10 complaints (30%) 
arose because of police inaction, or failure to fulfil their duties and obligations. One in 
every four complaints (26%) described conduct that violated the law, such as assaults. 
Other forms of police conduct that led to complaints were less frequent: one in every 
10 complaints (11%) was characterised as a form of unprofessional behaviour, or 
undue aggression or force, or discriminatory/biased treatment. The nature of the 
police conduct reported, the proportion of complaints in each category, and examples 
provided by the legal representatives and client advocates of each type of conduct are 
displayed in table 2. 
A supplementary assessment of the gravity of the police conduct reported was 
provided by analysing the level of legal risk exposure to the NSWPF inherent in 
that conduct. The results revealed that the actions taken by police officers exposed 
NSWPF to substantial levels of legal risk. Only 9% of the incidents were rated low or 
low-to-moderate risk. By far the substantial majority, 89%, were rated as moderate-
to-high risk incidents. One-half of the behaviours described (49%) were classified as 
either moderate-to-high (23/89) or high risk (21/89). The proportion of complaints 
within each risk category and examples of the reported conduct in each category are 
shown in table 3.
Table 3: Legal risk incurred by police conduct reported 
Level of risk % Example of conduct reported
Low 3 My client complained that the officer was insulting and 
disrespectful as well as rude and inappropriate (Client  
Advocate 18)
Low–moderate 5 Attitude of the police when arresting based on circumstantial 
evidence (Client Advocate 16)
Moderate 38 Lack of action from attending police, on behalf of victim of 
domestic violence (Client Advocate 2)
Moderate–high 25 The police performed a strip search of my client at the back of a 
pub with the door partially ajar (instructs my client). My client was 
detained for 30 minutes while a female police officer was called 
from a nearby town. Nothing was found. My client was unhappy 
with the bullying behaviour of the police, the fact that she was 
made to wait and the fact that she was completely strip searched 
for the alleged theft of a purse (Legal Practitioner 9)
High 23 Client was seriously beaten by police, while not doing anything 
unlawful. Client was subsequently charged with assault police and 
use offensive language (Legal Practitioner 30)
Unable to be coded 2 Traffic matter (Legal Practitioner 39)
Note: N = 91.
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Human rights abuses in the reported police conduct
Examination of the reported conduct in light of the Articles in the UHDR revealed 
that rights in all but three Articles (the right to political asylum, Art 14; the right 
to a nationality, Art 15; and the right to marry and found a family, Art 16) were 
potentially impacted by the exercise of police operations. The conduct reported by 
the participants was further analysed to determine the nature of the rights impacted 
by that conduct and the percentage of human rights violations in each category. In 
addition, the relevant police powers and authorisation for police actions impacting 
upon these rights were tabulated for each type of complaint. 
These analyses demonstrated that the right most susceptible to violation was equality 
before the law (UDHR, Art 7), accounting for one-third of the complaints. A number 
of examples of complaints in this category were about domestic violence incidents, 
where participants reported a ‘lack of action in relation to domestic violence and 
applications for apprehended domestic violence orders’ (Legal Practitioner 25) 
by police, or that police treated victims of domestic violence inappropriately and 
insensitively and ‘put inappropriate comments in the AVO [apprehended violence 
order]’ (Legal Practitioner 14). 
One in every five complaints was classified as a violation of the right to life, liberty 
and security of person (UDHR, Art 3). Typical complaints in this category were 
those where the clients reported that ‘excessive force’ was used by police, along with 
alleged ‘assaults’ by police when the clients were being detained or held in custody.
The proportion of complaints comprising violations of all other human rights was 
smaller. No breaches of Art 4 (no one shall be held in slavery or servitude), Art 18 (the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) or Art 20 (the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association) were observed. Table 4 displays the percentage of 
violations of each article in the UDHR with examples of the reported police conduct 
that infringed each enumerated right.
Discussion
The current study aimed to evaluate human rights concerns within formal complaints 
lodged against the NSWPF. Specifically, the focus was on types of conduct or failures 
to perform assigned duties that generated citizen complaints. 
The study participants were not the complainants themselves, but persons who, 
in their professional roles as legal representatives of clients who had experienced 
problems with police, regarded the police conduct in issue as sufficiently serious 
to warrant a formal written complaint. The fact that the complaints were lodged by 
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professionals who are subject to criminal sanctions for frivolous use of the complaint 
process (s 141(b) of the Police Act 1990 (NSW)) provided an additional degree of 
reliability regarding the nature of the reported police conduct that was the subject 
of this analysis. This feature of the survey distinguished it from studies that rely 
exclusively on self-reports by complainants, who may be more susceptible to self-
serving biases. 
The most frequent type of complaint against the NSWPF entailed reported police 
conduct that was inadequate or circumstances in which police inaction was 
unsatisfactory, along with behaviour that was considered unprofessional or unlawful. 
These behaviours translated into various violations of human rights. The violation 
that was most frequently reported was the right of all persons to be equal before 
the law. Another substantial complaint category concerned violations of the human 
right to life, liberty and security of person. The nature of the police conduct reported 
in these complaints comprised substantial violations of not only human rights laws, 
but also codes of conduct within the NSWPF. Members of the NSWPF are trained to 
respect human rights and they acknowledge international instruments such as the 
UDHR and the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials in their recruit 
training. Yet the results of this survey indicated that some police officers in New 
South Wales did not appear to comply with their Oath of Office or with good policing 
practice.
The NSWPF complaints system plays an important role in holding police officers 
accountable for their conduct, promoting fair treatment and protecting the human 
rights of citizens. A key function of the NSWPF complaints system is that it also 
provides an opportunity for the police to resolve disputes over conduct with 
complainants and maintain positive relationships with the community. When the 
NSWPF does not resolve adverse relationships with complainants, complainants 
rarely pursue the matter further. Although complainants can resort to alternative 
methods of resolving conflict with police, such as civil litigation for monetary 
damages, financial costs usually prevent this (Hopkins 2011; Ransley, Anderson and 
Prenzler 2007). One participant stated: ‘Need some [civil litigation] to make an impact 
on the current system [to document cases] where non-compliance with LEPRA is 
[regarded by police as] an acceptable form of behaviour’. 
Civil litigation as a mechanism to redress complaints has a high success rate financially, 
with high costs to the police (Hopkins 2011). Unresolved complaints against the 
NSWPF leading to civil litigation have resulted in substantial compensation awarded 
in decisions against the police (Nine News 2012; Hekmat 2012). Overall, the NSWPF 
incurred $75 million in 2010 and $69.7 million in 2011 in costs related to contingent 
liabilities for all civil matter claims against the police (Dodd 2012, app 2). During the 
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Table 4: Reported violations of human rights and associated NSWPF powers
UDHR Article and human 
right
% Examples of reported human 
rights infringement
Relevant police powers, code/
legislation 
7. All are equal before the 
law. All are entitled to equal 
protection against any 
discrimination in violation of 
this Declaration and against 
any incitement to such 
discrimination. (Note: also 
a right under UDHR, Art 12; 
ICCPR, Arts 2 and 17)
34 • Failure to act on assaults (Legal 
Practitioner 1) 
• Police officer refused to breach 
perpetrator on an AVO saying 
that it was a technical breach 
… then perpetrator went back 
to premises an hour later and 
assaulted her (Client Advocate 6)
• Client made a report of sexual 
assault as a teenager against 
her father. My client’s case was 
not followed up, and she later 
discovered paperwork had been 
mislaid (Other Advocate 6)
Discriminatory use of powers 
in investigating specific crimes/
incidents and investigating/ 
assembling evidence or 
omitting/declining to take 
prescribed action; Law 
Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) 
(LEPRA), ss 114–138, 197–204
3. Right to life, liberty and 
security of person.
20 • Alleged assault by police officer 
(Legal Practitioner 3)
• Use of excessive force by police 
during arrest (Other Advocate 8)
• Client arrest for offence where the 
circumstances did not support the 
charge and police were or should 
have been aware that that was 
the case (Legal Practitioner 35)
• Assault in custody on a female 
(Legal Practitioner 15)
Coercive force (minor to 
lethal); powers of entry, arrest, 
detention, search, seizure; 
LEPRA, ss 230, 231, 9–10, 
99–108, 114–138, 20–45, 46–52
12. No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence.
7 • The client was not happy with 
her treatment and believed that 
she was treated with contempt 
each time police attended her 
home (Client Advocate 5)
• Police heavy-handed in their bail 
checks (Legal Practitioner 7)
Powers of search and seizure; 
discretion/decision-making in 
granting/not granting licences 
administered by the police such 
as firearms, betting, gaming, 
liquor licences and other 
businesses; LEPRA, ss 211–229.
5. No one shall be subjected 
to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.
5 • Strip search conducted at police 
station without complying with 
LEPRA (Legal Practitioner 2)
• Victim in DV [domestic violence] 
re-traumatised by the OIC [officer 
in charge] (Client Advocate 7)
• Client claimed the police 
searched her in the main street 
(Client Advocate 11)
Treatment of arrested persons 
and persons in custody; 
treatment of witnesses and 
vulnerable persons; LEPRA, ss 
114–138; NSWPF 2010a 
6. Right to recognition 
everywhere as a person 
before the law.
5 • Lack of using interpreters 
for CALD [culturally and 
linguistically diverse] community 
members (Client Advocate 1)
Discriminatory use of police 
powers, arrest, charging, 
prosecution; international 
treaties
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UDHR Article and human 
right
% Examples of reported human 
rights infringement
Relevant police powers, code/
legislation 
2. Everyone is entitled to 
rights and freedoms in this 
Declaration.
3 • Intellectually delayed client 
unfairly treated by police 
officers (Client Advocate 3)
• Targeting of client with 
intellectual disability (Legal 
Practitioner 11)
Oath of Office, cl 8; Police 
Regulations 2000 (NSW); 
NSWPF 2008
9. No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest, detention 
or exile. 
3 • False imprisonment when 
arrested by mistake (Legal 
Practitioner 33)
• Attitude of the police when 
arresting based on circumstantial 
evidence (Other Advocate 13)
Powers of arrest, detention, 
deportation; move-on powers; 
LEPRA, ss 9–10, 99–108, 114–
138, 20–45, 46–52, 197–204
10. Everyone is entitled in full 
equality to a fair and public 
hearing.
3 • Police officer lying and admitting 
lying under cross-examination 
(Legal Practitioner 19)
• Fabrication of evidence assault 
committed, unlawful arrest 
(Other Advocate 16)
Investigations in specific crimes/
incidents and assembly of 
evidence or lack of it; common 
law (Bar Rules); international 
treaties; Evidence Amendment 
(Evidence of Silence) Act 2013 
(NSW)
11. Everyone charged with a 
penal offence has the right 
to be presumed innocent. 
(Also right to representation, 
ICCPR, Art 14.)
3 • Two young people kept in police 
cell for nearly 48 hours without 
ALS [Aboriginal Legal Service] 
contact or put before a bail court 
(Other Advocate 9)
• Corrupt conduct in the form of 
police encouraging clients not 
to seek legal assistance and 
demanding to know what the 
defence was by direct contact 
with represented clients (Legal 
Practitioner 16)
Investigations and interviews; 
common law (Bar Rules); 
international treaties; Evidence 
Amendment (Evidence of 
Silence) Act 2013 (NSW)
13. Right to freedom of 
movement and residence 
within the borders of each 
state.
3 • Harassment of client by local 
police officers (Legal Practitioner 
23)
• Unlawful removal from transport 
and excessive force (Client 
Advocate 14)
Stop and search powers on foot 
or in vehicles; LEPRA, ss 35–45, 
185–192
17. Right to own property 
alone as well as in 
association with others. 
3 • Trespass by police, refusal to 
leave, foot in the door  
(Legal Practitioner 38)
• Intimidation of elderly man and 
direction to leave his home 
(Legal Practitioner 42)
• Non-return of property following 
an arrest (Legal Practitioner 47)
Search and seizure of property; 
LEPRA, ss 211–229
96 Australian Journal of Human Rights 2014
financial year 2010/11, $5.3 million was paid in compensation and legal costs only 
for matters involving unlawful arrests or detention (McNally 2012). These human 
rights violations impose an enormous financial burden on the NSWPF (Dodd 2012). A 
prudent public sector organisation should minimise public expenditures on litigation 
by effective interventions before matters escalate. Unresolved complaints diminish 
police legitimacy (Goodman-Delahunty et al 2013b), trust in the police, and the 
cooperation of the community (Maguire and Corbett 1991, 10; Mazerolle et al 2011).
Prior research revealed that obstacles to effective police complaint handling include 
the presumption by many police officers that complaints are mostly non-meritorious 
and are filed by police suspects who are motivated to retaliate against police 
(Goodman-Delahunty et al 2013a). This view was controverted by the findings in this 
study that most of the complaints entailed serious actionable police misconduct that 
exposed the NSWPF to significant legal risk. 
The fact that the majority of the study participants who had filed complaints on behalf 
of their clients were legal professionals reflected the fact that the current complaints 
UDHR Article and human 
right
% Examples of reported human 
rights infringement
Relevant police powers, code/
legislation 
1. All human beings free and 
equal in dignity and rights. 
(Also ICCPR, Art 2.) 
2 • Racial vilification, detained due 
to racial identification, racial 
slurs made to person (Other 
Advocate 4)
• A client who had a number of 
encounters with NSWPF and 
the Charter of Victims’ Rights 
was not complied with (Legal 
Practitioner 13)
Oath of Office, cl 8; Police 
Regulations 2000 (NSW); 
NSWPF 2008
8. Right to an effective 
remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts 
violating the fundamental 
rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law.
2 • Lack of thorough preparation of 
a prosecution in a breach of an 
AVO domestic (Legal  
Practitioner 8)
Discriminatory use of 
police powers; approach to 
specific crimes/incidents and 
investigating/assembling 
evidence or omitting/declining 
to take prescribed action; 
international treaties
19. Right to freedom of 
opinion and expression. 
(Also ICCPR, Arts 2 and 
6; Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against 
Women, Arts 1 and 2.)
2 • The issue was that the police did 
not listen to a deaf woman who 
suffered domestic violence from 
her daughter at home (Client 
Advocate 9)
• Lack of provision of Auslan [sign 
language] interpreters (Client 
Advocate 13)
Powers in managing/curtailing 
public protests/meetings; 
move-on powers; LEPRA, ss 87, 
197–200
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system was largely inaccessible to lay citizens and other members of the community 
(Goodman-Delahunty et al 2014, 83). If the system were more user friendly, 
community members who have negative experiences with the NSWPF would not 
have to seek legal representation to make a complaint about perceived violations of 
their rights (Goodman-Delahunty et al 2013a). Law texts feature details of the ICCPR 
prominently, although criticism has been levelled at Australia because of the lack of 
openness, access and transparency of the law to the general public (Gans et al 2011, 
47), particularly in respect of the right to privacy (Beckley 2013a). Recommendations 
to increase options for complainants to avoid litigation should incorporate a number 
of intermediate steps (Goodman-Delahunty et al 2012), including:
• seeking to speak with the police officer concerned; 
• seeking to speak with a more senior officer in the relevant police station; 
• seeking to speak with the local area commander; 
• seeking resolution via the NSWPF Customer Assistance Unit; 
• making a formal written complaint (lodged with NSWPF, NSW Ombudsman 
or various other organisations); 
• reporting a police officer to the Police Integrity Commission; 
• filing a complaint with the Australian Human Rights Commission under anti-
discrimination law; 
• if relevant, raising concerns in the criminal defence of a client accused of an 
offence; 
• sending a letter of demand for redress to NSWPF (such as for compensation); 
and
• commencing civil legal action against the NSWPF. 
Conclusion
The human rights treaties that comprised measures of police operational actions in 
this article are not recognised in the domestic law of Australia, except where explicitly 
included (Gans et al 2011, 18). The situations in Victoria and the Australian Capital 
Territory, which have incorporated a Bill of Rights into the criminal justice system, 
are exceptions; the remaining states and territories of Australia comply in principle 
with human rights law, but do not offer effective legal protection to their citizens. An 
initiative commenced in 2009 to introduce a national human rights framework failed 
to gain acceptance (Australian Government 2011a) by the then federal government, 
apparently because ‘the majority of people did not foresee their rights being curtailed 
and were content with current arrangements’ (Marmo, de Lint and Palmer 2012, 
641). The baseline study (Australian Government 2011b) for the framework set out 
Australia’s commitment to human rights: 
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Australia has a long tradition of supporting the protection and promotion of human 
rights at the international level and has been closely involved in the development of the 
international human rights system.13 [Australian Government 2011, 5.] 
There have been some positive developments (AHRC 2011),14 but the lamentable 
conclusion of the national initiative and the government’s ostensible strong 
commitment to human rights have been questioned in several areas in recent years. 
Examples include the record on immigration (Human Rights Law Centre 2013; 
Hekmat 2013); discrimination against Indigenous peoples (Johnston 1991); people 
trafficking (Lindley and Beacroft 2011); and, specifically, the use of excessive force and 
lethal force by police officers in Australia (UN Human Rights Council 2010; Lillebuen 
2013; Sommers 2013). The issue of the right to privacy and its lack of enforcement 
has also been discussed (Beckley 2013a). The findings of Royal Commissions and 
empirical studies15 can substantiate a basis to indicate that governmental action is 
required to protect citizens’ human rights and fundamental freedoms. The foregoing 
analyses of qualitative data about police conduct described by legal practitioners and 
community advocates comprising the basis of a formal complaint against the NSWPF 
revealed that almost all complaints lodged involved police conduct that infringed 
human rights. A more user-friendly complaints system that enables the resolution of 
complaints will assist in ensuring the legitimacy of the NSWPF.
One of the benefits to police organisations of the foregoing analysis of complaints is 
the opportunity to learn from mistakes and to identify best practice (Neyroud and 
Beckley 2001, 154–55). Ideally, the police organisation should have a process in place 
to capture the learning from adverse incidents or experiences involving members of 
the public and then disseminate information and training on practices, policies and 
procedures to eliminate the risk of human rights abuses (Beckley 2013b). Governments 
need to adopt a wider vision to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for individual citizens are effectively protected, or they risk diminution of national 
standing, and dilution of the ideology and benefits of a liberal democracy. ●
13 For example, Dr H V Evatt, then Australia’s Minister for External Affairs, played a leading role in the 
adoption of the UDHR and, as President of the UN General Assembly, chaired the session at which the 
UDHR was adopted on 10 December 1948.
14 For example, scrutiny of all new legislation for compliance with human rights principles through the 
Parliamentary Scrutiny Act 2011 (Cth).
15 For example, Bartkowiak-Theron and Asquith 2012; UN HRC 2009; Johnston 1991; Office of Police 
Integrity 2009.
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Protecting human rights in Australian  
investigative interviews: the role of recording and  
interview duration limits
Diane Sivasubramaniam, Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Martin Fraser  
and Melissa Martin*
The way in which interviewers balance human rights concerns in Australian 
investigative and intelligence interviews was examined by documenting common 
practices and beliefs reported by 139 seasoned practitioners (M = 16 years) employed 
in Australian police, military and intelligence organisations. An online survey gathered 
information about interviewers’ perceptions of recording practices, the duration of 
interviews and the number of times persons were interviewed for each matter. The 
majority of the participants (73%) were New South Wales Police Force interviewers. 
While results revealed some variability, interviewers reported that most interviews 
were conducted in two or three separate questioning sessions lasting approximately 
one hour each. Frequency analyses showed that interviewers favoured strategies 
protective of detainees’ human rights, such as videorecording of interviews. 
Interviewers’ open-ended responses revealed that they supported recording because 
it yielded more accurate information, promoted procedural fairness and transparency 
in compliance with legal evidentiary requirements for admissibility in court, and 
protected interviewer integrity. Participants reported that videorecording had the 
added advantage of preserving interviewees’ body language, tone of voice and other 
perceived indicators of credibility. The majority of interviews were reported to be 
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within length requirements and recorded as required, indicating compliance with 
human rights concerns of suspects and non-suspects.
Keywords: criminal investigation, intelligence gathering, recording, interviewing, 
HUMINT, police
Introduction
In the past decade, police interviewing has been influenced by a movement away 
from a ‘criminal justice’ paradigm that values individualism, rights and process 
principles, towards a ‘control source’ paradigm that values minimising risk and 
ensuring the security of the group, and emphasises efficiency and flexibility of process 
(Dixon 2008; 2009). This shift has raised questions about potential infringements of 
individual human rights of police detainees and interviewees. For the past decade, 
academic debate on police management methodologies has centred on the value of 
intelligence in improving law enforcement performance (Radcliffe 2008). The role 
of some police in Australia has shifted from response and enforcement activities 
to managing intelligence and human security risks (Coyne and Bell 2011). As a 
result, the goals of law enforcement interviews have broadened, and investigative 
interviews are conducted for multiple purposes. 
In Australian practice, investigative interviewing is the method of eliciting evidentiary 
information through the questioning of suspects, victims and witnesses to record 
their accounts of events related to criminal activity (Green 2012; Kassin, Appleby and 
Perillo 2010). The ultimate or desired outcome from interviewing is not exclusively 
criminal prosecution. Rather than documenting a suspect’s past offences and gaining 
viable evidence for prosecution, the focus in interviews has moved to information 
gathering, or gaining knowledge of future actions. The aim of the investigative 
interview is to contribute to an investigation by gaining details of events, rather 
than solely eliciting a confession or incriminating evidence (Kassin, Appleby and 
Perillo 2010). In interviews with detainees suspected of a criminal offence, accusatory 
confession-oriented or prosecution-oriented tactics can lead to violations of the 
legal right against self-incrimination, which has attained status internationally as a 
fundamental human right, as outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). In recent years, recognition of the unproductive outcomes 
of confession-oriented, accusatorial tactics (in particular, false confessions; for a 
review, see Kassin and Gudjonsson 2004) led to a revision of police interviewing 
procedures in Australian criminal investigations towards a less accusatorial and 
more information-gathering framework (Moston and Fisher 2007). In addition, in 
intelligence and counter-intelligence operations (which may include intelligence-
gathering interviews not only with suspects, but also with witnesses and other 
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informants), the desired outcome may be information ‘supporting the production of 
strategic, operational and tactical intelligence’ (www.afp.gov.au). 
This article describes an empirical study in which contemporary law enforcement 
officers were surveyed about their interviewing practices. It examines the extent to 
which their reported practice aligned with a human rights framework. The article also 
analyses whether methods commonly reported in pursuit of intelligence operations 
where suspects are detained and interviewed are consistent with the principle that 
‘all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect 
for the inherent dignity of the human person’ (ICCPR, Art 10, para 1). Because 
fundamental differences may exist in the desired outcomes of interviews conducted 
for investigation versus intelligence purposes, possibly leading to differences in 
interviewers’ approaches, the article also compares the approaches of interviewers 
who work in investigative versus intelligence contexts. Furthermore, in Australian 
criminal investigations and intelligence operations where interviewees are not under 
arrest or detained, but are questioned informally by police officers, their liberty may 
not be deprived. Thus, no enforceable legal rights are accorded to non-suspects such 
as informants or witnesses. Finding a balance between allowing public authorities 
to function properly and protecting the public from failure by public authorities 
to exercise their power appropriately is difficult (United Nations Human Rights 
Council 2012), and it is important to ensure that the human rights of interviewees 
are not compromised in efforts by law enforcement to ensure community safety. 
Scholars have expressed concern that the shift towards a control source paradigm has 
abrogated individual rights in favour of community rights, making it more difficult to 
scrutinise police processes and eliminating the clarity that existed under the criminal 
justice paradigm, in which individual rights were better protected (Bronitt 2004; 
Dixon 2008; 2009). In this article, we consider the ways in which police balance the 
individual rights of interviewees (whether suspects, witnesses or informants) with 
the rights of the community to safety and security from crime, including terrorism. 
In many policing and security agencies, distinctions are made between information-
gathering interview techniques that aim to gain intelligence about past and future 
threats, and traditional criminal investigative interview techniques that aim to 
produce admissible evidence about a crime. The primary purpose of interviews 
with witnesses and informants may be information gathering or the production of 
admissible evidence, and interviews with witnesses and other informants are not 
accusatory. Interviews with suspects may also be conducted for the purposes of 
gathering information and producing admissible evidence, but different techniques 
may be used for different purposes in suspect interviews, with accusatory confession-
oriented or prosecution-oriented tactics employed for the purpose of producing 
admissible evidence, and more rapport-based and less accusatorial techniques 
110 Australian Journal of Human Rights 2014
employed for information gathering. Such techniques would represent a deviation 
from the approach intended by jurisdictional regulations; in Australia, as in the 
United Kingdom, interviewing of suspects in the PEACE model is intended to be 
non-accusatory (Dixon 2010). Although some confusion about usage of the terms 
‘interrogation’ and ‘interview’ persists due to changes in questioning techniques 
over recent decades, and fictional portrayals of police procedures on television shows 
(Dixon 2010; Moston and Fisher 2007), the term ‘interrogation’ is not used officially in 
law enforcement in Australia or the United Kingdom (Dixon 2010). 
Regulation of investigative and intelligence interviews
Within constraints imposed by the adversarial legal system in Australia, interviewers 
must secure the cooperation of interviewees (whether they are suspects, witnesses or 
other human intelligence sources) and must communicate with them in ways that are 
productive and that do not violate their human rights. Police powers to arrest, detain 
and interview suspects exercised in the course of operations to prevent and detect 
crime can infringe upon suspects’ human rights to personal freedom (such as those 
outlined in the ICCPR) guaranteeing ‘the right to liberty and security of person’. In 
the past, a successful criminal interview was defined as one in which a full confession 
was obtained, but failing a full confession, any incriminating evidence produced in the 
interview represented success (Evans et al 2010). Historically, confessional evidence 
was relied upon, and courts controlled police malpractice in interviews through the 
exclusion of evidence at trial. A variety of compliance-gaining tactics has been used 
by interviewers in many jurisdictions. Australian courts usually dismiss any evidence 
gained via coercive, misleading or suggestive techniques (such as threatening the 
detainee, or lying to the detainee about evidence), in line with Australia’s obligations 
as a signatory to United Nations Human Rights covenants (including the ICCPR and 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment). For a comprehensive discussion about miscarriages of justice that 
have resulted from coercive interviewing strategies, and the psychological processes 
that produce these miscarriages of justice, see Kassin and Gudjonsson (2004). 
Australian states and territories are largely responsible for regulating their own 
criminal justice systems; each state has its own criminal laws, justice system and 
police force. In the empirical study we describe in this article, the majority of 
participants were agents of the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF), the largest 
Australian state police force, with approximately 20,000 employees (NSWPF 2012). 
The state of New South Wales does not have a rights-based legal system.1 However, 
1 That is not the case in the state of Victoria and in the Australian Capital Territory, each of which has its 
own human rights legislation.
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its residents are, by implication, beneficiaries of the rights enumerated in the Articles 
of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ratified by Australia 
at the UN General Assembly in 1948 (AHRC 2006). Although the Declaration is not 
a binding treaty, it is perceived as a source of law in Australia (Gans et al 2011), 
interpreted and applied mainly by the High Court of Australia rather than by courts 
in the states or territories.
Four major Articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are pertinent to 
suspect interviews: Article 5 states that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’; Article 9 that ‘No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile’; Article 11 that ‘Everyone charged 
with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent’; and Article 29 that ‘In the 
exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and 
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements 
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society’. These 
rights have implications for police practices with respect to the records of interviews, 
the duration of interviews and the number of times that a detainee is interviewed, 
and it is on these practices that this article focuses in order to examine alignment of 
interview practice with human rights concerns.
Furthermore, United Nations treaties such as the ICCPR have been used to interpret 
national domestic law through judicial intervention.2 As noted in the General 
Comments and Recommendations on the ICCPR statement for the Right to a Fair 
Hearing, the ICCPR provides that the accused may not be compelled to testify 
against himself or herself or to confess guilt (para 24). The General Comments and 
Recommendations explicitly state that in considering this safeguard, the provisions 
of Art 7 (preventing torture or cruel or degrading treatment) and Art 10, para 1 
(ensuring that ‘all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity 
and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’) should be prioritised, 
and recognise that methods that violate these provisions are sometimes used in order 
to compel the accused to confess or to testify against himself or herself. The General 
Comments and Recommendations state that the law should require that ‘evidence 
provided by means of such methods or any other form of compulsion is wholly 
unacceptable’. The refusal by Australian courts to admit evidence gained via coercive, 
misleading or suggestive techniques is consistent with these ICCPR principles. 
It should be noted that, while procedures and regulations designed to protect against 
coercive, misleading or suggestive techniques are well-aligned with human rights 
2 See www.bayefsky.com/getfile.php/id/1128.
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principles, they may not entirely eliminate the use of such techniques. For example, 
in a high profile terrorism case, Justice Adams condemned Australian intelligence 
officers for conducting an unlawful, intimidating and deceptive investigation, which 
included false imprisonment and kidnapping and amounted to a ‘gross breach of 
powers’ (R v Ul-Haque, 2007). Although interview recording requirements and other 
regulations were followed in this case (including the suspect being asked on tape if 
he was a willing and voluntary interviewee), the content of the interview made it 
clear that he was coerced into compliance with interviewers, rather than voluntarily 
cooperating in the interview.
Records of interviews 
Since the 1990s, police in Australian jurisdictions have been required to routinely 
record electronically suspect interviews about all indictable offences (Dixon 2010). 
The introduction of mandatory recording of police interviews is a pre-trial mechanism 
intended to control police malpractice in interviews and to protect the rights of 
suspects. In 1991, the NSWPF introduced its audiovisual program, Electronic 
Recording of Interviews with Suspected Persons (ERISP), which was a police 
initiative, rather than legislation mandating the recording of interviews. The policy in 
the NSWPF Code of Practice for CRIME (Custody, Rights, Investigation, Management 
and Evidence) is to require recording of admissions relating to indictable offences on 
a tape, with consent of the accused (NSWPF 2010, 74). Further, when an interview 
is not recorded, the police must present reasonable explanations for failure to record 
(NSWPF 2010), which can include a refusal by the detainee to be recorded (Dixon 
2006). Other Australian jurisdictions have similar requirements (for example, s 464H 
of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) requires police who are questioning a suspect in relation 
to an indictable offence to record by audio or audiovisual recording any confession 
or admission made by the person). In Queensland, police officers are required to 
electronically record cautions and the provision of information to persons under 
investigation or questioning for indictable offences ‘if practicable’ (s 435 of the Police 
Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld)). An evaluation of this policy demonstrated 
both benefits and harms to the administration of criminal justice. There was 
agreement among judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers that ERISP reduced the 
length of trials and challenges to the admissibility of evidence related to admissions, 
and increased public faith in the justice process (Dixon 2006). Conversely, the use of 
visual images in evidence could be problematic when defendants are judged on their 
appearance and body language (which research shows bear no discernible links to 
deceit: DePaulo et al 2003), as a ‘majority of judges and prosecutors reported that they 
believed that demeanour was an indicator of veracity’ (Dixon 2006). 
Volume 20(2) Police and human rights: 1963 and 2013 113      Protecting human rights in Au tralian i vestigative interviews 
In addition, the NSWPF Code of Practice for CRIME details the powers of police 
when investigating indictable offences. CRIME stipulates that police have no power 
to compel or intimate to the suspect that he or she must participate in an electronic 
recording of interview. The police caution given to detainees who are questioned 
by an investigating official is as follows: ‘You are not obliged to say or do anything 
unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do 
you understand?’ (Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Act 2013 (NSW), Sch 1, 
ss 89(A), 9(A)(9)). In this context, ‘official questioning’ of a defendant in relation to a 
serious indictable offence means questions put to the defendant by an investigating 
official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation 
of the commission, or possible commission, of the serious indictable offence. In this 
way, the CRIME guidelines align with the principles outlined in the ICCPR, which 
specify the minimum guarantees in the determination and investigation of criminal 
charges, and aim to ensure that police interviewers engage in a non-coercive and 
transparent interaction with suspects in custody (Art 14, para 13). 
Notably, Australian police are not required to record interviews with witnesses 
or other informants, or with people who are not suspects of indictable offences. 
Furthermore, past research on the ERISP in New South Wales revealed that 
informal police questioning of suspects (pre-ERISP) was common (Dixon 2006). 
Researchers have noted that Australian courts give police some latitude on interviews 
conducted away from formal ERISP facilities or other types of recording equipment 
(Moston 2009). 
Interview duration and number of interviews
As noted earlier, four Articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are 
relevant to suspect interviews. These Articles have implications for police practices 
with respect to not only the records of interviews, but also the duration of interviews 
and the number of times that a detainee is interviewed. Police in New South Wales 
are directed to operate within the protocols of the Law Enforcement (Powers and 
Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) (LEPRA) during interview proceedings. Sections 
114–121 of LEPRA constrain the duration of investigative interviews by imposing 
time limits on the investigation period. These provisions specify that the maximum 
investigation period is four hours, but may be extended up to eight hours by a 
detention warrant. In general, police in New South Wales must conduct and conclude 
an interview in less than four hours; in special circumstances, the detention and 
interview period may exceed four but not eight hours. During the detention period, 
a detainee may be questioned multiple times. Police in other jurisdictions around 
Australia are subject to similar restrictions — for example, in Queensland, under 
the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), a person must not be detained 
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for more than eight hours (unless an extension is obtained from a magistrate) and, 
within that eight-hour detention period, the person must not be questioned for more 
than four hours. 
Research aims
Few studies have examined the views and practices of Australian law enforcement 
officials (Alison and Howard 2005; Hill and Moston 2011). Dixon (2010, 437) called 
for additional research on this topic, noting the difficulties of access to police samples 
and records of interviews. The present research evaluated Australian investigative 
interviewing and intelligence collection practices with respect to records of interviews, 
their duration, and the number of times detainees are interviewed, in the context of 
human rights principles. In line with the principles articulated in various international 
human rights declarations and treaties, legislation mandating the videorecording of 
suspect interviews in criminal investigations was introduced around Australia in the 
1990s. This study examined the extent to which practitioners reported compliance 
with that legislation, explored their attitudes towards the recording of interviews, 
and also compared responses of members of the NSWPF with those of police from 
other states and territories. Because fundamental differences may exist in interviews 
conducted for investigation versus intelligence purposes, as noted above, this 
study also compared the approaches and strategies of interviewers who work in 
investigative versus intelligence contexts.3 
Method
Participants
Participants comprised individuals from a wide range of organisations engaging 
in intelligence and investigative interviewing, such as police forces, military forces 
and intelligence organisations. Participants were recruited via convenience and 
purposive sampling through contacts with various law enforcement agencies in 
Australia, including police and intelligence agencies. To be eligible to complete the 
survey, participants had to be at least 18 years of age and have some experience in 
investigative interviewing. Participants of any role or rank in the organisation were 
eligible, and any members of the agency with intelligence, counter-intelligence or 
3 The data collected in this study did not focus on high-stakes interviews but rather on procedural 
approaches in investigations. Others have addressed issues in high-stakes interviews. See, for example, 
Dixon 2008; Lynch, Macdonald and Williams 2007.
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information-gathering interviewing experience were invited by email to take part in 
the survey. No incentives were offered in return for survey participation.
Overall, 139 individuals (76.3% males, 23% females, 1 gender undisclosed) participated 
in the survey. Participants ranged in age from 21 to 62 years (M = 39.55, SD = 9.16). 
Almost the entire sample (96%) reported current engagement in active duty. Of the 
139 participants, 88% (n = 122) were employed in a police force. Approximately three-
quarters of the sample (73%, n = 101) were members of the NSWPF. The remainder 
of the sample were from an Australian police force (unspecified: 15.2%, n = 21), an 
Australian agency (unspecified: 4.3%, n = 6), the Australian Federal Police (3.6%, 
n = 5), the Australian military (2.2%, n = 3), Australian foreign intelligence (0.7%, 
n = 1) and Fair Trade NSW (0.7%, n = 1). One person did not report their agency. For 
the purposes of analyses presented in this article, participants who did not report that 
they were members of the NSWPF were classified as non-NSW police. 
The majority of participants reported that their current or most recent assignment 
was a criminal investigation (68%, n = 95; intelligence collection 9%, n = 12; 
undisclosed 23%, n = 32). The sample was highly experienced (M = 15.79 years, 
SD = 8.92 years), ranging between 0.33 and 45 years of practical experience in 
the field. On average, they had a high level of formal education (M = 14.87 years, 
SD = 2.52 years), ranging between 10 and 18 years (including primary, secondary and 
tertiary education). The majority of the sample (65.9%) reported having at least some 
tertiary education, with 30.4% of the sample reporting at least four years of tertiary 
education.4 In addition to this formal education, participants in this sample may 
have received additional qualifications specific to investigation. The 2011 Australian 
Government Investigations Standards (AGIS) recommend minimum levels of 
training or qualifications for staff in any Australian government agency involved 
in conducting investigations. For officers primarily engaged as investigators, a 
Certificate IV in Government (Investigation) is recommended, and officers without 
this qualification should be under the supervision of a qualified investigator. For 
officers primarily engaged in the coordination and supervision of investigations, a 
Diploma of Government (Investigation) is recommended.
4 The question about education was phrased as: ‘How many years of formal school education (or their 
equivalent) did you complete (starting with primary school)?’ Data about level of tertiary education is 
predicated on the assumption that 13 years of formal education is the completion time for primary and 
high school (as is the case in the Australian education system).
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Research design
The study took the form of an online survey, administered via the website 
psychsurveys.org. The survey evaluated participants’ general interviewing 
experience, the requirements that governed their interview recording practices, their 
beliefs about the recording of interviews, and demographic information.5 Notably, 
the survey methodology cannot establish the interviewing practices actually used by 
law enforcement professionals, or their actual compliance with interview recording 
legislation, but instead registers their self-reported practices. As the researchers 
were not permitted access to any objective records of interviews (for example, 
videorecordings, audiorecordings or written notes), the degree to which this self-
reported practice corresponds with actual practice is unknown. Self-reports are 
subject to the limitations of memory (for example, law enforcement officers are likely 
to err, to some degree, when reporting the approximate number of interviews they 
have conducted across their entire careers). The survey methodology was chosen 
because it most directly achieved the research aim of this study — to examine law 
enforcement professionals’ attitudes towards strategies employed in investigative 
and intelligence gathering contexts — but the data presented below are self-reported 
perceptions and practices of interviewers. A copy of the survey questions is included 
as an appendix to this article.
Procedure
An email invitation containing a link to the survey was sent to contacts in 
policing agencies with a request to forward the invitation to eligible participants 
and co-workers. Before completing the survey, participants read a participant 
information form and a consent information statement that outlined the nature of 
the study and explained that completion and submission of the survey implied 
consent to voluntarily participation. The full survey took approximately 20–25 
minutes to complete. Data collection commenced in July 2012 and was completed in 
October 2013. 
5 Data analysed for this article were a subset of Australian responses to questions included in a larger 
international survey. Questions included in the larger survey also evaluated participants’ personal 
approaches to investigative interviewing, their countries’ approach to interviewing, participants’ 
beliefs about their ability to detect deception, and participants’ favoured interviewing techniques, their 
interviewing goals, their comfort and experience in interviewing members of other cultures, and their 
common interviewing practices.
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Results
Previous experience
As noted above, the overall sample was highly experienced, averaging over 15 
years of professional experience in law enforcement. Participants reported having 
conducted an average of 251.45 interviews (SD = 440.19) across their career, ranging 
between four and 3000 interviews. Participants were asked about the average number 
of times each interviewee was questioned about the same matter, and indicated that 
each interview required an average of 2.28 questioning sessions (SD = 4.11), ranging 
between one and 35. The average length of interviews conducted was approximately 
one hour (M = 62.52 minutes, SD = 36.15 minutes) and ranged between 15 and 180 
minutes. Participants were also asked to report the single longest interview session 
they had previously conducted. In response, participants reported that their longest 
interview session had lasted an average of approximately four hours (M = 3.52 hours, 
SD = 2.87 hours), although the duration ranged between 0.12 and 20 hours. 
Because fundamental differences may exist in interviews conducted for investigation 
versus intelligence purposes, analyses were conducted to compare the responses 
of interviewers who work in investigative versus intelligence contexts. In addition, 
because the majority of participants in this sample were members of the NSWPF, 
analyses were conducted to test for differences between those who identified as 
members of the NSWPF and those who did not. 
Analyses were conducted to examine whether members of the NSWPF had different 
levels of experience from individuals outside of that police force, by examining years 
in the field and number of interviews conducted. Differences in the number of years 
of experience were not significant (p = 0.488) between NSWPF (M = 15.47 years, 
SD = 8.74 years) and non-NSW police (M = 16.68 years, SD = 9.45 years). Subsequently, 
analyses were implemented to evaluate whether levels of experience varied based on 
whether participants’ current or most recent assignment was a criminal investigation 
or an intelligence collection. Differences in the number of years of experience were 
not significant (p = 0.796) between professionals performing criminal investigation 
(M = 15.24 years, SD = 8.72 years) and intelligence collection (M = 14.56 years, 
SD = 7.22 years). 
Comparisons of estimates of the total number of previous interviews conducted 
yielded no significant differences (p = 0.579) between NSW police (M = 264.52, 
SD = 433.62) and non-NSW police (M = 216.00, SD = 462.12). Differences with respect 
to the average number of questioning sessions conducted with each interviewee 
were also not significant (p = 0.974) between NSW police (M = 2.27, SD = 4.39) 
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and non-NSW police (M = 2.30, SD = 3.39). The average length of interviews 
conducted (minutes) was not significantly different (p = 0.092) between NSW police 
(M = 58.53, SD = 30.25) and non-NSW police (M = 73.14, SD = 47.41). In the number 
of previous interviews conducted, differences were also not significant (p = 0.482) 
between criminal investigation (M = 267.77, SD = 423.73) and intelligence collection 
(M = 373.75, SD = 837.31). Differences were also not significant (p = 0.831) with 
regard to the average number of questioning sessions conducted between criminal 
investigation (M = 2.36, SD = 4.53) and intelligence collection (M = 2.05, SD = 1.61). 
The average length of interviews conducted (minutes) was also not significantly 
different (p = 0.515) between criminal investigation (M = 65.68, SD = 34.66) and 
intelligence collection (M = 77.08, SD = 57.50). In short, these comparisons confirmed 
that on all measures of general practice and experience, the Australian sample was 
homogenous.
Interview procedures reported by participants 
When asked whether they were required to record the questioning of interviewees, 
almost all participants (99%, n = 137) indicated that they were, with 94% reporting 
that interviews were videotaped, 74% reporting that interviews were audiotaped, 
26% reporting that interviews were recorded via written notes (stenographs), and 
10% reporting that other forms of recording were used. (Since participants could 
select multiple recording methods in response to this item, these figures do not 
sum to 100%.) Participants who selected the ‘other’ category were asked to provide 
an open-ended response describing the specific recording method used, but all 
participants who did so described recording options already provided (that is, of 
those who selected ‘other’, 50% reported using handwritten notes; 28% reported some 
other form of videorecording, such as DVD; and 21% reported some combination of 
recording options already provided). 
The findings indicated that NSW police interviewers were more likely to use videotape 
recordings than were non-NSW police, χ2 (1, N = 137) = 5.12, p = 0.024, but there were 
no significant differences between NSW police and others with respect to the use of 
other recording methods. As might be expected, there were also significant differences 
in recording practices based on type of assignment, with videotaped recordings, χ2 (1, 
N = 105) = 9.35, p = 0.002, and ‘other’ recording types, χ2 (1, N = 105) = 8.91, p = 0.003, 
more frequently used in criminal investigations than in intelligence operations. 
Given that the answers to the former question tapped the policies and guidelines in 
place in different jurisdictions, a follow-up question sought more explicit information 
about actual practices. Participants were asked how often certain types of recordings 
were actually used in the interviews in which they had previously been involved. In 
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response to this question, 78% of participants indicated that videorecording was used 
most of the time (that is, in more than 50% of the interviews in which they had been 
involved) and 69% of participants indicated that audiotapes were recorded most of 
the time. Fewer than 15% of participants indicated that written records (stenograph) 
were taken most of the time, and only 1% of participants indicated that ‘other’ 
recording methods were used most of the time. 
Participants reported that it was very rare that interviews were not recorded at all, 
with 64% of participants reporting that sessions were always recorded in some form. 
However, 16% of participants indicated that interview sessions were not recorded up 
to 10% of the time, 5% reported non-recording 11–20% of the time, and a further 5% 
reported non-recording 21–30% of the time. 
The extent to which participants supported the policy of recording interviews 
was ascertained by asking whether interviews should be recorded. A very high 
proportion — 95% of the sample — indicated that they should. They indicated that 
their preferred recording methods were videotape (64%) and audiotape (22%), with 
lower support for written notes (4%) and other recording forms (5%). Preferences 
for whether interviews should be recorded were not associated with whether 
participants were NSW police, χ2 (1, N = 139) = 632, p = 0.427, or whether their 
most recent assignment was a criminal investigation or an intelligence operation, χ2 
(1, N = 107) = 663, p = 0.416. 
The reasons that participants supported or did not support the policy of recording 
interviews were investigated by asking participants why interviews should or should 
not be recorded. Those who had indicated in response to the previous question that 
interviews should be recorded were asked why they believed this. Open-ended 
responses were given by 128 participants and these responses were coded into four 
categories. (Participants’ answers were coded so that they could indicate multiple 
categories — up to four.) According to 64% of these participants, interviews should 
be recorded because they provide an aid to memory and accurate evidence; 39% 
responded that recordings address evidence admissibility requirements in court and 
promote procedural fairness; 28% stated that recordings protect interviewer integrity 
and enable transparency of interview proceedings; and 27% reported that recordings 
are useful in viewing the body language and credibility of the interview parties. 
Those participants who had indicated in response to the previous question that 
interviews should not be recorded were asked why they believed this. Of the sample, 
11 responded with open-ended answers, which were coded into three categories. 
(Participants’ answers were coded so that they could indicate multiple categories 
— up to three.) According to 46% of these participants, interviews should not be 
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recorded because discretion should be applied based on the circumstances (for 
example, when a witness or informant does not wish to be recorded or placed on 
record); 27% indicated that they should not be recorded where consent was not 
given; and 27% stated that recordings of interviews were not required for intelligence 
collection purposes.
Discussion
The current study aimed to evaluate to what extent law enforcement professionals 
conducting investigative and intelligence interviews within Australia report adherence 
to universal principles of individual human rights. This was explored by analysing 
interviewers’ reports of the amounts of time they spent conducting interviews, the 
frequency of interviews, and the recording practices of interview sessions. Findings of 
the present study revealed that the interviewers who participated in the study tended 
to have significant professional experience as interviewers, were well educated, 
and reported that their longest interviews were on average less than four hours 
(consistent with LEPRA guidelines for NSWPF and comparable guidelines for police 
in other Australian jurisdictions). Additionally, interviewers conducted an average of 
fewer than three interview sessions with each interviewee, which (to the extent that 
the interviews described were suspect interviews) appeared reasonable within the 
constraints of human rights principles restricting length of detention without trial — 
for example, see General Comments and Recommendations on Liberty and Security 
of the Person, paras 1 and 2, as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which states in Art 29: 
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public 
order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
Interview recording practices
Overall, the majority of the sample endorsed the recording of interviews, but 10% of 
the sample reported that they had been involved in interviews that were not recorded 
in any way between 10% and 30% of the time. To the extent that participants were 
referring to suspect interviews in criminal investigations that did not meet one of 
those criteria, this is problematic. Given the potential for human rights violations 
in an interview (particularly when the process is focused on confession and 
prosecution), the failure to comply with recording practices leaves interviews open 
to the problem, recognised by the ICCPR General Comments and Recommendations, 
that in order to compel the accused to confess or to testify against himself or herself, 
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methods that violate human rights provisions may frequently be used. Compliance 
with interview recording requirements not only offers protection to detainees against 
such compulsion to confess, but also offers a degree of protection to interviewers 
from accusations of the violation of these principles.
However, it is important to note that the questions asked in this survey did not 
refer specifically to suspect interviews. So, there are several alternative explanations 
for participants’ reports that some interviews are not recorded, and nuances in 
recording requirements and investigative demands must qualify interpretation of 
this data. In addition, a large proportion of the interviews reported may have been 
conducted informally or in the field for intelligence collection, and others may 
have been conducted prior to the time that recording protocols were implemented. 
Considering the level of experience of our sample (which raises the possibility that 
some of the interviews they refer to were conducted prior to the current recording 
regulations), the breadth of our sample (many of whom conduct interviews in 
criminal investigations where recordings are required, and also for intelligence 
gathering where recordings are not required), and the breadth of our participants’ 
interview tasks (which include interviews with suspects, witnesses and other 
sources), the finding that some interviews are not recorded should not be interpreted 
as noncompliance with recording requirements, or as a violation of human rights 
principles. Rather, these data could indicate that interviews are being conducted in 
line with an array of varying recording requirements and human rights concerns. 
This interpretation was supported by participants’ own reports about why they 
endorsed (and the circumstances in which they did not endorse) recording of 
interviews. Future research should investigate these potential nuances further, testing 
whether interviewers’ strategies differ depending on whether a suspect, witness or 
informant is being interviewed. 
Balancing human rights concerns: attitudes towards recording interviews
When participants were surveyed on why they thought interviews should be 
recorded, the majority (64%) referred to videotaped recording and described 
several key elements of this procedure. First, they described recordings as useful 
as an aid to memory, noted that they resulted in more accurate evidence, and 
referred to the fallibility of human memory and the tendency for confabulations 
to increase over time. They also discussed recordings as important to meet court 
admissibility requirements in prosecutions, and noted their value in promoting 
procedural fairness with both parties aware that the interviews would be recorded. 
Additionally, interviewers commented that having interviews recorded helped 
to protect their professional integrity and documented the transparency of their 
interview proceedings. Videorecordings were also considered valuable in enabling 
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the interviewer, colleagues and juries to view the body language, verbal responses 
and credibility of the interviewee, and recorded video footage could be valuable 
in attempting to detect deception. (This last element lent support to the findings of 
Dixon (2006), who noted that the use of visual images in evidence is problematic 
when defendants are judged on their appearance and body language because 
research shows that these visual features are not, in fact, indicative of deception.) 
Finally, videorecording was commended because it promoted the safety and 
respectful treatment of interviewees by increasing the accountability of interviewers 
with respect to both the content of the questions and the treatment of the detainee.
Given the fact that the study predominantly used NSWPF interviewers as participants, 
the preference for a videotaped record (providing visual cues about the suspects’ 
interview responses) was hardly surprising, as recording is one of the requirements 
under the NSW Code of Practice for Crime. However, it was interesting to note 
that a majority of the 11 participants who opposed videotaping were also NSWPF 
interviewers.
Analyses of open-ended responses as to why participants opposed the recording of 
interviews was restricted, since only 11 participants gave reasons for disfavouring this 
practice. Reasons cited included denial of consent to record the interview (one of the 
exceptions to the recording requirements in New South Wales), that this procedure 
was not required for intelligence collection, and that investigators should be allowed 
to exercise professional discretion in circumstances where witnesses or informants 
would be discouraged by being placed ‘on record’ or recorded unnecessarily. 
This result suggested that very few experienced interviewers believed that 
videotaping should not be standard practice, and that the rare circumstances under 
which interviewers would endorse the absence of a recording were consistent with 
human rights principles, such as the need to employ discretion where witnesses and 
informants are concerned. The views of interviewers in this regard were consistent 
with those of justice scholars. Crenshaw (1998) noted that in instances where no legal 
provisions exist to regulate police action (for example, interviews with non-suspects 
such as witnesses or human intelligence sources), and where no other guidelines 
have been developed, the legal principles for respect for human dignity and equal 
and inalienable rights should inform police action. Exempting witnesses and human 
intelligence sources from recording practices can be framed as exercising a duty 
of care to protect the human rights of the witness or informant. Bronitt (2004, 47) 
noted that police ‘vigilantly protect’ undercover police and informers. Although the 
ICCPR states that everyone accused of a crime shall be entitled ‘To examine, or have 
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him’ (Art 14, 
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para 3e), this must be balanced against the recognised danger to victims, witnesses 
and other informants in criminal and intelligence contexts. The need to maintain this 
balance was acknowledged in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, which 
recommended:
Where victims of terrorism have given information to the authorities, or are called upon to 
provide testimony during a prosecution, their rights to life, physical security and privacy 
must be fully protected, subject to safeguards to ensure that any protective measures 
adopted are compatible with the accused person’s right to a fair and public hearing under 
Article 14 ICCPR. [United Nations Human Rights Council 2012, 20.] 
In some jurisdictions, judicial decisions have explicitly articulated reasoning 
consistent with this principle; for example, in Monfils v Taylor, 1999, the United States 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that police were liable for releasing a tape of 
a telephone call from an informant regarding an alleged theft. The informant had 
requested that his taped telephone call not be released to the suspect. After the tape 
was released, the suspect killed the informant. The court held that the release of the 
tape by the deputy chief created a danger to the informant, who otherwise would 
not have been in danger. In some jurisdictions, such as Canada, tort law provisions 
can protect the rights of suspects and non-suspects who are injured as a result of 
a negligent or unreasonable police investigation (McCreight v Canada (AG), 2013). 
Besides Canada, no other common law jurisdiction has imposed liability on police 
officers who conduct an investigation that results in harm that was reasonably 
foreseeable (Mazzuca, Nash and Szymanski 2010). Although this is not a right, it is 
a source of protection for suspects and non-suspects. Recognition by interviewers in 
our sample that discretion is required in decisions to record interviews, as well as 
our finding that some participants have been involved in interviews that were not 
recorded, could be indications that our participants were engaging in some balancing 
of the human rights concerns of suspects, witnesses and other informants. 
Further research is needed to determine whether the police may feel restricted in 
their powers to obtain information or whether there is a negative impact on police 
of having their performance regularly monitored and evaluated. Additionally, future 
research should explore whether interviewees who may be nervous or fearful of 
being recorded become more reluctant to cooperate during an interview. Regarding 
both open-ended sets of responses, it was noteworthy that while the majority were 
commenting on videotaping practices, a minority of these responses were in reference 
to other forms of recording (audiotape, written notes and other forms). The relatively 
small number of participants who reported reasons supporting or not supporting 
these alternative forms of recording precludes firm conclusions about reasons for 
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these preferences, and further research is needed to investigate whether different 
recording methods are perceived by interviewers to be differentially effective in 
achieving the desired balance between preserving an accurate record of the interview 
and serving interviewers’ human rights considerations, such as informant protection. 
For example, it is likely that interviewers will be more supportive of audio or written 
recording of interviews in cases where protection of an informant is a concern. 
Strengths and limitations
The present study has contributed a unique component to research on Australian 
policies and practices by examining perceptions of investigative interviews within 
the NSWPF and other Australian law enforcement agencies. Specifically, the study 
examined interviewers’ reports of how often recordings are taken, and in what form, 
along with the attitudes of the professionals who use them. Additionally, this research 
explored how long and how often interviewees are subjected to interviews, and 
compared how these practices change depending on whether the interviewers are 
conducting criminal investigations. 
By asking open-ended questions about interviewers’ views on whether videorecording 
of interviews was beneficial, insights were gained that can inform future directions 
about policy and practice. The findings suggested that Australian policy guidelines 
to record suspect interviews in some form was being consistently met, and indicated 
that criminal and intelligence interviewers have strong explicit motivations for 
upholding recording practices that are consistent with human rights concerns. In 
particular, the police expressed a desire to record suspect interviews because they 
themselves recognised that recordings were helpful in obtaining admissible evidence 
and preserving information about the evidence and interview. Where reluctance to 
record interviews was expressed by this sample, reported reasons for that reluctance 
were consistent with regulations, as well as with a desire to protect the human rights 
of witnesses and other informants.
The dominance of the NSWPF in this sample may limit our ability to draw 
conclusions about interviewing practices across other Australian jurisdictions, and 
some of our data are inconsistent with previous empirical investigations of police 
interviewing in other states in Australia. For example, in an audit of Queensland 
Police interview tapes of suspects, the average interview length was approximately 
24 minutes (Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission 2004, xi), much shorter 
than our participants’ reports that the average length of an interview session was 
just over an hour. While we conducted analyses to test for differences between 
NSW police and others in our sample, comparisons between groups in the study 
were limited by low power, due to uneven group sizes, with the vast majority of the 
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sample associated with the NSWPF. The restrictive size of non-police in the sample 
also meant that there were very few interviewers whose most recent assignments 
were related to intelligence collection, limiting the opportunity to compare criminal 
investigation practices within the police to those in other agencies who exclusively 
conduct investigative interviews for intelligence gathering. Therefore, results and 
interpretations of findings in the present study based on comparisons between these 
groups should be interpreted with caution, given the limited sample size.6 
Overall, the vast majority of participants expressed attitudes showing strong support 
for the recording of interviews. This finding was consistent with other empirical 
research that revealed that concerns expressed about electronic recording were 
not substantiated: the interviewer’s task has not become impossible and suspects 
continued to confess and make admissions (Cohen 1988). The mandatory recording 
of interviews for NSWPF has reduced previous difficulties with evidence and 
admissibility in court (Mills 2011).
The requirement in Australia that police videorecord suspect interviews has been 
instrumental in ensuring that interviews are conducted in conformity with human 
rights principles, and has reduced the potential for human rights abuses. The impact 
of these regulations in constraining abuses was demonstrated vividly by the conduct 
in 2006 of a group of Queensland police who, when they believed that there was no 
videorecord, threw the suspect across the room and intimidated him (Moston 2009). 
As this example shows, and as academics such as Dixon (2009; 2010) have noted, 
the requirement for a record of interview on video does not preclude coercion prior 
to the commencement of the recording, or, as Justice Adams observed in reviewing 
the videorecorded interview in R v ul-Haque (Nolan 2009; Dixon 2008), the verbal 
statement on tape by a suspect that he is voluntarily participating in an interview 
does not necessarily end the inquiry into the question as to whether the suspect 
is in fact voluntarily cooperating or is simply compliant after earlier unrecorded 
coercion. Thus, these videotaped records of interview are not a panacea, and do not 
6 For reliable statistical analysis, available power to detect differences between groups should be 80% or 
greater (Cohen 1988). Power analyses were conducted using the G*Power statistical software package 
(Faul et al 2007). Effect sizes were defined as 0.2 for small, 0.5 for medium and 0.8 for large (Cohen 1988). 
Analyses testing differences between NSWPF and non-NSW police interviewers had 12% statistical 
power to detect a small effect, 48% power for a medium effect, and 87% power for a large effect. Thus, 
the present study was not equipped with enough participants to reliably detect small to medium-sized 
effects. For comparisons between criminal investigations and intelligence collection, the study did not 
have a large enough sample size to reliably detect a small to large effect between groups, based on type 
of most recent assignment.
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guarantee compliance with human rights principles. Accordingly, while self-reported 
survey responses have limitations in terms of a research method, it is important to 
acknowledge that access to records of interview, where granted, is also a method 
subject to limitation, in that these records do not capture the entire interaction 
between a suspect and an interviewer. 
Conclusion
The present study offered a preliminary view of factors that can impact upon 
policy and practice regarding investigative interviewing and intelligence collection, 
particularly in relation to the human rights of the suspect and non-suspect 
interviewees. Findings indicated that videorecordings of interviews were supported 
by the majority of interviewers, for the protection of both themselves and their 
interviewees. The majority of interviews conducted were reported to be within 
length requirements and recorded as required by policy, demonstrating substantial 
perceptions of compliance by interviewers with Australian guidelines, as well as 
human rights principles such as the ICCPR principles of liberty and security of the 
person, protection from self-incrimination, treatment with humanity and respect 
for inherent dignity, and protection from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Future directions for policy and practice of investigative interviewing would benefit 
greatly from additional research with larger sample sizes and an international scope. 
Collectively, these findings suggested that interviewing professionals were engaging 
in procedures designed to uphold the human rights of suspects, witnesses and other 
human intelligence sources in their interviewing practices. ●
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Appendix
Interview questionnaire
1.  What is your gender? 
 Male  Female
2.  What is your age?
 
3.  How many years of formal school education (or their equivalent) did you 
complete (starting with primary school)? 
	  10 years or less 
	  11 years
	  12 years
	  13 years 
	  14 years 
	  15 years 
	  16 years
	  17 years
 18 years or over
4.  For which service and in what country do you (or did you) conduct 
interviews?
5.  What is your current status? 
 Active  Retired
6.  Is your current or most recent assignment: 
	  Civilian 
	  Military
	  Police 
 Other: 
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7.  Is your current or most recent assignment:
	  Criminal investigation
	  Intelligence collection from human sources (including counterintelligence)
 Other: 
8.  In total, approximately how much professional experience do you have in 
law enforcement?
Years     Months 
9.  Approximately how many interviews with a source or suspect have you 
conducted, alone or with others? 
10. What was the average number of times each interviewee was questioned 
about the same matter? 
11.  What was the average length of an interview session?
 (hours)     (minutes)
12.  What was the longest interview session you were involved in?
 (hours)      (minutes)
13.  Do you have to record your questioning of interviewees?
 Yes / No
  IF YES, what procedure is used? (Select all that apply)
	  Videotape recording 
	  Audiotape recording 
	  Written (stenographic)
 Other (Describe): 
14.  Considering all the interviews in which you have been involved, please 
estimate the percentage (0–100) in which the following was true:
 % The session was videotaped 
 % The session was audiotaped
 % A written record was kept by a stenographer
% The session was not recorded in any way
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15.  Should all interviews be recorded in some way?
 Yes / No 
 IF YES, how? (Select one)
	  Videotape recording 
	  Audiotape recording 
	  Written (stenographic)
	  Other (Describe): 
 If YES, why? 
 
 
 If NO, why not? 
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Law, morality and the authorisation of  
covert police surveillance
Clive Harfield*
Management of covert investigations is a complex and multifaceted arena that 
engages the rights of individuals, the legitimate expectations of the wider community, 
and criminal justice practitioner judgments about lawfulness and legitimacy. This 
article examines two legal regimes (Australia and the United Kingdom) within which 
police surveillance may lawfully be conducted and considers the making of moral 
judgments in relation to prior authorisation as a mechanism of management and 
governance. It is argued that for police surveillance to be legitimate, it must be 
morally justifiable as well as legally justifiable. Prior authorisation is a mechanism that 
seems to have been devised primarily to ensure the lawfulness of police surveillance. 
It is a mechanism through which moral justification can also be ensured, but the 
operation of the current mechanisms considered here is each, in different ways, 
morally problematic. The vulnerability exists that any given use of police surveillance 
may be lawful but unethical, and therefore devoid of legitimacy, to the moral 
detriment of the community and the criminal justice system. 
Keywords: police surveillance, prior authorisation, covert investigation governance, 
legitimacy, investigation ethics
Introduction
This article contends that to be legitimate, police use of covert investigation methods 
must be not only lawful but also ethical. Lawfulness is a matter of statute; ethical use 
is a matter of management and governance.
Policing, particularly that purportedly delivered by consent (see Dixon 1997, ch 3), 
depends for its effectiveness and efficacy upon being perceived as legitimate. Two 
characteristics of legitimacy are lawfulness and moral justification. Policing must 
be undertaken in order to protect justifiably enforceable individual moral rights 
(Miller and Blackler 2005, 26), and in a manner that ensures that the conduct of 
* Associate Investigator, ARC Centre of Excellence for Policing and Security, Griffith University. Email: 
c.harfield@griffith.edu.au.
 I am grateful to Simon Bronitt, Jon Sleeman and a number of anonymous peer reviewers for commenting 
on earlier drafts of this article.
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policing does not itself unjustifiably infringe individual rights.1 This is particularly 
so in relation to the covert acquisition of information and/or evidence through 
surveillance or through infiltration by informers and undercover investigators.2 With 
increasing reliance upon, and capacity to undertake, covert (or at least unnoticeable) 
surveillance, the potential for policing to intrude against the privacy of persons 
other than the investigation subject is significantly increased. For surveillance to 
be a legitimate investigative policing tool, its use must be morally sound as well as 
lawful. Governance framework mechanisms purporting to protect those surveilled 
from unlawful and/or arbitrary interference and infringement must accommodate 
demonstrable moral justifications, as well as meeting the relevant statutory tests of 
lawfulness. 
The apparent need to balance or offset competing values and interests when 
contemplating otherwise morally harmful conduct is an area that deserves robust 
scrutiny and requires critical thinking and faultless logic (Waldron 2003; see also 
Ashworth 1999; 2002; Bronitt 2002; 2004). In seeking to contribute to this debate, this 
article takes as its starting point the proposition that the characterisation of any given 
surveillance as morally justifiable in the circumstances begins with the decision to 
authorise such conduct. Those whose role it is in law to assess whether surveillance 
can lawfully be authorised are simultaneously making a decision about whether the 
moral harm inherent in surveillance is justifiable in the circumstances. The way in 
which such decisions are made will in turn characterise whether or not the decision is 
morally sound. Decision-making is itself characterised by the procedural architecture 
within which decisions are constructed. If the decision-making regime is morally 
problematic, then the decisions made using the regime consequently may be morally 
problematic.
Ethical problems in criminal justice and in policing have been considered elsewhere 
(Kleinig 1996; Miller and Blackler 2005; Kleinig 2009; Miller 2014; Miller and Gordon 
2014), as have different models of statutory governance of covert investigation 
(Harfield 2010). Here it is intended to focus on one particular element of the 
surveillance management process — the decision to authorise the use of covert 
investigation methods — to explore the relationship between statutory governance 
structures and ethical decision-making in an area where competing moral claims are 
ever present. 
1 It is suggested here that this holds true even if there is no enforceable human rights statute in the 
relevant jurisdiction.
2 Hereafter, unless otherwise stipulated, surveillance will be taken to include infiltration.
Volume 20(2) Police and human rights: 1963 and 2013 135Law, morality and authoris tion 
This article examines the proposed moral theory of policing and then considers moral 
issues inherent in the process of authorising covert investigation, before discussing the 
relationship between the moral theory of policing and the function of authorisation, 
and the risks of an authorisation regime becoming simply a rubber-stamping process. 
The article then considers prior authorisation of covert investigation in general and 
two current authorisation regimes and the specific moral issues to which they each 
give rise.
Protecting rights within a moral theory of policing
Policing is viewed as an institutional activity essential to a peaceful society in which 
individuals can flourish and lead fulfilling lives to the extent that, in doing so, they 
do not cause harm to others. The moral purpose of policing, argues Miller, is derived 
from the collective good it provides:
… the protection of fundamental moral rights — specifically justifiably enforceable 
(aggregate) moral rights — is a collective good to which the members of the community 
have a joint right, and it is the central and most important collective end of police work. 
[Miller 2010, 250.] 
It is paradoxical, therefore, that policing (the purpose of which is the protection of 
justifiably enforceable moral rights) is facilitated by three kinds of conduct, each 
of which is a species of prima facie moral harm. The first is coercion (constraining 
individual liberty through arrest, search and seizure); the second is deception 
(undermining trust in relationships through the use of informers and undercover 
officers); and the third is surveillance (intrusion into private life by various 
mechanisms) (Miller 2010, 263). The ability to lead one’s life according to and in 
fulfilment of one’s interests (to the extent that doing so does not unjustifiably harm 
others), without interference from others that prevents such an aim being achieved, is 
a fundamental moral good that is interfered with by police when coercion, deception 
and surveillance are employed directly against individuals, or when individuals 
are collaterally subject to such infringements of their moral interests because of 
their association with a person under investigation. Interference with a moral good 
3 Interference may range from minor infringement to serious violation of an individual’s (or the 
community’s) moral claim or interest. It is recognised that this idea of an interference range, and the 
range of (morally and materially) harmful consequences which can arise from different degrees of 
interference with a moral interest — for example, from causing a setback in someone’s interests to 
treating someone wrongfully or unjustly — warrants more detailed discussion, which is beyond the 
scope of this article. For consideration of various categories of harm within the context of the criminal 
law, see Feinberg 1984.
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is morally wrong.3 Either form of harm should not be perpetrated unless there is 
‘special justification’ for doing so founded on countervailing, weightier moral claims 
(Miller and Blackler 2005, 26). All things being equal, individuals and communities 
have a collective interest in maintaining a well-ordered and peaceful society. In 
enforcing legislatively enshrined social values against those acting in self-interest 
against established social values, the wider interests of the community are considered 
to outweigh individual criminal self-interest.4
The protection of an individual’s moral rights by using otherwise morally harmful 
means is clearly problematic because of the inherent moral contradiction present in 
such circumstances. What is needed is a moral account that can accommodate this 
confrontation. Seumas Miller and John Blackler propose a moral theory of policing 
in which ‘harmful and normally immoral methods are on occasion necessary in 
order to realise the fundamental end of policing, namely the protection of (justifiably 
enforceable) moral rights’ (Miller and Blackler 2005, 26), on which occasions will 
be determined by the circumstances of the case (Miller 2010, 265). This overarching 
moral theory of policing provides an account within which, if the police are to fulfil 
their proper institutional purpose, occasional recourse to otherwise morally harmful 
methods is required. Such recourse cannot be unfettered. It should be utilised only 
within strict parameters, and when police act outside those parameters, there is a 
risk that the integrity of the criminal justice system and the rule of law itself will 
be undermined (which would constitute harms against both the moral interests of 
individuals and the collective interests of the community). 
Miller and Blackler’s moral theory of policing is adopted here as a justification 
benchmark for investigators’ actions, including recourse to covert surveillance that 
would otherwise cause moral harm. Police investigators called upon to make morally 
significant decisions about whether or not to apply for authorisation and decision-
4 Each of these moral harms is also a potential infringement of the human rights enshrined in the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: coercion in the 
form of arrest infringes the right to liberty (Art 5) and all three conducts infringe in various ways the 
right to respect of private and family life (Art 8) and also the right to a fair trial. These issues have been 
considered many times by the European Court of Human Rights. See, for example, Jersild v Denmark, 
1995, on whether sufficient and relevant reasons based on reliable information support the proposed 
use of covert investigation; Campbell v United Kingdom, 1993, on whether the same investigative outcome 
could be achieved through less intrusive methods; Klass v Germany, 1979–80, on safeguards in place to 
prevent police abuse of an investigation technique; and W v United Kingdom, 1988, McMichael v United 
Kingdom, 1995, and Buckley v United Kingdom, 1997, on whether authorisation decisions are demonstrably 
fair.
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makers authorising the infringement of a qualified statutory right (or what would 
otherwise be an intrusion into an individual’s private life) have a duty to take moral 
issues into consideration when making such determinations. Miller and Blackler’s 
account does not absolve such decision-makers of this duty.5
Moral issues inherent in authorisation
To be conducted in a manner consistent with the moral theory of policing, 
surveillance must be simultaneously lawful, legitimate, proportionate and necessary.6 
No matter how professional or dispassionate in their approach, the vested interests 
of investigators in furthering their investigation potentially conflict with the 
requirement (inherent in Australian law relating to natural justice and procedural 
fairness) for an unbiased and objective decision. Equally, such vested interests may, 
wittingly or unwittingly, unduly influence determinations in respect of legitimacy 
(use of covert surveillance for an approved purpose), proportionality and necessity 
within the European human rights context. These propositions support the rationale 
for requiring prior independent authorisation of the use of such methods.
If the moral theory of policing is accepted as an ethical benchmark, then it follows that 
surveillance authorisation regimes should be consistent with, and certainly should not 
militate against, the theory. To the extent possible, authorisation regimes should be 
structured so that authorisation decision-makers are independent from the investigation 
for which use of surveillance is being sought. If the authority regime is not sufficiently 
independent from either the investigation or the investigators, then the objectivity that 
5 The duty does not fall upon police decision-makers alone — it falls upon anyone whose role requires 
them to make such decisions in relation to the use of covert surveillance methods on behalf of the state 
when investigating a citizen or citizens. It is acknowledged in passing here that communal interest 
in prosecuting serious crimes can find itself in conflict with the communal interest in preserving a 
criminal justice system characterised by integrity: that society may occasionally be faced with a decision 
about whether the ends justify the means or whether the means would debase the values that were 
purportedly being protected. How such a balancing act might be approached was recently considered 
at length in Warren v Her Majesty’s Attorney General of the Bailiwick of Jersey, 2011, when reviewing on 
appeal whether a stay should be ordered when ‘but for an abuse of executive power, [the defendant] 
would never have been before the court at all’ (Panday v Virgil (Senior Superintendent of Police), 2008 at 
[28], quoted by Lord Dyson in Warren at [27]).
6 It is recognised that this assertion warrants further detailed examination, but that is not possible within 
the editorial parameters for this article. So, for the sake of argument, let this three-part proposition 
stand. Lawfulness, proportionality and necessity are considered more fully below in the section entitled 
‘Surveillance governance and prior authorisation’. 
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it purports to invest in the overall process of covert intrusive surveillance governance 
may be superficial in nature or even merely symbolic (a mere ‘rubber stamp’), rather 
than a substantive merits review of the authorisation. The potential harm arising from 
an insufficient or inadequate authority regime is that the proposed conduct, when 
executed, will fail to comply with the moral theory of policing and so any moral and/or 
material harm arising from an investigator’s conduct will be morally unjustifiable, even 
if the given authorisation regime is provided for in law. Such a disconnection between 
legal justification and moral justification calls into question the legitimacy of the law 
and the law enforcement institutions. 
The use of police power that is deployed to the disadvantage of others always 
requires moral consideration, even in instances where that police power is prescribed 
by law as mandatory (the officer shall), rather than merely discretionary (the officer 
may). In the case of covert investigation, there is no requirement to use such methods; 
such methods are not mandatory, they are merely a tactical option available to 
police — sometimes only in certain specified circumstances. Statutorily required 
considerations about the necessity and proportionality of such methods point to the 
need for moral consideration on the part of applicant and authorising officer, but 
meeting the legal criteria will not, in and of itself, provide moral justification because 
that which is legally justified is not necessarily also morally justified; moral limits 
may be crossed before legal limits are reached (Miller, Roberts and Spence 2005, xvi; 
Kleinig 1996, 135). Nor does the fact that potentially immoral methods have been 
made available to the police service as an institution, in and of itself, justify individual 
police investigator use of such methods.7
Surveillance may be covert, and there may exist sound reasons to refrain from full 
public disclosure of such methods, but such constraints do not excuse investigators 
from the requirements of transparent accountability. Transparent accountability 
is not necessarily the same thing as public accountability: accountability can be 
transparent to an independent entity rather than the general public. Thus, in the 
United Kingdom, the Chief Surveillance Commissioner (acting under the authority of 
parliament as a representative body of public interest in a fair, efficient and effective 
criminal justice system) is one such example — without being transparent to the 
7 This point is explored more fully in the next section of the article. Such methods include, for example, 
the use of deception (informers, undercover officers) and the infringement of respect of private life 
(surveillance, communication interception, infiltration by informers and undercover officers).
Volume 20(2) Police and human rights: 1963 and 2013 139Law, morality and authoris tion 
general public.8 In other words, there should be no place to hide from appropriate 
scrutiny when conducting covert investigation within the context of a governance 
regime. There is a requirement to engage in moral justification and there is no means 
of disguising — from those who wish to scrutinise properly — the fact that one has 
acted without moral considerations.
The deployment of remotely operated surveillance devices similarly engages moral 
considerations because the devices are intended to be used to intrude into an 
individual’s private life in order to acquire information that may be used by police to 
the detriment of the surveillance subject (for example, prosecution potentially leading 
to conviction and sanction). As will be seen below, Australian laws are framed in a 
way that has the appearance of legislating for moral considerations when deploying 
such devices. That surveillance conducted without the assistance of a surveillance 
device seems not to require specific authorisation in Australian jurisdictions does 
not mean that moral considerations are not required. There just appears to be no 
statutory requirement to be satisfied. (This is all the more reason for investigating 
agencies to have documented moral consideration protocols in place.)
The moral theory of policing and the function of authorisation
How does the authority regime — the mechanism intended to ensure that investigators 
do not infringe the relevant qualified human rights without justification — engage 
with the moral theory of policing? To reiterate: Miller and Blackler’s moral theory 
of policing provides an account that explains why, on occasion, morally harmful 
methods may be used justifiably in pursuit of the moral purpose of policing. The 
theory can accommodate accounts of justification for otherwise morally harmful 
conduct at three levels: the institutional level, the management level and the level 
of policing by individual officers (which includes any given investigation). What 
it cannot accommodate is an account that provides a single cover-all justification 
simultaneously across all three levels. The theory has to be applied individually and 
according to the particular circumstances at each level. It does not follow that because 
the moral theory of policing can accommodate at the institutional level the occasional 
recourse to otherwise morally harmful methods as a tactical option that recourse 
to such methods will automatically be justifiable in any given operational instance 
when such an option is being contemplated. The availability of a tactic within the 
8 A similar role is performed in Queensland, which has created an independent Office of Public Interest 
Monitor, who has the powers to intervene in surveillance and telephone interception warrant proceedings, 
and will advocate for the rights and interests of the affected person and broader community: Police Powers 
and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), s 743; Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld), s 328.
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institutional armoury is not a justification for any given individual use of the tactic. 
Just because it can be used does not mean that it should be used. 
In practical terms, were the justification provided by the moral theory of policing at 
the institutional level to be relied upon as justification for deployment of otherwise 
morally harmful tactics at the operational level, the effect would be that of providing 
a blank cheque: investigators could employ otherwise morally harmful methods 
simply because the police (as an institution) could justify theoretically the use of such 
methods. This, in effect, would absolve the applicant and the authorising officer from 
having to undertaken any moral consideration about the proposed use of morally 
harmful methods. It could be used to provide a readymade response to the statutory 
considerations of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality without giving actual or 
sufficiently serious consideration to the underlying moral justification that needs to 
be claimed and demonstrated in such circumstances.
Risk and moral management: avoiding tick boxes and rubber stamps
The existence of a governance regime primarily addresses the institutional level of 
justification within the moral theory of policing: this generates the requirement that 
individual investigators as agents of a state organisation must seek an authority 
external to the investigation (if not actually external to the organisation) to use 
otherwise morally harmful covert methods. At the same time, at the individual level 
of justification, investigators must secure authorisation of covert methods in each 
specific operational context. 
Any given investigation will give rise to numerous instances in which covert methods 
might be relied upon. The investigation as a whole would fall within the institutional 
level of moral justification for covert action, but each planned use of otherwise 
morally harmful methods must be individually legally authorised and individually 
morally justified throughout the progress of the investigation. Furthermore, a single 
covert tactic may involve a process comprising separate constituent elements each 
requiring individual authorisation and justification. For example, the placing of a 
listening device inside a building will require, first, a covert feasibility reconnaissance 
to identify what sort of surveillance device will be needed and where it might be 
placed and for how long; second, covert deployment of the device; third, covert 
use of the device; and fourth, covert recovery of the device (which, if circumstances 
have changed since deployment, might itself require a further covert preliminary 
feasibility reconnaissance). Changing circumstances may change the validity and 
strength of any moral justification that previously existed: for example, the feasibility 
reconnaissance (morally justifiable in the circumstances) may reveal new information 
about previously unknown countervailing moral claims that undermine any moral 
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justification for the actual deployment and use of the equipment.9 It is not sufficient 
merely to assert that covert investigation is, in principle, capable of being morally 
justified within the overarching moral theory of policing. The moral complexity of 
such methods is multilayered and contextual, requiring regular and ongoing review 
of decisions made and actions proposed. 
Legal risk management in policing requires demonstrable transparency in the 
authorisation process. This has the potential to foster a bureaucratic approach 
towards decision-making that is inimical to the moral deliberation required above: 
put simply, authorisation processes are vulnerable to the ‘ticking of boxes’ and 
‘rubber stamping’. Technology has accentuated this risk: the advent of bespoke 
computer software programs provides police agencies with a means of documenting 
transparency (albeit to a discrete audience) in covert investigations. Such programs 
serve a number of purposes: primarily, they document ‘what, when and who’ 
for the purposes of accountability; they provide a secure environment for such 
documentation; and they ensure consistency of process. This last characteristic 
is a double-edged sword: the desirable characteristic of achieving consistency in 
decision-making, rather than improving the quality of individual decisions, can itself 
come to define the process. The danger exists that the process ceases to service the 
decision-making; instead, the decision-making comes to service the process. This 
becomes evident in the repeated use of stock phrases and formulaic expressions in 
written applications for authorisation.
Bureaucratic process-adherence may militate against considered decision-making, 
including the making of complex moral judgments. This can be so even when 
the recording of moral considerations is part of the process. In assessing the risks 
involved in mounting an operation of any kind, including a covert operation, 
investigators in the United Kingdom have at their disposal a risk assessment matrix 
(known as the PPPLEM model) in which six categories of risks are identified: 
political, physical, psychological, legal, economic and moral. In applying for 
authorisation to utilise covert investigation tactics, investigators identify foreseeable 
risks within each category and indicate how the risks are to be managed. While 
working as an intelligence manager receiving draft applications for review prior to 
9 A covertly deployed surveillance camera and/or microphone, if automated and set simply to record, 
will record everything that falls within its range of image or sound capture, regardless of whether what 
is being recorded involves the subject of the investigation or persons entirely unconnected with and not 
suspected of involvement in the alleged offence. Such a device might be placed in a public space, or in 
a communal place within premises that the suspect but also other innocent passengers and bystanders 
frequent.
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their being considered by a superintendent, the author did not recall ever seeing a risk 
assessment in which moral risks were explicitly identified.10 Some software versions 
of the authorisation process documentation appeared erroneously to have mis-
labelled the ‘economic’ risks category as an ‘ethical’ risks category, thus purportedly 
requiring investigators to identify both ethical risks and moral risks! Interestingly, 
this iteration at least prompted applicant references to the ethical risk of collateral 
intrusion (persons other than the named surveillance subject also being surveilled 
due to their coincidental presence in the surveillance arena). 
A number of points follow from this. First, the author’s professional experience 
suggests that, among practitioners, there is a widespread lack of understanding 
of what constitutes a ‘moral issue’ in the practice and methodology of covert 
investigation — at least beyond the limits of professional standards and a basic 
requirement to adhere to police codes of conduct. If police practitioners do not fully 
appreciate the wider moral complexities, they cannot reasonably be expected to make 
sound moral judgments or even to recognise the relative merits of a countervailing 
moral claim. This is a significant training issue not only for investigator applicants 
and authorising officers within an administrative authorisation regime, but also, it is 
suggested, in the authorisation framework involving oversight by judicial officers or 
tribunal members — perhaps ‘judicious’ would be a better label, given that members 
must act in a personal capacity.11 Law and morality are not the same thing and it does 
not necessarily follow that in having the qualities necessary to perform judicial office 
well, the office-holder is equally well equipped to make moral judgments within the 
operational context of covert investigation management.
The fact that some iterations of the authorisation documentation software used 
in some organisations in the United Kingdom included both ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ 
risk categories, and that investigator applicants often responded to the notion of 
an ‘ethical’ risk by recognising collateral intrusion and suggesting a management 
strategy for its minimisation and for managing the product of collateral intrusion, 
suggests that the seeds of training would not fall on barren ground. But the formulaic 
nature of both these responses and ‘management’ strategies makes the second point 
that needs to be noted: the repeated use of standard phrases seems to evidence the 
concern above that applications can be drafted so as to serve the purpose of the 
bureaucracy and not the purpose of authorisation. Investigators using this particular 
construction of the process had learnt what was expected under the label ‘ethical’ 
10 This anecdotal observation is based on many dozens of applications drafted within a single organisation: 
it does not represent the findings of a systematic and properly designed survey.
11 I am grateful to Professor Simon Bronitt for this observation, which will be elaborated below.
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and responded accordingly in a manner that seemed to owe more to Pavlovian 
institutionalisation than to any inherent moral intuition.
The third point is this: the need for proper consideration of uncomfortable moral 
complexities seems to have been lost in the convenience of bureaucratic language 
and the design of a risk management model that, for the most part, focuses on 
risks to the investigator, investigation and institution, rather than risks to others 
(innocent associates of the suspect, passengers and bystanders). The determination 
of whether a risk should be removed, avoided, reduced or accepted may well involve 
moral considerations, but protecting a justifiably enforceable moral right (the moral 
purpose of policing, and argued here to be the ultimate purpose of an investigation 
governance regime) ought not to be reduced simply to operational risk management. 
Through their actions, investigators will be causing otherwise unjustifiable moral 
harm to one or more others: it is these others who are primarily at risk of moral 
harm, not the investigation itself or the investigators.12 Risk management is not rights 
protection. Any given qualified right must be respected and protected unless there is 
a countervailing, stronger moral claim. This is a matter of moral judgment, not risk 
management. Notwithstanding the undoubted good intentions of including the need 
for a documented moral justification in the application process, the manner in which it 
has been included appears to have misconstrued — or to have created circumstances 
in which practitioners might misconstrue — the sort of consideration that should be 
being made: a misconstruction compounded by the lack of practitioner awareness in 
relation to the moral complexities of covert investigation methodologies.13
Surveillance governance and prior authorisation
Two generic authorisation decision-making frameworks relating to covert police 
surveillance, currently in use, are considered here. Common to both models is 
the device of prior authorisation as part of the governance mechanism for police 
12 An argument can be made, of course, that requiring practitioners to operate a regime, and within the 
context of a process that is morally unsound, exposes the practitioner to moral risk in doing so. 
13 It should be noted in passing that the PPPLEM is not the only risk assessment model used in planning 
and applying for covert investigation operations. Covert investigators from the Metropolitan Police 
Service came to view the PPPLEM model as unsuited to the covert operational environment and 
consequently devised an alternative: the PLAICE risk assessment model (physical risks, legal risks, 
risks to assets, information/IT risks, risks of compromise of staff or tactics, and environmental risks). 
On its face, this model (presented in Billingsley 2006) omits any reference to the risk of moral harm 
to investigation subjects, third parties or innocent passengers and bystanders, which removes moral 
judgment from the management of risk but leaves unanswered whether moral considerations are 
adequately addressed at some other stage of the planning and application process.
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covert surveillance, but this common paradigm has two significantly different 
manifestations, each with its own moral implications. The first model of covert 
surveillance authorisation considered here is the regime set out in the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (UK) (RIPA) that enacts in UK criminal procedural law 
the key principles enshrined within Art 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and given domestic effect in the United 
Kingdom through the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
The right to respect for family and private life protected by Art 8 is not an absolute 
right. Infringement by state officials or agents is considered capable of being justified, 
and so permissible, when certain circumstances exist together. First, the exercise of a 
power likely to lead to an infringement must be provided for in law. In relation to police 
use of surveillance and other covert investigation methods, such as communication 
interception, the primary purpose of RIPA is to establish the lawfulness of such 
methods. In essence, the use of a method is either provided for in law or it is not. 
Second, where police methods are likely to infringe Art 8, there is a requirement that 
their use should not be arbitrary: in other words, such recourse should be legitimate 
(for a specified purpose14), and it should be necessary and proportionate, not just 
desirable, useful or reasonable (Bingham 2010, 74–76; Harfield and Harfield 2012, 
16–22). These are judgment calls that require an objective basis. The (perception 
of) objectivity in determining whether a proposed action is legitimate, necessary 
and proportionate in any given circumstance potentially is enhanced if those 
determinations are arrived at by someone other than the investigator seeking to 
use such methods, because the latter will likely have a vested interest is using the 
methods proposed that may unduly influence his or her own decision-making. 
Herein lays the second purpose of RIPA, because it provides governance frameworks 
for such matters to be considered and authorisation for the deployment of the 
method to be either granted or refused.
14 What constitutes a legitimate purpose is defined in RIPA: ss 28(3), 81(2) and 81(5) specify that police 
may conduct surveillance for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime, preventing disorder or 
apprehending a suspected offender. In limited circumstances, certain other agencies may conduct 
surveillance in the interests of national security; in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the 
United Kingdom; in the interests of public safety; for the purpose of protecting public health; or for 
the purpose of assessing or collecting certain fiscal levies. The relevant secondary legislation, the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Directed Surveillance and Covert Human Intelligence Sources) Order 2003 
(SI 2003/3171), details which other agencies can utilise surveillance in respect of these other defined 
legitimate purposes. 
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RIPA defines ‘surveillance’ (s 48(2)) as including the monitoring, observing or listening 
to of persons, their movements, their conversations or their other activities and 
communications; the recording of such activities; and also any surveillance by or with 
the assistance of a surveillance device.15 RIPA categorises covert surveillance as either 
directed (s 26(2)) or intrusive (s 26(3)), depending on the circumstances in which the 
covert surveillance is being conducted, providing different authorisation frameworks 
accordingly. Thus, RIPA does not focus on specific surveillance technologies (for 
example, asset location devices, audio recording devices and video recording 
devices), but on surveillance in general as a species of conduct that engages the Art 8 
rights and which, when conducted covertly for specific purposes, is held to require 
prior authorisation as part of the mechanism for determining lawful justification. It 
is a rights-centric statute that provides an administrative authorisation framework 
largely internal in character.16 
The second generic authorisation model is that which forms the basis of many of 
the Australian covert surveillance regimes: the statutory paradigm is fundamentally 
15 Thus, surveillance is distinguished from other forms of covert investigation, such as communication 
interception and entrapment. Arguably, this passive listening and watching is also distinguishable 
from what Gans et al (2011, 341) term ‘participant surveillance’ — the use of undercover officers and 
informers — which might also be labelled interactive surveillance. The moral issues arising from the 
deployment of undercover officers and/or informers warrant separate consideration (see, for example, 
Harfield 2012): this article focuses on surveillance as defined in s 48(2) of RIPA.
16 RIPA incorporates in Pt 1 of the Act revised and updated provisions in relation to the interception of 
communications formally provided for in the now repealed Interception of Communications Act 1985 (UK). 
Again, this is not technology-specific — the policy intention being that as far as possible the provisions 
should be technology-neutral for future-proofing purposes (the present author represented the police 
service in pre-legislative policy discussion with Home Office officials during the drafting of the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill (UK)) — but focuses on an overall conduct and its consequential 
engagement of Art 8 rights.
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different.17 First, Australian laws appear to be silent on surveillance as a law 
enforcement conduct, in and of itself worthy of regulation. Instead, the statutory 
starting point generally in relation to surveillance is the criminalisation of the use of 
surveillance devices, to which general prohibition exemptions are available in certain 
circumstances for the purposes of law enforcement (Gans et al 2011, 302). In other 
words, when Australian police officers apply for authorisation to install, use,18 
maintain and retrieve surveillance devices, they are not seeking authorisation to 
engage in conduct that would otherwise arbitrarily infringe protected rights: rather, 
they are seeking exemption from culpability in specific conduct otherwise legislated 
as criminal.19 These two different authorisation paradigms thus generate two 
different contexts with which moral judgments must be made by authorising officers. 
17 There is no overarching human rights legislation in Australia. The state of Victoria and the Australian 
Capital Territory have passed a Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and a Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT) respectively, but arguably these are not as robust or as comprehensive in their 
considerations as European human rights legislation. Section 13 of the Victorian Charter asserts that 
a person has the right not to have his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or 
arbitrarily interfered with; s 20 asserts that a person must not be deprived of his or her property other 
than in accordance with the law. In the absence of defined qualifications and parameters (such as those 
outlined in Art 8(2) of the ECHR), the limits of the Victorian Charter are in essence defined by other 
statutes: if conduct is lawful under another statute, by definition it will not offend against the Victorian 
Charter. The ACT legislation is crafted in a similar vein, but with the qualification (s 40B) that it is 
unlawful for a public authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a human right unless the law 
requires the authority to act in such a way. The statutory protection of human rights within Australia’s 
various jurisdictions has been subject to significant criticism: see, for example, O’Neill, Rica and Douglas 
2004. Unlike the United Kingdom, the Australian Commonwealth jurisdiction does have a Privacy 
Act (the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth)) governing the acquisition, collection, management and dissemination 
of personal information, which, as of a 2012 amendment, incorporates the conduct of surveillance 
activities, intelligence-gathering activities and monitoring activities as ‘enforcement-related activity’ 
which is often exempted from many of the information-protecting Australian Privacy Principles: see the 
Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth). 
18 The ‘use’ of surveillance devices is defined in functional and technical terms by characterising the 
product (including a recording) obtainable by the technology being used. See, for instance, s 4 of the 
Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) or s 3 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW). 
19 The Australian states and territories, together with the Commonwealth jurisdiction, enforce their own 
individual criminal jurisdictions with their own individual criminal procedural laws. See Gans et al 
2011, 334 for a brief comparison of the different regimes. It is not necessary for the purposes of this article 
to discuss the different regimes in detail. Suffice it here to consider in general terms common features 
of the different regimes and the implications of these for those officials making authorisation decisions. 
The criminalisation of the use of surveillance devices is intended to be a means of protecting personal 
privacy absent any statutory protections beyond the regulated use of personal information. 
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In the former model, the context requiring moral justification has an external focus, 
protecting others from police abuse of power; in the latter model, the requirement 
for moral justification has an internal focus, protecting the police from what would 
otherwise be criminal liability. Engaging in surveillance without the assistance of 
specific devices does not generally appear to require authorisation in Australian 
jurisdictions. Such unaided surveillance may not engage statute, but it still engages 
moral concerns because such conduct will be otherwise morally offensive unless 
justified by a weightier moral claim. 
Another key difference between the general formats of the UK and Australian covert 
surveillance authorisation regimes is the character of the authorising official. In 
the RIPA administrative authorisation regime, the authorising officer for directed 
surveillance is a senior manager from the agency concerned (Harfield and Harfield 
2012, 37), while for intrusive surveillance it is a senior executive from the agency 
concerned whose decision to authorise is subject to independent, quasi-judicial 
scrutiny and prior approval before the intrusive surveillance can commence (Harfield 
and Harfield 2012, 6–58).20 In most of the Australian regimes that permit the use of 
surveillance devices by the police, sworn affidavit application for a warrant must be 
made by a police officer (sometimes stipulated to be of a senior rank) to a judicial 
officer or tribunal member (although for tracking devices in some jurisdictions a 
magistrate may authorise deployment, use and retrieval).21 The Australian Federal 
Police may also apply to specified members of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
for a warrant to deploy and use surveillance devices.22
These different models engage different moral implications and considerations at 
different levels. First, there is the issue of the character of what is being authorised: 
infringement of individual privacy or exemption from criminal prohibition, and the 
20 The power to conduct covert surveillance under RIPA is not confined to the police but is invested in a 
large number of law enforcement, regulatory and government agencies as prescribed in Sch 1 of RIPA. 
21 See, for example, ss 14 and 16 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth); s 16 of the Surveillance Devices Act 
2007 (NSW); s 328 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld); s 14 of the Surveillance Devices 
Act 1999 (Vic); and ss 12–13 of the Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA). Note that Pt 4 of the Surveillance 
Devices Act 2004 (Cth) makes provision for limited use of surveillance technology without warrant 
in circumstances where there is no entry onto premises or interference with vehicles, where the law 
enforcement officer is party to the recorded conversation, and where the use of a tracking device for 
limited purposes has been authorised by a senior member of the same agency. The latter circumstances 
bring s 39 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) within the context of the discussion below on 
administrative authorisation. 
22 Sections 11 and 13 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth).
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influence that these two different approaches might have on the moral consciences of 
investigators. Second, there is the issue of what it is that the authorising officer is being 
asked to consider when determining whether to grant or withhold authorisation, and 
whether either species of authorising officer — internal administrator or external 
(sometimes quasi-)judicial officer — is being asked to make a morally appropriate 
determination within the context of their office and position. 
Moral management and administrative authorisation: the UK model
To what moral harms does an administrative authorisation scheme, such as 
that enacted by RIPA, potentially give rise? And to whom will such harm be 
caused? To be consistent with the moral theory of policing, the authorising 
officer in an administrative authorisation regime must make dispassionate and 
objective determinations about the use of covert surveillance in circumstances 
of organisational affinity and perceivable conflicts of interest.23 The role of an 
investigator is impartially to discover, secure and present relevant and reliable facts 
— both incriminating and exculpatory — for an independent decision-maker (jury 
and/or judge) to use to determine whether guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. 
Nevertheless, political and popular rhetoric posits the police as crime-fighters,24 a 
perception which privileges the interests of the investigator,25 and the interests of 
individual victims in restoration and retribution, over the wider collective interests 
of the community in having a dispassionate criminal justice system operating with 
integrity to serve democratic society.26 The perception of police as crime-fighters is 
reinforced through performance measures which, although they change in detail and 
character from time to time, have in common the ultimate purpose of conviction. In 
23 Conflicts of interest in policing sometimes cannot be avoided and must be managed. For a discussion on 
unavoidable conflicts of interest in policing, see Coleman 2005.
24 Consider, for example: the slogan seen on Australian Federal Police (AFP) advertising hoardings around 
Canberra, where the AFP, in addition to its national duties, undertakes community policing in the 
Australian Capital Territory: ‘To fight crime and win’; the recruitment campaign for the new National 
Crime Agency in the United Kingdom describes the Agency as one of ‘operational crime fighters’ 
(National Crime Agency 2012); and election campaigns are fought on manifestos that promise police 
will be crime fighters, not form fillers (Lincolnshire Conservative Association 2011).
25 For example, and in no particular order, meeting performance targets, earning professional kudos, and 
being seen to be worth his or her salary. 
26 In this latter construction, the victim’s interests are addressed relative to the victim’s status as a member 
of society rather than as an aggrieved individual: these issues are insightfully discussed in Kennedy 
2004, 13 and 24.
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this context, investigators primarily tend to see their role not as neutral fact-finders 
but as the builders of the strongest-possible prosecution case.27
The authorising officer in such an administrative regime must not be a member 
of the team investigating the matter at hand. Yet, inevitably, at the same time, this 
individual cannot be entirely divorced from the context of organisational culture and 
objectives within which he or she makes authorisation decisions. Consequently, these 
important decisions (which are simultaneously statutory and moral in character) 
are made in an environment of vested interest and an arena in which objectivity is 
robustly confronted by bias, be it conscious or subconscious. 
Police surveillance conduct that would otherwise give rise to moral harm will be 
justifiable within the context of the moral theory of policing if certain criteria exist; 
the authorisation process is intended to ensure that consideration of whether these 
criteria exist is undertaken before the conduct commences. Authorisation thus 
becomes integral to the moral legitimacy of covert surveillance. But this also requires 
that the authorisation decision itself is morally sound. That decision will itself be 
morally harmful if the decision-maker (the authorising officer) is unduly influenced 
by bias. If the circumstances in which the authorisation is granted are morally 
problematic, then the covert surveillance will fail to satisfy the moral theory of 
policing and the consequent moral harm arising will be compounded; the legitimacy 
of the investigating agency will be compromised and not only will the subject of the 
surveillance suffer the moral harm of unjustified infringement of respect for his or her 
family life, but also the community will suffer moral harm arising from the improper 
actions of a criminal justice agency the legitimacy of which is part of the foundations 
of a democratic society. 
A second category of potential moral harms is associated with administrative 
authorisation: that the applicant seeking authorisation will wish to, and will have the 
means to, exaggerate the intelligence case upon which the application is founded, 
thus deceiving the authorising officer in order to induce an authorisation that might 
27 The author’s experience of serving in five different policing organisations was that this was the 
prevailing organisational culture. It is also evidenced through instances of miscarriage of justice, where 
investigators have withheld relevant exculpatory facts from the prosecutor (see, for example, Walker 
and Starmer 1999) and through instances of police misusing covert surveillance methods in order to 
try to secure incriminating evidence in circumstances that breach legal privilege and other due process 
protections (see, for example, R v Sutherland, 2002; R v Sentence, 2004; and R v Grant, 2005, discussed in 
Harfield and Harfield 2012, 27; since this discussion was first published, aspects of the original judgment 
in Grant have been disapproved: see Hyland and Walker 2014, 565).
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not otherwise have been granted. Such misrepresentation is itself a moral harm 
because it undermines the integrity of the authorisation process that is intended to 
serve the public interest, and because it manifests disrespect to the authorising officer 
by using (or merely seeking to use) that individual as a means to an unjustifiable 
end.28 Further, once authorising officers come to recognise (as in my experience I 
came to recognise) that the applications of certain officers must be treated not with a 
healthy scepticism but with suspicion, the trust upon which fruitful and purposeful 
collaboration with colleagues depends is broken; the organisation is the poorer for 
it; and service to the public and in the public interest suffers (each of these being a 
morally harmful outcome).29
Performance targets and competition for scarce covert surveillance resources can act 
as perverse incentives that tempt investigators to exaggerate the intelligence case 
upon which their application for covert surveillance authority is founded in order 
to secure access to resources and so enhance the prospects of achieving performance 
targets. The authorisation regime is thus devalued and undermined because of the 
way in which it and the intelligence-led policing paradigm function — a further 
moral harm because the integrity of the investigating agency, which society is entitled 
to expect and demand, is thus compromised. Perverse incentives can corrupt those 
who might not otherwise have been corrupted,30 in the sense that officers who would 
not conceive of trying to deceive an external authority, such as a judge, might yet feel 
less scrupulous about manipulating a colleague.31
Moral management and (quasi-)judicial authorisation: the  
Australian model
If the lack of a truly independent authorisation decision-maker is perceived to 
be the inherent weakness of the UK administrative authorisation model, then 
removing that function outside the investigating agency presents itself as a potential 
28 Using another individual as a means is a moral wrong; abusing their ignorance is a moral wrong; and 
the unjustifiable ends are also a moral wrong. 
29 One method employed by some applicants was to populate their application with large numbers of 
intelligence unique reference numbers in the hope that I would be impressed by the weight of numbers 
and accept the intelligence case on this basis alone, without actually reading each and every intelligence 
log. Some officers soon came to realise that I would read every log; others never gave up trying the tactic. 
30 Corruption is conceived here to be a continuum of debasement ranging from functional incompetence, 
through deliberative evasion of required protocols (howsoever motivated) to deliberate abuse of power 
for private gain. I am grateful to Professor John Kleinig for discussing this idea with me.
31 For judicial consideration of exactly this police train of thought, see the judgments in Warren v Her 
Majesty’s Attorney General of the Bailiwick of Jersey, 2011.
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and straightforward solution. A number of Australian jurisdictions require use 
of surveillance devices to be authorised by a judicial officer. At first glance, this 
requirement seems to satisfy the independence principle.32 But is this really the case? 
And, even if it is the case, is the Australian authorisation framework yet free from 
intrinsic moral hazard?
Across the various Australian jurisdictions, a number of statutory tests must be 
met before law enforcement agencies may lawfully utilise a surveillance device. 
The judicial officer from whom authorisation is sought must be satisfied of certain 
specified matters. What specified matters must be considered varies between the 
different Australian jurisdictions, but common to all are the following requirements: 
first, the authorising judicial officer must be satisfied that there exist reasonable 
grounds for suspicion or belief upon which the application is founded;33 second, 
the authorising judicial officer must consider the extent to which privacy is likely to 
be affected by the use of a surveillance device;34 and third, the authorising judicial 
officer must take into consideration whether warrants have previously been issued in 
relation to the investigation to which the current application relates. 
Also common is the requirement for the authorising judicial officer to consider 
the ‘nature and gravity’ of the offence suspected or being investigated. On its face, 
this requirement would seem to address the issue of proportionality. But it is a 
very different test from the consideration of proportionality within the schemes 
such as RIPA in the United Kingdom that implement the ECHR principles. The 
rationale underpinning RIPA is that the desired product of a given method must 
be proportionate to the intrusiveness of the method employed.35 The seriousness 
of the suspected offence under investigation (characterised by the maximum length 
32 See, for example, s 16 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); s 328 of the Police Powers and 
Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld); s 14 of the Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); and ss 12–13 of the 
Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA).
33 New South Wales and Victoria require a ‘suspicion or a belief’, Queensland and Western Australia 
require belief. Elsewhere in the regulation of police powers, the triggers of suspicion and belief are 
deliberately distinguished (Spears, Quilter and Harfield 2011, 218–30) and in the United Kingdom belief 
is a higher threshold than suspicion. In relation to applying for the use of surveillance devices, the law 
in New South Wales and Victoria operates in a context of ambiguity not tolerated in other state laws. 
34 In the Australian jurisdictions, there is no hierarchy of authorisation related to the seriousness of the 
intrusion as there is in the RIPA scheme — albeit that the latter has only the most basic two tiers in its 
hierarchy.
35 See, for example, McKay 2006; McKay 2011, ch 2; Ormerod 2006; Taylor 2006 — all of which inform the 
discussion of proportionality and RIPA in Harfield and Harfield 2012, 19–22. 
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of sentence upon conviction) is of relevance only in determining whether the RIPA 
threshold for intrusive surveillance has been met (distinguishing circumstances in 
which directed surveillance may be used but not intrusive surveillance). No matter 
how grave or serious an offence is suspected or alleged, in the European context 
the use of covert surveillance in any given circumstance may yet be prohibited 
because the intrusion of the method intended to be used is deemed disproportionate 
to the intelligence or evidential value of the product that would be obtained. This 
construction protects the suspect, the investigator and the community from the 
moral harm arising from unjustifiably disproportionate use of state power. Not so 
in Australian jurisdictions, where it is the seriousness of the offence that founds 
justification for using intrusive investigation methods. The danger that arises in the 
Australian construction is that it is always possible to argue that suspicious conduct 
is symptomatic of or in preparation for serious crime. Consequently, seriousness is no 
real or reliable measure of proportionality (and so this test is no adequate protection 
against morally harmful conduct arising from a disproportionate response).36 
The investigator’s suspicion (or, where applicable, belief) can always be framed 
in such a way as to trump rights — a concern recognised in the Covert Surveillance 
and Property Interference Revised Code of Practice accompanying RIPA: ‘The fact that a 
suspected offence may be serious will not alone render intrusive actions proportionate’ 
(para 3.5; see also Bronitt 2002; 2004; Waldron 2003). The moral legitimacy of the law 
depends in part upon appropriate and proper statutory tests and thresholds being 
set. To the extent that statutory tests are theoretically unsound, the law in this respect 
is likely to be morally unsound also because of the failure of legislators to recognise 
and adequately protect important social values. When investigation powers engage 
other important social values, significant moral harm, and likely also material harm, 
will arise and the proposed use of the powers therefore must be morally as well as 
legally justifiable (see, generally, Kleinig 2009).
What constitutes lawful necessity in using a surveillance device is dealt with in 
different ways among Australian jurisdictions. Judges (or, as applicable, magistrates) 
in New South Wales must consider the ‘existence’ of alternative means of obtaining 
the evidence and whether those alternative means may assist or prejudice the 
investigation (as must their counterparts in Queensland). In Victoria, judges (or, 
as applicable, magistrates) must consider the ‘availability’ of alternative means 
of obtaining the same product and the extent to which such means would assist 
or prejudice the investigation. In Western Australia, judges (or, as applicable, 
36 See Kleinig 2009, 204 for further detailed consideration of the misuse of ‘vague appeals’ to seriousness 
‘cloaked in the language of proportionality’.
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magistrates) must consider the extent to which the evidence of information 
sought is likely to be obtained by methods other than using a surveillance 
device.37 Detailed discussion of the difference between these requirements must 
be undertaken elsewhere: of relevance here is that the operation of different 
standards in neighbouring jurisdictions that may be called upon to collaborate on 
cross-border investigations is morally problematic because the possibility exists 
that criminal co-conspirators who happen to live in different jurisdictions may be 
subject to different coercive powers in otherwise identical circumstances. The moral 
harm arising here is that of unfairness: those who are co-accused but who live and 
operate in different jurisdictions within a single nation receiving unequal treatment 
before the law. To the extent that these circumstances occasion different adverse 
material consequences for individuals co-accused, unfairness is manifest within 
the criminal justice context. Assuming procedural fairness, natural justice and due 
process are held to be primary social values. Cross-border collaboration may be 
seen consequently to be morally unjustifiable if the outcome of collaborating within 
the context of incompatible regimes is inequity, particularly in relation to the use of 
surveillance against citizens.38 
Judges (or, as applicable, magistrates or tribunal members) in each of the Australian 
jurisdictions are required to make ‘judgment calls’ that require them to be thoroughly 
briefed about all aspects of the investigation (not just those aspects that the 
investigator chooses to include in the application affidavit): such judgments are 
essentially investigation determinations. For example, in New South Wales, judicial 
officers authorising covert investigation technologies must consider how the 
information sought would assist the investigation and (separately) the evidentiary 
value of the information. In Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia, judges must 
consider the intelligence and evidentiary value of the information being sought. The 
37 Section 19(2) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW); s 330 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities 
Act 2000 (Qld); s 19 of the Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic); and s 13 of the Surveillance Devices Act 
1998 (WA). Mere ‘existence’ seems to be a weaker test than ‘availability’: neither seems, on face value, 
to be definitive. It is unclear whether Victorian judges may legitimately regard a surveillance device 
as necessary in circumstances where scarce resources that might otherwise have secured the desired 
product in a less intrusive way are deployed elsewhere and so are not ‘available’. 
38 In ECHR case law, variation between different jurisdictions is accommodated within the concept of the 
margin of appreciation: local differences are permissible to the extent that the fundamental principles 
of the ECHR are promoted and protected by the given domestic law. The scope of the margin of 
appreciation ‘will depend not only on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular 
nature of the interference [with a protected right] involved’: Segerstedt-Wiberg v Sweden, 2006 at [88]. See 
Hopkins 2009, 31 for further discussion. 
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requirement to make such determinations brings the decision-maker much closer to 
the management of the investigation than would normally be the case for a judicial 
officer, imperilling the decision-maker’s independence in doing so.39 Further, unless 
the decision-maker has access to an independent review of the investigation, such 
decisions must be made entirely on the information provided by the investigator 
(albeit on oath in an affidavit).40 The ‘independence’ of the authorisation decision-
maker is potentially compromised because of their total dependence upon what 
information the investigator chooses to disclose in application. This vulnerability was 
highlighted recently in Seven West Media Ltd v Commissioner, Australian Federal Police, 
2014, when a combination of ‘erroneous statements and what the [affidavit] material 
did not say’ led to magistrates, acting as authorisation decision-makers, making 
legally unsound decisions (at [79]), thus contributing to a miscarriage of justice (at 
[84]).41 In the federal jurisdiction, judges who authorise such investigator conduct do 
so in a personal capacity rather than as a function of their office, because the separation 
39 It can be argued, I believe, that a judge-issued search warrant ordering the seizure and production of 
evidence for use at trial is distinct from a surveillance device warrant, which is concerned with the 
investigative function of discovering whether evidence actually exists and of capturing information 
in order that it can then become evidence. The product of an executed search warrant will be tested as 
evidence in open court, which is a test of the integrity of the original application for the warrant: the 
product of covert investigation may never be examined at court (particularly if the product is desired 
for intelligence purposes), and so applications to use such methodologies and technologies may never 
be tested in a transparent setting.
40 When draft applications were submitted for review prior to onward transmission to an authorising 
officer, the author had access to the intelligence database, the contents of which had been ‘prayed in 
aid’ by the applicant in drafting the application. This provided the author with an opportunity to check 
claims made and make verifiable further enquiries if doubts existed about the applicant’s assertions. 
Judges can merely question an applicant, but little more. 
41 The Federal Court held that the AFP had failed properly to explain the context of its application for 
a search warrant (at [72]); the magistrates would necessarily have taken the wording of the affidavit 
very seriously and literally (at [76]); the affidavit sworn by the AFP had serious factual errors and 
significant omissions (at [79]); and these errors led to a fundamental miscarriage of justice (at [84]). 
This combination of circumstances meant that a coercive search was unjustifiable not only legally but 
also morally. The misuse of coercive powers is morally harmful because: (a) coercive powers infringe 
individual moral interests and in some cases can violate such interests to the extent that not only moral 
harm but also material harm is occasioned; (b) misuse of legislated power entrusted to an investigator 
violates the interests of both citizen and community in power being used on their behalf justly; and (c) 
misconduct simultaneously violates the legitimate, lawful and moral interests of investigated persons 
who are entitled to be treated according to the law, especially when the law is being used (justifiably) 
against them.
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of powers intrinsic in the Australian Constitution demands that the judiciary must 
not act in an executive capacity.
This merely highlights the moral ambiguities inherent in judge-authorised covert 
surveillance. A constitutional principle is preserved through political artifice because 
the independence of the judiciary is called into question when members are asked 
to issue a surveillance device warrant.42 There exists moral (and perhaps also legal) 
ambiguity about the necessity of having to manufacture a constitutional interpretation 
to fit laws subsequently enacted. Moral ambiguity also arises because of the statutory 
considerations that a member of the judiciary must work through when considering 
an application for a surveillance device warrant: such determinations mean that the 
authorising judicial officers are not truly the fully independent decision-makers that 
they might at first appear to be. A framework that requires conduct, the outcome of 
which could result in a loss of public confidence in the judiciary (an independent 
judiciary being a key pillar of democratic society), is a regime the operation of which 
causes a moral harm in and of itself (in this case, loss of public confidence in, and 
compromise of the status of, the judiciary). Again, if the position of the decision-
maker (in respect of decisions about authorising otherwise morally harmful conduct) 
is itself morally unsound, then the authorisation and conduct pursuant to it is likely 
to be morally unjustifiable within the context of the moral theory of policing.43 
In reviewing Australian and UK law, two broad types of authorisation framework for 
covert police surveillance are identifiable. Neither type is entirely free from morally 
problematic issues concerning the role and status of the authorisation decision-
maker: neither is ideal. The focus of the UK RIPA regime is compliance with the 
principles of the ECHR, which are independently enforced through the supranational 
42 ‘The maintenance of public confidence in the independence and impartiality of … judges … in 
hearing disputes between the citizen and the government and its agencies is contingent upon the 
public perception that the judges … are impartial and entirely independent of the executive arm of 
government. That public perception must be diminished when the judges … are involved in secret, ex 
parte administrative procedures, forming part of the criminal investigative process, that are carried out 
as a routine part of their daily work’: Grollo v Palmer, 1995 at 380. In relation to telephone interception — 
another form of covert surveillance and investigation — this issue is discussed from a legal perspective 
by Bronitt and Stellios (2005, 883).
43 Sections 11 and 13 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) make provision for members of the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal to act as authorising officers for the use of surveillance devices. Both 
this alternative provision (anecdotally reported to be the preferred port of call for law enforcement 
agents seeking authority), and the fact that judges when authorising must do so in a personal rather than 
judicial capacity, render the character of the authorisation process quasi-judicial. 
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European Court of Human Rights. The rights of the citizen form the keystone in 
this overarching paradigm.44 The considerations that Australian judges, magistrates 
and Administrative Appeal Tribunal members must bring to bear on issues such as 
intelligence value and the gravity of the suspected offence operate in a framework 
that primarily serves to exempt investigators from the general criminal prohibition 
against using surveillance devices. The framework can be argued to have the interests 
of the investigator more firmly sighted than the rights of the citizen. There is moral 
implication in the underpinning purpose of legislation.45
Conclusion: Protecting human rights or exempting police from  
criminal liability?
In the governance of covert investigation methods in Australia and the United 
Kingdom, one of two underpinning rationales is generally applied: protecting 
human rights (in the United Kingdom made manifest through the administrative 
authorisation regime established by RIPA) or exempting police from criminal liability 
(in Australia made manifest through a quasi-judicial authorisation framework). The 
‘protecting rights’ approach is evident in the construction of RIPA within the context 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). The ‘regulating police exemption’ approach 
may be seen not only in regard to surveillance device warrants (for example, the 
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) and similar provisions in state laws) but also in 
44 It should be noted that elsewhere in Europe, where there exists the role of the investigating prosecutor or 
the juge d’instruction, which role forms part of the judiciary within the Napoleonic Code criminal system, 
the authorisation for covert surveillance comes from a judicial office-holder whose role it is to oversee 
investigations. There is no equivalent in England, Wales or Northern Ireland — although the Procurator 
Fiscal is a close approximation in Scotland — so the RIPA system has been designed to keep the judiciary 
separate from investigation management decisions.
45 Through their legislatures, different communities define the values they wish to protect. Societies 
affording precedence to state or national security (the security of the state and its official entities) might 
be expected to favour legislation that privileges the powers of state agencies over the interests of the 
citizen. Prioritising the rights and interests of individual citizens is an approach consistent with the 
philosophy of community safety, rather than state security. 
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Australian police powers to conduct controlled operations, such as s 15 of the Crimes 
Act 1914 (Cth) (and the various equivalent instruments in the states and territories).46 
Despite different philosophical approaches, the moral harms at issue would seem 
to be the same: individual autonomy and privacy are being intruded upon by state 
agents and, to the extent that policing infringes personal freedoms, there must be a 
justification for doing so that outweighs the moral claims of the individual whose 
moral interests are being infringed. The Australian emphasis on exempting police 
conduct — absent an overarching enforceable human rights framework that sets 
clear parameters for investigators47 — provides a perspective that is different from 
that of those operating in the RIPA regime. Legal compliance (making lawful police 
actions that would be otherwise unlawful in order to ensure that evidence for the 
prosecution is admissible at trial) rather than human rights protection seems to be the 
driving force.48 This approach provides a different nuance to moral considerations. It 
might be interpreted as offering different moral weighting to competing claims from 
the emphasis provided by a rights protection approach. 
46 The rationale for the regulation of controlled operations in Australian law — and the exemption 
of investigators and third parties from criminal liability in certain circumstances for which prior 
authorisation is preferred but retrospective authorisation is available in limited circumstances — is 
derived from Ridgeway v The Queen, 1995, in which Ridgeway’s conviction for heroin importation to 
Australia was quashed because of the extensive role played by AFP investigators in facilitating the 
importation so that Ridgeway could be arrested and prosecuted. The High Court found that the AFP 
had aided and abetted the offence, contrary to s 233B(1)(d) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). Among the 
legislative developments following Ridgeway was the enacting of s 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) 
— and its state equivalents — enabling courts to adduce evidence improperly obtained when the 
undesirability of admitting tainted evidence is outweighed by the desirability of admitting the evidence: 
see Bronitt 2004, 38–39; Chernok 2011, 362–64; Harfield 2010, 791–92; and Mellifont 2010, 20–21, and 
139–42.
47 As noted above, two Australian jurisdictions have enacted human rights instruments. The Victorian 
Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 recognises the right of individuals not to have their 
privacy, family, home or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with but, unlike the ECHR, 
does not set parameters defining lawful interference (s 13(a)). The ACT Human Rights Act 2004, on its 
face, seems not dissimilar from the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), but on closer inspection, and reading 
it in conjunction with other legislation, it seems that there is a number of ways in which the actions of 
police investigators are exempt from the rights protection framework.
48 For example, Pt 1AB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) begins with the stated premise that the Part serves 
‘to exempt from criminal liability, and to indemnify from civil liability’ individuals (both police and 
non-police) who participate in a controlled operation (s 15G). Moral judgments will be made within the 
context of this premise.
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Within this context, it is conceivable that individuals might misconstrue exemption 
from criminal liability, consciously or subconsciously, as incorporating exemption 
from moral liability. In the Australian regime, the authorisation focus is the 
facilitation of the investigation rather than the protection of individual rights. In 
justifying self for the purposes of legal compliance, the Australian investigator 
loses sight of — because the regime does not direct their sight towards — the moral 
obligations owed by investigators to others. The United Kingdom’s RIPA regime may 
have a greater focus on human rights protection, but the perception that governance 
is largely a bureaucratic exercise eclipses the value of this approach and obscures 
from investigators the significance of their moral obligations.
Regardless of within which of these two approaches covert investigation is being 
conducted, in terms of moral justification the decision-making that an investigator 
has to engage with seems to be the same: 
… what I propose to do will cause moral (and possibly material) harm to others, possibly 
including law-abiding non-suspects. I recognise that all these individuals have competing 
moral claims to be able to enjoy their lives free from intrusion and interference, and that 
the ultimate purpose of policing is to provide a social environment in which legitimate 
freedoms can be pursued. The proposed investigative conduct is justified not just because 
it is a policing method provided in law; not just because within the institutional context 
of policing the proposed conduct is consistent with the moral theory of policing. It is 
specifically justified in this particular operational instance because … [at which point, the 
investigator explains why the specific product to be obtained by the proposed method 
cannot be obtained by any other method of investigation, and how and why the product 
sought in this instance characterises the proposed method as proportionate]. 
That both the administrative authorisation model and the (quasi-)judicial model 
remain morally problematic, notwithstanding that they are lawful within their 
different jurisdictions, seems to call into question whether the authorising officer 
in either regime is being asked to undertake such an important function in a way 
that is morally appropriate. At the very least, it highlights a need for training in 
investigation ethics (which is distinct from police professional ethics49), alongside 
training in investigation law. 
This article has considered the relationship between a moral theory of policing and the 
architecture of governance; the management of risk in covert surveillance; and two 
49 Police professional ethics are often articulated in the form of published codes of conduct. For discussion 
of ethical shortcomings in police codes of conduct, see Cawthray, Prenzler and Porter 2013. 
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generic types of authorisation framework for covert surveillance. It has illustrated 
the complexities of the moral landscape for covert investigation that confronts 
authorising officers. When considering collateral intrusion, for instance, intuitively it 
will never be necessary (in fact or in law) to intrude on the privacy of innocent persons 
when conducting surveillance, thus the question arises as to whether intrusion of 
an innocent interlocutor’s, passenger’s or bystander’s privacy can ever be morally 
justifiable, even if the intrusion against the suspect’s privacy is justifiable in relation 
to the counter-claims of the victim and the wider community to a peaceful and safe 
social environment in which to live their lives. Collateral intrusion into the privacy 
interests of innocent persons is one instance in which policing will create more victims, 
even if the harms are predominantly (or exclusively) moral rather than material. 
When police methods create victims, including victims of moral harm, even if the 
degree of material harm is negligible, the legitimacy of policing is corroded. That is 
why mechanisms for rights protection, such as covert policing authorisation regimes 
(whether internal or external), must not only promote legality but must also demand 
sound ethical deliberation. To ensure that this takes place, sufficient understanding 
is required on the part of practitioners — both investigators and decision-makers 
— which itself has significant training implications.50 For the police use of covert 
investigation methods to be legitimate, such use must be both justified in law and 
morally justified. Prior authorisation is a mechanism primarily focused (in both 
the Australian and the UK contexts) on demonstrating the lawfulness of proposed 
conduct, but it is also a mechanism that can ensure proper determination of moral 
justification. The inherent ambiguities in the two authorisation models considered 
here add to the complications of making such judgments and making them soundly. 
It is not in the interests of policing, the police or the policed to have to rely upon 
unsound and problematic law. It cannot but imperil the legitimacy of policing, and so 
ultimately the legitimacy and purpose of the criminal justice system, if investigators 
are equipped with poorly designed law when acting on behalf of the community. A 
mechanism that addresses or focuses on legal criteria without also addressing moral 
contexts of decision-making is insufficient, even if on its face it seems to deliver 
legal compliance, in terms of both procedural and human rights protection. The 
mechanism may be lawful, but inadequate design and implementation may mean in 
practical terms that it falls short of being ethical. ●
50 It seems axiomatic that practitioners insufficiently well trained are incapable of delivering policing or 
judicial practice that will serve the ultimate moral purpose of policing or the criminal justice system.
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Human rights, police corruption and anti-corruption  
systems for police organisations
Seumas Miller*
My concern in this article is with the nature and causes of police corruption and the 
methods used to combat it. However, I will argue that human and other moral rights 
are deeply implicated in police corruption and anti-corruption systems — not least 
because the fundamental institutional purpose of police organisations is to protect the 
human and other moral rights of citizens. The principal institutional anti-corruption 
vehicle is what is referred to as an integrity system. Accordingly, the matter resolves 
itself into designing an integrity system for police organisations that is sensitive to the 
fundamental purposes of policing, to the moral rights of victims of police corruption, 
and to the rights of police officers. I also discuss two key challenges faced in devising 
integrity systems for police organisations — namely, the reluctance of police officers 
to inform on their corrupt colleagues (the so-called ‘blue wall of silence’) and the 
quality of internal affairs investigations into police corruption. 
Keywords: police ethics, corruption, professional reporting, human rights, integrity 
systems, internal affairs investigations
Introduction
Recent and not-so-recent commissions of inquiry into police corruption — including 
the Knapp and Mollen Commissions into the New York City Police Department, the 
Rampart investigation into the Los Angeles Police Department, the Fitzgerald Royal 
Commission into the Queensland Police Service and the Wood Commission into 
the New South Wales Police Service — have uncovered corruption of a profoundly 
disturbing kind (Knapp 1972; Mollen 1994; Rampart Independent Review Panel 2000; 
Fitzgerald 1989; Wood 1997). Police officers have been involved in perjury, fabricating 
evidence, protecting pederast rings, taking drug money and selling drugs. In South 
Africa, police have been involved in murder, armed robbery and rape, as well as theft, 
fraud, fabrication of evidence, and the like. High levels of police corruption have 
been a persistent historical tendency in police services throughout the world. 
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My general concern in this article is with the nature and causes of police corruption 
and the methods used to combat it. However, I will argue that human and other 
moral rights are deeply implicated in police corruption and anti-corruption systems 
— not least because the fundamental institutional purpose of police organisations is 
to protect the human and other moral rights of citizens. The principal institutional 
anti-corruption vehicle is what is referred to as an integrity system. Accordingly, the 
matter resolves itself into designing an integrity system for police organisations that 
is sensitive to the fundamental purposes of policing, to the moral rights of victims of 
police corruption, and to the rights of police officers. I also discuss two key challenges 
faced in devising integrity systems for police organisations — namely, the reluctance 
of police officers to inform on their corrupt colleagues (the so-called ‘blue wall of 
silence’) (Kleinig 2001) and the quality of internal affairs investigations into police 
corruption (Punch 1983; Richardson 1987). 
Human rights, police corruption and anti-corruption challenges
There are historically important and interconnected challenges that confront police 
organisations in combating corruption. These are:
• conditions conducive to corruption — for example, the use of harmful, 
normally immoral, methods by police (such as use of force, deception and 
intrusive surveillance) which infringe (but hopefully do not violate) human 
and other moral rights; and
• conditions antithetical to anti-corruption and, in particular:
 » the blue wall of silence, whereby the professional reporting of corrupt 
police officers by their colleagues is widely regarded in many police 
organisations as ‘ratting’ on one’s colleagues; and 
 » poor quality internal affairs investigations of corrupt police officers.
• (See Knapp 1972; Mollen 1994; Rampart Independent Review Panel 2000; 
Fitzgerald 1989; Wood 1997; Newburn 1999; Miller 1989a.)
An important contributing factor to police corruption is the inescapable use by 
police officers of what in normal circumstances would be regarded as morally 
unacceptable activity by virtue of its constituting an infringement of human and 
other rights, such as the rights to personal security, to freedom and to privacy.1 The 
use of coercive force — including, in the last resort, the use of deadly force — is in 
itself both harmful and an infringement of the human right to personal security. 
1 Such moral rights are typically enshrined in legal and quasi-legal documents such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
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Accordingly, in normal circumstances, its use is morally unacceptable. So it would 
be morally wrong, for example, for a private citizen forcibly to take someone to his 
or her house for questioning. Similarly, locking up individuals deprives them of 
their liberty, and as such is an infringement of the human right to freedom and is, 
therefore, morally wrong. Again, deception, including telling lies, is under normal 
circumstances morally wrong. Intrusive surveillance is in itself morally wrong — it 
is an infringement of the right to privacy. And the same can be said of various other 
methods used in policing.
Coercion, depriving individuals of their liberty, deception and so on are harmful 
methods; they are activities which, considered in themselves and under normal 
circumstances, are morally wrong by virtue of being infringements of human rights 
or other moral rights. Therefore, they stand in need of special justification. In relation 
to policing, there is a special justification. These harmful and normally immoral 
methods are on occasion necessary in order to realise the fundamental end of policing 
— namely, the protection of moral rights. More specifically, the use of any of these 
methods constitutes an infringement, but not a violation, of the human and other 
moral rights of suspects, provided that three conditions are met: 
• the infringement is morally justified in the circumstances — for example, use 
of coercive force is necessary, proportionate, reasonable and so on;
• the infringement is lawful in that there is an explicit legal power to undertake 
the action; and
• the infringement is communally sanctioned — for example, by virtue of being 
in compliance with a law enacted by a democratically elected legislature. 
• (For further discussion, see Miller 2010a, ch 8; Miller and Blackler 2005, ch 1.)
In short, and at the risk of oversimplification, I am suggesting that police use methods 
that infringe moral rights in order to protect moral rights.
However, the fundamental point that needs to be made here is that the use by police 
officers of these harmful methods — albeit methods that in the right circumstances 
are morally justifiable — can have a corrupting influence on police officers. A police 
officer can begin by engaging in the morally justifiable activity of telling lies to 
criminals, and engaging in elaborate schemes of deception as an undercover agent, 
and end up engaging in the morally unjustifiable activity of telling lies and deceiving 
innocent members of the public or fellow officers. A police officer can begin by 
engaging in the morally justifiable activity of deploying coercive force to arrest 
violent offenders resisting arrest, and end up engaging in the morally unjustified 
activity of beating up suspects to obtain a confession and conviction.
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It might be suggested that such methods could be wholly abandoned in favour 
of the morally unproblematic methods already heavily relied upon in relation to 
investigating suspects, such as engaging in rational discourse with the suspect (for 
example, simply asking questions), appealing to the moral sentiment of witnesses to 
assist police, relying on upright citizens to come forward with information, and so 
on. Doubtless, in many instances, morally problematic methods could be replaced. 
And, certainly, overuse of these methods is a sign of bad police work, and perhaps 
of the partial breakdown of the police–community trust that is so necessary to police 
work. However, the point is that the morally problematic methods could not be 
replaced in all instances. For one thing, the violations of moral rights that the police 
exist to uphold are sometimes violations perpetrated by persons who are unmoved 
by rationality, appeals to moral sentiment, and so on. Indeed, such persons — far 
from being moved by well-intentioned police overtures — may seek to influence or 
corrupt police officers for the purpose of preventing them from doing their moral 
and lawful duty. For another thing, the relevant members of the community, for one 
reason or another, may be unwilling or unable to provide the necessary information 
or evidence, and police may need to rely on persons of bad character, or methods 
such as intrusive surveillance. So, unfortunately, harmful methods that are in normal 
circumstances considered to be infringements of human rights, or otherwise immoral, 
are on occasion necessary in order to realise the fundamental end of policing — 
namely, the protection of human and other moral rights.
The paradox whereby police necessarily use methods that are normally morally 
wrong — that are indeed infringements of moral rights — in order to secure morally 
worthy ends — notably, the protection of human rights — sets up a dangerous moral 
dynamic. The danger is that police will come to think that ‘the ends always justify the 
means’ and will come to accept the inevitability and desirability of so-called ‘noble 
cause corruption’ (see Delattre 1994; Miller 2004). From noble cause corruption, police 
can in turn graduate to straightforward corruption — corruption motivated by greed 
and personal gain.
A particularly significant contributing factor to police corruption is the widespread 
use in contemporary societies of illegal drugs such as heroin, cocaine and Ecstasy.2 
Police officers, especially detectives, are called on to enforce anti-drug laws in 
circumstances having the following features: 
• the illicit market involves large amounts of money and a willingness on the 
part of drug-users, and especially drug-dealers, to bribe police;
2 This was a key finding in the Wood Report (Wood 1997), for example.
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• there are no identifiable complainants — the ‘victims’ are not persons who 
would come forward to the police and report that they have been the victim 
of a criminal act; 
• corrupt police officers can accept bribes or steal drugs or drug money 
with relative impunity, given the absence of identifiable complainants and 
identifiable victims; 
• there is a feeling in some sectors of the community that drug addiction is not 
so much a crime as a medical condition, and that therefore drug-taking should 
not be regarded as a crime;
• young police officers typically share the attitudes of their peers outside 
policing, and thus may regard the use of illegal drugs as a relatively minor 
offence; and
• police officers who are especially vulnerable, such as young police officers or 
those working in drug investigations, may out of fear turn a blind eye to drugs, 
or even succumb to drug-taking themselves, and thereby enter the spiral of 
corruption that moves from moral vulnerability to moral compromise, and 
then to corrupt activities.
Let us now list some of the general conditions contributing to police corruption. 
These conditions include:
• as discussed above, the necessity at times for police officers to deploy harmful 
methods, such as coercion and deception, which are normally regarded as 
infringements of human and other moral rights;
• the high levels of discretionary authority and power exercised by police 
officers in circumstances in which close supervision is not possible and in the 
context of the key ideal of constabulary independence in the United Kingdom 
and Australia, which permits police at all levels discretion in whether or not 
to enforce the law in a given case (see, for example, Miller 1989b);
• the ongoing interaction between police officers and corrupt persons who have 
an interest in compromising and corrupting police; 
• the necessity for police officers to make discretionary ethical judgments in 
morally ambiguous situations (Miller 1989b); and
• the operation of police officers in an environment in which there is widespread 
use of illegal drugs and large amounts of drug money. 
In addition to these conditions that are conducive to corruption, there are conditions 
that impede anti-corruption measures — notably, the blue wall of silence and, 
although this is changing in many modern well-resourced police organisations, poor-
quality internal affairs investigations. 
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Organisational integrity systems, including integrity systems for police organisations, 
rely heavily on the members of organisations to report the ethical misconduct of their 
colleagues and, in the case of criminal offences, to be prepared to provide sworn 
evidence against them. Historically, police officers have been very reluctant to ‘rat’ 
on corrupt colleagues, and this reluctance has been explained in large part in terms 
of police culture and, specifically, the above-mentioned blue wall of silence. Police 
culture is a complex phenomenon and one much-commented on (Reiner 1985, 
ch 3). Moreover, we need to distinguish the sociological description of police culture 
from the ethical or, more broadly, normative analysis of it. As noted earlier, a feature 
of police culture is the strong sense of loyalty felt by police officers to one another. 
Police work is inherently dangerous and requires a high level of cooperation and 
trust, particularly among street police. So it is unsurprising that police culture is 
characterised in part by a strong sense of solidarity among police officers. Moreover, 
at least in many large metropolitan police services, this solidarity goes hand in glove 
with an ‘us-versus-them’ mentality in respect of both the general public and police 
management. The general public is often thought by police to misunderstand, dislike 
and/or fear the police — after all, it is members of the public who are being policed 
and in urban crime-ridden areas it may be difficult for police to separate offenders 
from ordinary law-abiding citizens. Police managers are often thought by street 
police to be unsupportive, untrustworthy and punitive — after all, it is the managers 
who are ‘policing the police’, and in police organisations with an acknowledged 
corruption problem, street police are likely to be especially distrustful of the police 
managers who are under political pressure to be seen to be doing something about 
the corruption (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983).
Numerous inquiries into police corruption have noted that police officers typically 
expect fellow police officers not to report them (Knapp 1972; Mollen 1994; Rampart 
Independent Review Panel 2000; Fitzgerald 1989; Wood 1997), even when they have 
engaged in criminal acts and notwithstanding the legal requirement that they do so. 
This blue wall of silence depends in part on the feelings of loyalty described above. 
Perhaps it also draws support from the feeling among many police officers that at 
times they are justified in breaking the law, whether by failing to report corruption or 
by engaging in (at least) noble cause corruption. 
Police solidarity can often be a virtue. It enables officers to cooperate with one another 
and to stand solid in the face of danger — for example, to successfully discharge their 
responsibilities in relation to crowd control or when two police officers ‘on the beat’ 
confront a violent offender. It also reinforces the individual capacity for physical 
courage, including a preparedness to die in the service of others. And it generates a 
willingness to help other police when they most need help. But such solidarity can 
also be a vice. Historically, in many police organisations solidarity has manifested 
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itself in a willingness to elevate organisational interests above those of the public, 
including by tolerating corruption in the ranks. Notoriously, police have engaged in 
cover-ups of the crimes of fellow officers. Such cover-ups represent examples of the 
immorality that solidarity can bring about.
As mentioned earlier, one dimension of police culture is the schism between 
‘street cops’ and ‘management cops’ and, more specifically, between street cops 
and internal affairs investigators (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni 1983). This aspect of 
police culture can have profound implications for the effectiveness of the police 
organisation. If there is an us-versus-them attitude between lower and upper 
echelon employees, an organisation is hardly likely to perform at optimum levels 
of efficiency and effectiveness. For example, it is conducive to a punitive culture 
in which minor ethical misconduct on the part of subordinates, once exposed, is 
harshly punished — often following an internal affairs investigation in the service 
of a police management hell-bent on demonstrating a tough anti-corruption stance 
to its political masters and the public at large — when a remedial/development 
response would be far more appropriate. Naturally, such a punitive culture 
reinforces the blue wall of silence, particularly among lower echelon police 
officers. Moreover, it generates an attitude of animosity towards internal affairs 
departments and a marked reluctance, in particular, to undertake an investigative 
role in such departments.
It is not surprising, then, that, historically, the quality of internal investigations of 
police corruption and misconduct has been poor. Numerous police commissions 
in the United States, Australia and elsewhere have found major deficiencies 
when ‘police investigate police’ (Knapp 1972; Mollen 1994; Rampart Independent 
Review Panel 2000; Fitzgerald 1989; Wood 1997). The deficiencies identified have 
included inadequate planning of investigations, inadequate use of electronic 
surveillance, failure to interview key witnesses, breaches of confidentiality, and 
lack of timeliness. Doubtless, the problem is less now than in the past — due, 
for example, to the widespread introduction of more effective vetting practices, 
better education, increased use of modern methods of covert investigation, many 
more competent and committed internal investigators and, more generally, the 
implementation of processes of professionalisation. However, the problem has by 
no means disappeared. 
Having elaborated on conditions conducive to police corruption and conditions 
antithetical to anti-corruption measures, let us now turn to integrity systems in police 
organisations. 
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Integrity systems in police organisations
An integrity system is an assemblage of institutional entities, mechanisms and 
procedures whose purpose is to ensure compliance with minimum ethical standards 
and to promote the pursuit of ethical ideals. Integrity systems can be contrasted with 
regulatory frameworks (Miller, Roberts and Spence 2005; see also Alexander and 
Miller 2010). A regulatory framework is a structured set of explicit laws, rules or 
regulations governing behaviour, issued by some institutional authority and backed 
by sanctions. It may serve to ensure compliance with minimum ethical standards 
(namely, those embodied in a law, rule or regulation), but this is only one of its 
purposes. There are numerous laws, rules and regulations that have little or nothing 
to do with ethics. 
Integrity systems for police organisations can and do vary. However, it has been 
suggested that such systems ought to have at least the following components or 
aspects (Miller and Prenzler 2008; see also Prenzler 2009): 
• an effective streamlined complaints and discipline system;
• a comprehensive suite of stringent vetting and induction processes reflective 
of the different levels of risk in different areas of the organisation;
• a basic code of ethics and specialised codes of practice — for example, in 
relation to the use of firearms — supported by ethics education in recruitment, 
training, and ongoing professional development programs;
• adequate welfare support systems — for example, in relation to drug and 
alcohol abuse, and psychological injury;
• intelligence gathering, risk management and early warning systems for at-risk 
officers — for example, officers with high levels of complaints;
• internal investigations — that is, the police organisation takes a high degree of 
responsibility for its own unethical officers;
• pro-active anti-corruption intervention systems — for example, targeted 
integrity testing;
• ethical leadership — for example, promoting police who give priority to the 
collective ends definitive of the organisation rather than their own career 
ambitions; and
• external oversight by an independent well-resourced body with investigative 
powers.
As the foregoing points suggest, a key element in an integrity system for police 
organisations is an organisation-wide, intelligence-based, ethics risk assessment 
process. This involves good intelligence and an organisation-wide ethics risk 
assessment plan and — based on good intelligence and the risk assessment plan — 
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the identification of corruption, rights violations and ethical misconduct risks in the 
police organisation. 
Ethical risks in a contemporary police organisation might include risks in many, if 
not most, of the following areas (Miller and Prenzler 2008; see also Prenzler 2009):
• data security, notably electronic data;
• drug investigations, given the massive funds involved and the absence of 
victims who might complain;
• excessive use of force;
• informant management, given that most informants are themselves criminals; 
and
• infiltration by organised crime.
Other areas of concern in many police organisations are the ethical risks stemming 
from severe stress among police officers and the inability of managers to identify and 
respond effectively to severe stress in their subordinates; noble cause corruption, in 
which officers break the law to achieve good outcomes — for example, by doctoring 
statements and even fabricating evidence; and political and/or media and/or 
police hierarchy pressure for results, or even actual interference in high profile 
investigations, thereby compromising the investigative process and (potentially) its 
outcome.
Once ethical risk areas have been identified, preventive countermeasures need to 
be put in place. These countermeasures should track the identified risks. Some 
countermeasures and the risks that they track include the following (Miller and 
Prenzler 2008; see also Prenzler 2009):
• in relation to data security: segregation of, and controlled access to, internal 
affairs databases; audits of data base access;
• in relation to drug investigations: early warning systems — for example, 
profiles of at-risk officers and locations, as well as high risk areas; intelligence-
driven targeted integrity testing of individuals and locations; audits of drug 
squads and forensic laboratories;
• in relation to excessive use of force: complaints-driven investigations informed 
by intelligence — for example, a high number of complaints of excessive use 
of force;
• in relation to informant management: accountability mechanisms, such as 
documentation naming the informant, ensuring that a police officer with an 
informant has a supervisor who meets with the officer and the informant, 
having a supervisor who monitors the police officer’s dealings with the 
174 Australian Journal of Human Rights 2014
informant, and recording all payments (including electronic transfers) to 
prevent theft);
• in relation to infiltration by organised crime: stringent and constantly updated 
vetting procedures (especially for officers in sensitive areas), ensuring 
adequate supervision of all officers, and monitoring and utilisation of 
intelligence databases (including criminal associations);
• in relation to stress: ensuring adequate supervision of all officers; introduction 
of stress management tools; and
• in relation to all of the above: ongoing ethics training based on identified risks 
in specific roles.
Professional reporting and internal affairs investigations
Having outlined integrity systems for police organisations in general terms, I now 
turn to a detailed consideration of two more specific interrelated problems described 
earlier — namely, the blue wall of silence and poor quality internal investigations.3 
Police culture, it is suggested, is not the pervasive, monolithic and dominant force 
that it is often presented as being. Rather, it is a malleable phenomenon; in principle, 
it can be changed and, in particular, its malignant features can be curtailed — even 
if they cannot be removed entirely. Curtailment depends on a number of things, 
notably designing and implementing appropriate integrity systems. However, in the 
context of an appropriate overall integrity system, curtailment typically depends in 
part on adjusting the incentive structures in place so as to make compliance with the 
dictates of malignant features of police culture much less rational than it otherwise 
would be. (This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the deterrence mechanisms 
that are a necessary feature of most integrity systems.) 
Unfortunately, in dysfunctional, corruption-riddled police organisations, compliance 
on the part of any given police officer with the malignant features of police culture 
may be quite rational. This is not to say that the malignant features of police culture 
are an irresistible force. Far from it; these features of police culture are by no means 
the only important factors at work, and compliance, though rational, is not the only 
choice available. However, it is to say that the particular configuration of factors 
in play is such that these malignant features of police culture end up being the 
decisive factors at work. Accordingly, the challenge facing those seeking to design an 
appropriate integrity system is how to bring it about so that the malignant features 
of police culture cease to be the decisive factors at work; it is not necessarily, at least 
in the first instance, a matter of directly removing these features.
3 An earlier version of the material in this section of the article can be found in Miller 2010b.
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Here I want to narrow my focus and explore, in particular, an apparently important 
relationship between a reluctance on the part of police to report corrupt fellow 
police officers, on the one hand, and the quality of internal affairs investigations, 
on the other hand. Good, though by no means decisive, empirical evidence of this 
relationship has been provided in the Victoria Police study, of which the author was 
one of the lead researchers (Miller et al 2008). The relevant parts of the study comprise 
a survey of ethical attitudes, an analysis of all internal affairs corruption investigation 
files over a five-year period, and the conducting of 70 focus groups of serving police 
officers (approximately 500 police officers out of a police force of 10,000). Moreover, 
the evidence for this relationship is further strengthened by the consideration that it 
has an intuitively rational structure to it.
The first point to be made here is that in well-ordered liberal democratic states, such 
as Australia, the majority of police officers in many, if not most, contemporary police 
organisations are evidently not themselves corrupt and do not engage in ongoing 
corrupt activities. Moreover, a finding of the Victoria Police study was that the 
majority of police officers believe that morally (and not simply legally) they ought to 
report and provide evidence in relation to the minority of colleagues who are corrupt. 
Notwithstanding this belief, most police officers are apparently unwilling to report 
their corrupt colleagues; this was a further finding of the Victoria Police study. How 
can this be so?
According to the empirical evidence provided in the Victoria Police study, one 
important aspect (I do not say that it is the only important aspect) of the rational 
structure of the situation is as follows: 
Conclusion (C): Police officers (junior and senior) are reluctant to provide evidence in 
relation to corrupt officers because (for the reason that): 
Premise (A): Police believe that internal investigations are unlikely to result in 
convictions and/or termination and that they are, in any case, often management-
driven witch-hunts of innocent police or of police who have, at most, engaged in 
minor ethical misconduct. 
Premise (B): If honest police officers report/provide evidence in relation to corrupt 
officers and those officers are exonerated and remain in the force, then the police 
culture is such that their own careers will suffer from the stigma of having sided with 
a punitive management/internal affairs department and ‘ratted on’ their colleagues 
(who are widely believed to have been innocent or at least only guilty of a minor 
infraction).
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Of course, the fact that their exonerated colleagues are widely believed to be 
innocent, or at most guilty of only a minor infraction, is a function in large part of 
police culture. The loyalty of fellow police officers (one’s ‘brothers’) surely demands a 
strong presumption in favour of one’s innocence or, at the very least, a presumption in 
favour of the offence in question being an understandable breach of a legal or ethical 
principle. (The breach may be regarded as understandable because the principle in 
question is a minor one, or because the circumstances were such that compliance was 
not unproblematic, or some other justification or excuse.)
Notice, however — to return to the rational structure of (A) and (B) therefore (C) 
above — that police culture (the blue wall of silence) gets traction here only on the 
assumption that police believe that internal investigations are unlikely to result 
in convictions and/or termination of corrupt officers, and that there will be, as a 
consequence, a widespread view that the officers investigated were not guilty of any 
serious offence, but merely the victims of a punitive management/internal affairs 
department. The widespread belief of police in many, but by no means most, police 
organisations that internal affairs investigations are unlikely to result in convictions 
and/or terminations of corrupt officers is well founded, at least historically. Internal 
investigations in many, if not most, large metropolitan police organisations have as a 
matter of historical fact (and not simply of officers’ beliefs) had relatively little success; 
certainly, they have typically resulted in low rates of conviction and/or termination of 
officers under investigation (see, for example, Ratcliffe et al 2005; see also Punch 1983; 
Richardson 1987). The lack of success of internal police investigations is, of course, 
in large part dependent on the reluctance of police officers to provide evidence 
regarding their corrupt colleagues. There has also been a reluctance on the part of 
police officers to become internal investigators, albeit, as noted above, this reluctance 
is much less prevalent now than in the past. Solidarity dictates that investigating 
allegations of corruption against one’s fellow officers is unlikely to be an attractive 
role, and highly unlikely to be preferred to the role of investigating alleged offenders 
who are not police officers. 
So, there is a vicious circle in operation: the blue wall of silence undercuts the efficacy 
of internal investigations, which in turn reinforces the blue wall of silence. However, 
the point I want to stress here is that — in the current circumstances — it would be 
irrational of police officers to report, or provide evidence in relation to, their corrupt 
colleagues. For, on the one hand, they reasonably believe that this will not result in 
the conviction/termination of these corrupt officers and, on the other hand, they 
reasonably believe that it will ruin their own careers. Moreover, the irrationality of 
reporting corrupt colleagues is, I suggest, the decisive factor in determining their 
action (or at least inaction). They believe that it is morally wrong not to report their 
Volume 20(2) Police and human rights: 1963 and 2013 177         Human rights, police co rup ion and anti-corruption systems 
corrupt colleagues (at least in serious cases), feelings of loyalty notwithstanding; 
however, they believe that no good will come of it but only harm to themselves.
What is the way out of this impasse? There is a need for the following countermeasures. 
First, internal affairs departments within policing organisations ought to investigate 
only criminal matters and serious disciplinary matters that warrant termination. 
(And perhaps the difficulty of terminating police officers also needs to be looked at — 
for example, by recourse to ‘Loss of Commissioner Confidence’ provisions, although 
there are procedural rights issues in this area.4) Other ethical misconduct ought to be 
regarded as a management/remedial issue. The latter is important partly as a means 
of reducing the possibility that initial minor ethical lapses on the part of new recruits 
will come to be regarded, by the offending officers themselves as well as others, as 
fatal moral compromises that forever impugn their integrity and prevent them from 
ever reporting the serious ethical misconduct of their corrupt colleagues. 
Second, the rates of internal investigations leading to conviction/termination of 
employment need to be improved to a high level of success. In the first instance (that 
is, in the context of a reluctance on the part of officers to inform on their corrupt 
colleagues), this can be partly achieved by the following strategies: 
• increasing the quality of internal investigations (for example, by head-
hunting high quality investigators, including from other police organisations), 
increasing data security measures (for example, the use of ‘sterile corridors’, 
the stringent vetting of internal affairs personnel, including administrative 
staff), undertaking audits of investigations, and ensuring the adequate 
resourcing of internal affairs departments; 
• the use of well-resourced proactive anti-corruption strategies, notably targeted 
integrity tests and intrusive surveillance methods that do not rely heavily on 
the willingness of police to provide evidence regarding corrupt colleagues; 
and
• recourse to well-resourced external oversight bodies with an independent 
investigative capacity, especially in relation to serious corruption in the upper 
echelons of a police organisation.
Third, the stigma attached to being an internal investigator and to reporting, or 
providing evidence against, corrupt police needs to be reduced by: 
4  Loss of Commissioner Confidence provisions exist in a number of Australian police services, including 
Victoria Police and New South Wales Police. There is, of course, already a distinction between civil 
administrative breaches of police discipline and investigation of suspected criminal behaviour.
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• consistent with maintaining the highest standards, normalising the role of 
internal investigator — for example, by making two years as an internal 
investigator mandatory for all police investigators seeking promotion to 
senior investigative positions; 
• instituting measures to protect (physically and career-wise) those who provide 
evidence against corrupt colleagues — for example, the implementation of 
internal witness protection programs and transparent promotion processes; 
and
• introducing ongoing tailor-made ethics education programs that sensitively 
and squarely address the issues of police culture, internal affairs investigations 
and professional reporting.
In short, it needs to become rational, and not simply legally and ethically mandated, 
for police officers to report, and provide evidence in relation to, their corrupt 
colleagues. Given that most police officers are not themselves corrupt and believe 
that they ought morally to report or provide evidence in relation to their corrupt 
colleagues, they will do so — or at least are more likely to do so — if conditions are 
created under which it will be rational for them to do so; that is, if it works for them 
and brings rewards rather than punishment. 
These conditions will need to include a reasonable number, and a high rate, of 
convictions/employment terminations of corrupt police officers as a result of a well-
resourced, high quality, internal affairs investigation department focused only on 
criminal and serious disciplinary matters, and operating in the context of: 
• the normalisation of the role of internal investigator; and 
• the felt duty on the part of most police to report and provide intelligence or 
evidence regarding criminal and corrupt colleagues in the knowledge that if 
they do:
 » the persons in question are likely to be convicted and terminated; and
 » they themselves will suffer no harm or adverse career consequences.
These specific conditions are consistent with, and conducive to, a functional and 
defensible police culture — one in which loyalty is felt to be owed to police officers 
who embody the ideals and legitimate ends of policing, but not to corrupt colleagues. 
Such a functional police culture is likely in turn to facilitate the emergence of these 
specific conditions. ●
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I write this review at a time when state responses to crime, and even imagined crime, 
can be judged as violating human rights. In the interests of counter-terrorism, police 
arrests are reframed as raids, followed by the rapid introduction of legislation that 
reduces civil liberties. Crime, Justice and Human Rights is timely with its emphasis on 
‘everyday’ policing, as contemporary events reveal how the everyday can become 
the exception. As noted by the authors in their introduction, where security looms as 
a political goal, human rights can provide the language and concepts to pose critical 
questions about the harms, benefits and limits of state action and inaction. 
This is a standout book. It is an achievement in moving criminologists and aspiring 
criminologists from their comfort zones by enabling them to see the potential of 
intertwining criminology and human rights. The book does this well, not least 
because it is an accessible read, and applied sections of the text enable the reader to 
grasp the synergies in a tangible way.
But one is first required to do a bit of hard work. By necessity, the authors take us 
along the human rights journey through schools of philosophical thought and tenets 
of international law. The focus here is less specific to criminology and hence likely 
to be an attraction for other disciplines with a burgeoning interest in human rights. 
These early sections do not presuppose prior knowledge, which makes it likely that 
human rights novices will take to the book. 
Governments frequently position human rights as applicable only to countries that 
Western democracies condemn as human rights violators. The book’s venture into 
domestic issues alone is significant for two reasons. First, it avoids overly navigating 
tensions between the universal and relativist human rights contest. Second, it pays 
attention to human rights concerns within Australia, which are frequently glossed 
over by government, professions, media and the community. 
I found that the text particularly spoke to me in its analysis of human rights and civil 
society. In Australia, human rights is not a favoured concept in political discourse 
and, despite a robust consultation a few years back, national human rights legislation 
has not been introduced. This causes Australia to stand out among Western nations as 
a human rights avoider. Particularly pertinent in this chapter is that it locates human 
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rights beyond government by appealing to the moral responsibility of all of us as 
civil society actors. 
Another section that resonates is the call to build a culture of human rights, which can 
be as important as legislative and policy measures by privileging a moral perspective. 
For people working in everyday environments or in more complex policing or 
correctional settings, a human rights culture can set the scene for how people are 
treated by those holding powerful positions. As only two jurisdictions in Australia 
have introduced human rights legislation, it remains untested as to whether the 
laws have resulted in social and cultural change — an argument that human rights 
advocates often propose in favour of law, as the authors highlight. 
Discussion that moves beyond prevailing constructs of individual rights is in 
chapter 4, which discusses collective rights. It is these rights that most directly 
challenge neo-liberal conceptions, resulting in divided opinion on protections for 
specific groups — usually minorities that experience discrimination. Although the 
authors refer to the quest for recognition of collective rights for a range of groups, 
the Indigenous pursuit of self-determination is one of the most pressing matters 
facing the Australian nation. This is well recognised in criminology, as Indigenous 
disadvantage in the criminal justice system receives considerable attention from 
academic and practising criminologists. The long struggle to recognise Indigenous 
collective rights in Australia illustrates how collective rights are publicly debated and 
often negated. The pursuit of collective rights, along with arguments by supporters 
and opponents, is becoming increasingly apparent in the quest for constitutional 
recognition of Indigenous peoples — including the form of wording that this will 
take. 
With my radical tendencies, I am attracted to the term ‘protest human rights 
criminology’ in chapter 5, which explores the views of those subscribing to critical 
criminology principles. In doing so, the authors draw from the work of critical 
criminologists with varying ideological positions, including those who assert the 
moral obligation to incorporate human rights in both theory and research and those 
who advocate solidarity with the human rights movement as a foundation for 
activism. 
For newcomers to human rights, I highly recommend the section on applying human 
rights in criminology. In seven chapters, this section presents issues of concern to 
everyday criminology. The first in this section provides some nuance on criminal 
law, which exceeds most texts on this topic by including counter-terrorism and state 
crime. This chapter is highly engaging. Other chapters include crime prevention, 
including violence against women, policing, criminal courts, detention, juvenile 
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justice and victims. Readers will find synergies with their own worldviews, schools 
of intellectual thought and criminology principles to which they may subscribe. From 
my perspective as a critical human rights social worker, I was pleasantly surprised 
to see commonalities with critical criminology. And social work too is a profession 
that has been slow to embrace human rights in practice. As with criminology, many 
adherents perceive legal dominance rather than visioning the prospects of adopting a 
discursive, interdisciplinary and applied human rights approach to practice. 
The text is striking in its breadth, depth, academic rigour and accessible writing 
style. A co-authored book is not an easy achievement, but the pooling of collective 
wisdom has enabled the work to fully achieve its goal of building bridges between 
the knowledge domains of criminology and human rights. As the authors posit from 
the outset, human rights can be fraught territory, but they see human rights as an 
important framing for criminologists and they present convincing arguments that 
have the potential to ensure that human rights and criminology are conjoined. In 
concluding, the authors point out that although a criminology for human rights may 
take many forms, it is recognised by the primacy it accords to the wellbeing of all 
people and the social groups to which they belong. If this is an accepted premise by 
criminologists from different theoretical and applied persuasions, then it seems that 
the discipline has much to offer the quest for a better Australia and for realising the 
rights of the marginalised groups that criminologists encounter. ●
Linda Briskman 
Professor of Human Rights 
Swinburne Institute 
Email: lbriskman@swin.edu.au
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The Politics of Global Supply Chains
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Polity Press, 2014, 254 pages
In recent years, much has been written about globalisation and the positive and 
negative impacts of business on human rights, and how, why and if the corporate 
sector should be more engaged in both respecting and protecting rights. The debate 
has largely moved from ‘if’ business should be engaged with human rights, to ‘how’ 
(although there remains a set of persistent objectors who dispute this paradigm shift). 
But, as the role and influence of corporations have increased globally, so too has the 
confusion around what specifically is required of them. And, if there are expectations 
that companies should be engaged more substantially with human rights, what 
is the best mechanism for doing so? The Politics of Global Supply Chains tackles the 
thorny issue of how the ‘independent republic of the supply chain’ can be effectively 
regulated and what the roles of both government and non-state actors should be in 
this process. 
Today’s global supply chains — which some regard as not only ungoverned but 
ungovernable — link individual workers with large and small companies across 
national, political and cultural boundaries. ‘In a world of 80,000 transnational 
corporations, ten times as many subsidiaries and countless national firms, many of 
which are small and medium-sized enterprises’ (Human Rights Council 2010, para 
82), any attempt to regulate this intricate web of production encounters multiple 
challenges. Human rights violations of workers in these supply chains are common 
and include harassment, discrimination, unsafe working conditions, low pay and 
long hours. Attempts to enforce fair labour standards on the factories and fields 
within these supply chains that stretch around the globe have had varied and 
somewhat limited success. The collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh in 
April 2013, killing over 1100 workers, indicates that there is still some way to go in 
establishing safer and more humane conditions for workers at the bottom of these 
supply chains.
What is becoming increasingly apparent, and what is examined in this book, is that 
for sustained improvements to occur, a multiplicity of stakeholders (both state and 
non-state actors) must be involved. Some of the most powerful global actors today 
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are companies, not governments.1 Logically, recourse to local laws and a system of 
enforcement and judicial relief in the host countries where global corporations operate 
should be the first option for ensuring greater respect for human rights. However, the 
reality is that in many countries this simply is not happening. In developing countries 
(but not exclusively so), laws are sometimes weak but enforcement weaker still and 
corruption can be endemic — reflecting that chronic failures of states to ensure that 
human rights are protected remains a long-term proposition. In this interesting study, 
Macdonald notes that in Nicaragua (the geographical focus of her book), there are 
only five factory inspectors working in the industrial sector in Managua (the capital 
of Nicaragua). The problem is not only their limited number, but that, in addition, 
‘they have no money and no petrol for the car. Between them they only have one small 
car, and sometimes it isn’t working’ (p 37). In order to overcome basic problems such 
as this, attempts to regulate supply chains such as those in the garment and coffee 
sectors in Nicaragua have looked beyond the state to involve multiple stakeholders, 
including unions, non-government organisations and companies.
The Politics of Global Supply Chains is a timely study of the power and governance 
structures at play in the value chains of some of the many and varied multinational 
companies that produce goods all around the world. As Macdonald notes, 
globalisation has resulted in an economy where ‘firms and countries no longer trade 
simply in raw materials and final products. Rather different firms and countries 
specialize not just in producing different products, but in different parts of different 
products, each focusing variously on design, assembly, marketing and so on’ (p 2). 
The regulatory challenges in policing this vast network of specialised supply chains 
extend beyond the control of any one nation state and increasingly need to involve a 
variety of non-state actors. Macdonald provides an overview of the development of, 
and reliance on, some of these private governance models and provides an in-depth 
case study of some multi-stakeholder initiatives at play in the garment and coffee 
sectors in Nicaragua. Not everyone agrees that non-state governance is always either 
appropriate or effective, but too often criticisms are based on generalities and many 
of these multi-stakeholder mechanisms differ vastly from one to another. By delving 
deeply into the mechanics of the governance models that have been tried and tested 
1 For example, in 2013, the revenue of Wal-Mart ($473 billion) was equivalent to the GDP of Taiwan 
($484 billion). Wal-Mart employs over 2.2 million people worldwide. As the the world’s third-largest 
employer, it ‘has a workforce that trails only the militaries of the United States and China in size’ 
(Human Rights Watch 2013, 29). Other top Fortune 500 companies include Exxon Mobil ($407 billion; 
Thailand’s GDP is $400 billion); Chevron ($228 billion; Ireland’s GDP is $220 billion); Berkshire 
Hathaway ($182 billion; New Zealand’s GDP is $181 billion); and Apple ($170 billion; Vietnam’s GDP is 
$170 billion). See Fortune 2014; Central Intelligence Agency 2013.
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in Nicaragua, Macdonald is able to provide the reader with much-needed lessons 
learned — including the need for improved collaboration and alignment between 
state and non-state governance mechanisms. 
Improving workplace conditions is a process of progressive realisation. Global 
supply chains are characterised by relentless pressures on prices and lead-times 
and the corresponding effect is the deterioration of working conditions at the 
bottom of the supply chain. While a diverse range of initiatives (some initiated by 
states and others by non-state actors) aimed at curbing violations of workers’ rights 
have proliferated in recent decades, it is also clear that such initiatives have been 
unable to stem the flow of human rights violations. This should not be taken as an 
indication that such measures are altogether devoid of merit. Initiatives, including 
those highlighted in this book, that have relied on the development of soft law via 
such tools as codes of conduct can play a vital role in internalising human rights 
norms within corporations and solidifying the notion that corporations have duties 
with respect to shareholders and stakeholders (including workers in their supply 
chain) alike — a process that, in time, can shape the standards of care that are legally 
expected of business. ●
Justine Nolan 
Deputy Director, Australian Human Rights Centre  
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales 
Email: justine.nolan@unsw.edu.au
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